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                                              ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the thesis was to critically compare termination of contracts in South Africa, 
England and the CISG. It was found out that South Africa prefers to use the term cancellation 
because it is a remedy of last resort. The problem with cancellation is that is a drastic step of 
bringing the transaction to an abrupt and premature end, which is only used when a material 
breach occurs. English law uses the term discharge as it refers to the ending of the obligations 
under the contract when a breach occurred and represents the point at which one party is no 
longer bound by its’ contractual obligations and claims damages. Chapter 3 argued that 
though discharge goes beyond cancellation it does not cater for diverse domestic rules which 
need uniform international laws. Chapter 4 discussed and argued that avoidance is a term that 
was chosen by the CISG to end a contract when a fundamental breach occurs. There were 
problems on interpretation of terms and use of diverse domestic rules.  The advantage of the 
term avoidance is that it is a technical term adopted and given a uniform meaning in the 
CISG where interpretation of terms and diverse domestic rules did not apply. Avoidance 
furthermore comprised concepts of rescission and termination. From the above it was argued 
that South Africa needs to develop new terms for termination of a contract and create new    
laws along the lines of the CISG.   
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Chapter 1  
1.0 Background to the Study 
This study analyses the concepts of cancellation, discharge and avoidance as remedies for breach 
of contract in South Africa, England and the CISG respectively1.  The main emphasis of the 
study is to reveal and analyze the grounds and principles that are followed for cancellation, 
discharge and avoidance as remedy of breach in South Africa, England and the CISG. The 
principles and provisions forming decisions to cancel, discharge and avoid contracts need to be 
discussed and debated using selected landmark cases in order to establish which systems have 
robust mechanism to deal with breach of contract. The rules and regulations that protect 
contracts also need to be analyzed in order to benchmark them to the best internationally 
harmonized2 standards to benefit contract law for South Africa, England and the CISG.  
Landmark cases need to be critically analyzed in order to explain and critically compare the 
different workings of contract law for South Africa, England and the CISG3. Analysis of 
different landmark cases under one study can provide a critical context to compare findings on 
how South Africa, England and the CISG determine what is a landmark case and how its 
meanings can bring out new insights to understand why cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
can be the most appropriate terms to describe remedy of breach.  The choice of landmark cases 
that this study uses should be justified because not all cases can assist in explaining why 
termination4 of contract in South Africa, England and the CISG is best understood in the terms 
such as cancellation, discharge and avoidance respectively.  
Legal scholars encourage new researchers on contract law to make use of cases for analysis from 
“…several jurisdictions from around the world, both domestic and international”.5  This is 
because new cases emerge, and expand the complexity of interpreting contract law. And, ‘old’ 
cases are sometimes re-interpreted anew in light of precedents set in the past. However, it is not 
possible to use all known legal cases to explain cancellation, discharge and avoidance as 
                                                          
1 In my LLB, Hons, I compared South African law of Contract and the CISG. In this study I add a new dimension 
and compare the South Africa contract law, the English contract Law and the CISG. 
2 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 2.  
3 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 2. 
4 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V. 
5 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V, 2. 
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remedies of breach. In South Africa, England and the CISG, ‘old’ and ‘new’ landmark cases are 
very much still open to further and diverse legal interpretations.  
Moreover, principle authorities on legal opinion on contract law in South Africa, England and 
the CISG do not always agree on matters of detail in their interpretation of why cancellation, 
discharge and avoidance should be viewed as apt descriptions of what should be considered 
remedies to breach, whether fundamental or not. These disagreements in legal opinion must not 
be viewed as distracting but as Bergsten6 correctly states“... judges trained in the law of their 
own domestic legal system, will have a home-State bias when faced with the need to interpret 
and apply the Convention.”  
The CISG neither applies directly to South Africa nor the United Kingdom but my study follows 
the wise and correct advice offered by scholars on the CISG7   which is that “a casebook serves 
as a selection process whereby those cases of particular interest and significance are emphasized 
and their legal reasoning discussed.”8 This view is relevant to my study and also realistic because 
“it is not only impractical, but also inefficient and laborious to discuss every case ever 
decided….”9  
The study seeks to illustrate the argument that the ambiguities of cancellation, discharge and 
avoidance are revealed in a comparative study. Such a study may show that the interpretation of 
any landmark case whether from South Africa, England and the CISG can protect the rights of 
the debtor or creditor depending on what aspects of the facts of the case have been highlighted.  
1.1 Statement of the Problem   
Although, South Africa, England and the CISG use cancellation, discharge and avoidance as 
remedy of breach of contract, these terms do not mean the same thing. And yet there has not 
been an in-depth study from a comparative perspective to reveal why the terms continue to be 
viewed as remedy of breach of contract. The grounds, requirements and principles for 
                                                          
6 Bergsten CISG IX.  
7 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V.   
8 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V.   
9 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V.   
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cancellation, discharge and avoidance are not similar and yet there are few comparative studies10 
that critically explore the effects of those differences to the concepts of remedy of breach of 
contract in South Africa, England and the CISG. Extant studies have either limited their focus on 
South Africa11, England12 and the CISG13 or offered limited comparisons between England and 
the CISG14 and South Africa and the CISG.15 There is, therefore, need to work with well-defined 
and elaborate terms16 when stating the grounds for cancellation, discharge and avoidance. 
Considering the inadequacy of the resource of language to capture with precision the content of 
concepts, in contract law there appears to be a “wrestle”17 with words and meanings when 
attempting to define the term ‘fundamental breach’ or ‘material breach’.  
Additionally, in contract law, the difficulties posed by literal interpretation18 as opposed to 
metaphorical interpretation of contract law can be a challenge to legal experts when applying the 
rule-book19. Thus, it is hoped that while the use and interpretation of precedent cases can 
encourage uniformity in contract laws based on the authority of previous case rulings, there still 
is need to use cases from different regional blocs. This need cannot be overemphasized because 
over reliance on municipal laws can be too generalized20 while lack of finely detailed 
provisions21 and ignorance on well recognized international texts and comparative law22 may 
lead to narrowing of legal opinions on breach and their remedies.  
In comparative legal studies, uncritically applying the doctrine of stare decisis can impose 
narrow interpretive frameworks on new cases of breach of contract and its remedies. This can 
slow or even impede contract law reform.23 The result could be unfair legal judgments due to the 
discrepancies in the interpretation of the theory and the application of rules on the actual ground. 
                                                          
10 Yovel CISG 398,402,440-2; Eiselen 1996 SALJ 334; Clive and Hutchinson Breaches 176; Eiselen 2001 SAMLJ 
15.  
11 Hutchinson and Pretorius  Contracts 67. 
12 Beatson et al Contracts 78. 
13 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V. 
14 Eiselen 1996 SALJ 334.   
15 Eiselen  Remedies  15 
16 Eiselen  Interpretation 63-64. 
17 Hoffman Intolerable 124  
18 Eiselen Interpretation 61-62. 
19 Barnard Thesis 55.  
20 Since South Africa is not a member of the CISG, it does not benefit directly from CISG’s forms of standardized 
contract laws that are well harmonized and uniform. 
21 Zeller Sales 627-639. 
22 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales V. 
23 Aziz Decisis 66-73. 
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My current study agrees with Eiselen24 when he suggests that there is need to up-dated the 
definitions, tools, terms, and vocabulary of contract law.  
This present study uses a comparative approach to explain cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
as remedy to breach of contract. However, there is a need to provide a brief context that should 
justify why it is important to compare English sale law, South Africa sale law and the CISG. 
Changes in socio-political and economic levels of advancement in the context of globalization 
affect legislative intention, legislative history, and influence or engineer the laws that States 
construct, use, amend or adopt in dealing with dispute resolution in contracts law. England and 
South Africa are not members of the CISG. Despite this fact English and South African sales law 
recognize the differences between primary contractual remedy regimes of common law versus 
civil law systems. Damages constitute the primary remedy for English law. Civil law systems 
have a strong adherence to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.25 The differences between the 
primary remedies for breach of contract under South African and English law are most relevant 
for interpreting and understanding the differences between cancellation and discharge under 
South African law and English law respectively.  
It is, therefore, imperative to compare the two systems with the CISG that accommodates 
common law and civil law systems. Furthermore the CISG is most relevant for England which is 
a European Union member in light of the fact that all EU member states with the exception of 
Portugal are CISG contracting states.26 The CISG upon adoption becomes the domestic law of 
the country, but that there is an imperative in relation to Art 7 of the CISG, to interpret it in view 
of its international nature. It, therefore, creates a parallel sales regime, one for domestic sales and 
another for international sales.27  
The study hopes to manifest potential ambiguities in the “uniformity and diversity [within] the 
law of international sale’.28 The comparative and interpretive methods29 used in my current study 
can contribute to the growing scholarship aimed at explaining how best to harmonize the rules 
                                                          
24 Eiselen Interpretation 61-90. 
25 South Africa has a mixed legal system evidencing both common law and civil law influences. 
26 My study does not address the new development that saw England successfully vote to move out of the EU after a 
referendum on the 23rd of June 2016. This study was carried out before BREXIT. 
27 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey. Sales, V, 2. 
28 Bridge Uniformity PILR 55. 
29 The value of these two methods are well elaborated in the section on methodology of this study in this chapter. 
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and regulations in contract law. This may assist in strengthening and tightening the requirements 
and principles followed for cancelling, discharging and avoiding as remedies of breach in South 
Africa, England and the CISG.   
1.2 Aim of the Study 
Therefore, the main aim of this study is to offer a critical and comparative analysis of 
cancellation, discharge and avoidance as remedies of breach of contract in South Africa, England 
and the CISG, respectively.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Thus, by the end of study it is hoped that: 
• The terms cancellation, discharge and avoidance are analysed in their context of South 
Africa, England and the CISG respectively; 
• Landmark cases, both old and new drawn from different regional blocs are analysed to 
demonstrate how and why cancellation, discharge and avoidance are considered as 
remedies of breach of contract in South Africa, England and the CISG; 
• Comparative and interpretive theories are applied to the analysis of the actual landmark 
cases to demonstrate how cancellation, discharge and avoidance reveal the different ways 
they are understood as remedy of breach in South Africa, England and the CISG and that; 
• The grounds and principles that are followed for cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
are evaluated in order to determine to what extent they promote a rigorous and 
harmonized system of rules and regulations that should be considered as the best practice 
and emulated to strengthen contract law in South Africa, England and the CISG.    
1.4 Research Questions of the study 
The four research questions of the study are:  
• What are the terms used to define termination under South Africa, England and the 
CISG?  
• What are the requirements for cancellation, discharge and avoidance and how are they 
similar or different for South Africa, England and the CISG?  
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• To what extent does a critical comparison and evaluation of the similarities or difference 
in the concepts of cancellation, discharge and avoidance assist in strengthening contract 
law for South Africa, England and the CISG?30  
• To what extent does a critical comparison and evaluation of the similarities or difference 
in the concepts of cancellation, discharge and avoidance construct and manifest their 
explanatory potential as remedy of breach in South Africa, England and the CISG? 
These questions are relevant to this study because they assist in streamlining or narrowing the 
area of research enquiry. The questions also usefully structure the argument of the study to 
remain focused on the critical analysis of cancellation, discharge and avoidance as remedy of 
breach of contract in South Africa, England and the CISG.  
1.5 Chapter organization 
Chapter one is the introduction of the study. The chapter defines the area of study, provides 
justification, outlines methods used in the research and identifies a suitable theoretical 
framework of the study.  
Chapter two explores in detail why cancellation is a remedy of breach, explains the grounds for 
cancellation and the principles followed for cancellation in South Africa. The chapter argues that 
the presence of some weaknesses in South African contract law calls for the need to think of 
ways to upgrade the system so that it should be at par with best practices in international contract 
law.31 
Chapter three analyses in detail the principles that the English law follows when discharge is 
used as a remedy for breach of contract.  The assumption of the chapter is that English law’s 
longer history of efforts to harmonize contract law is an advantage. This assumption is tested 
against the best practices in international contract law of sale.32  
Chapter four focuses on the CISG and argues that continued scholarly debate on avoidance as 
remedy of breach can be taken as evidence of the advanced nature of the CISG.  This argument 
                                                          
30 These four questions are recalled and used in the same ways in chapters two, three, four and five, first to structure 
in a consistent way the whole study, and second, to assist in explaining different concepts that are described as 
remedies of breach in three contexts of South Africa, England and the CISG  
31 Eiselen  Adoption SLJ 330 
32 Beatson et al Contracts 1. 
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is modified by the observation made in the chapter which is that the fact alone that CISG 
continues to be studied is an admission that more needs to be done to harmonize the CISG 
laws.33    
Chapter five is the conclusion. The chapter recalls the four research questions of the study that 
are then used to structure the critical discussion that compares and evaluate the similarities and 
differences in cancellation, discharge and avoidance as remedies of breach in South African law, 
English law and the CISG. The chapter offers recommendations and suggests possible and future 
research areas in international contract law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Bridge Uniformity PILR 55; Bridge Sales 5. 
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2.0 Chapter 2: Cancellation under South African law   
2.1 Introduction 
In South Africa when a contract comes to an end, it is described as having been terminated, 
repudiated, rescinded or avoided.34 Although South Africa is not a member of the CISG, South 
Africa recognizes the differences between primary contractual remedy regimes of common law 
versus civil law systems. South Africa’s sales law has a strong adherence to the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda.35 In South Africa, cancellation is the term most popularly being used to describe 
the termination of a contract due to breach. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to critically 
explore why and with what implications cancellation is considered a remedy to breach of 
contract36. This chapter argues that cancellation is complex; its interpretation depends on 
context, which is whether or not it is the debtor or creditor who has defaulted.  
2.2.0 Terms for termination in South Africa 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The name of the remedy and the process are paramount in deciding a term for ending a 
contractual relationship. Terms used in South Africa include repudiation, rescission and 
cancellation. The non-fulfillment of the contractual obligations may lead to termination of a 
contract37. Obligations are terminated either by performance, by agreement, and by operation of 
law after a breach of contract that is sufficiently serious to allow the aggrieved party38 to 
terminate. If either party, by an act or omission and without lawful excuse, fails in any way to 
honor its contractual obligations, it commits a breach of contract.39 The manner in which a party 
commits a breach that leads to ending of a contractual obligation is what is important when 
considering the name of the remedy being considered.  If a breach is sufficiently serious to merit 
termination, the innocent party can uphold the contract or insist on its fulfillment, or rescind the 
contract, tender the return of the other party’s performance and claim restitution.40 Cancellation 
                                                          
34 Van der Merwe et al Contracts 308; Hutchinson and Pretorious Contracts;   Hutchinson Breaches, 279,297-300, 
304, 306; Kerr Contracts  88;  Eiselen Remedies 324, 348. 
35 South Africa has a mixed legal system evidencing both common law and civil law influences. 
36 Eiselen Remedies 348.  
37 Hawthorn and Lotz Contracts 195. 
38 Naude Termination 373, 2010  
39 Eiselen Remedies 346.  Hutchinson Breaches, 278, 308. 
40 Hutchinson Breaches 278. 
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is an extra ordinary remedy as it is aimed at undoing the whole transaction and only available in 
limited circumstances.41 
 
2.2.2 Repudiation 
 
Repudiation is a term sometimes used for termination in South Africa under the influence of 
English law. Repudiation is a form of breach and not a method of terminating a contract. This is 
supported by Van der Merwe et al 42 who say that repudiation is an unlawful conduct,43 which 
shows that one does not intend to comply with one’s duties of the contract.44 The conduct may 
take the form of a positive act or omission, or by mere failure to perform. There must be at least 
words or other conduct that can reasonably be interpreted as anticipating mal-performance.45 
Repudiation entitles the innocent party to cancel the contract due to material breach. For 
example, in Sonia (Pty) Ltd v Wheeler, 46 claims for cancellation were considered normal and 
desirable since the status of the contract was not in doubt and was well recognised. Repudiation 
is technically a breach of contract and not the exercise of a remedy. 
2.2.3 Rescission 
Rescission47 is an exceptional step or remedy that can be taken by a party to a contract in 
exceptional circumstances. If a party has the right to rescind, then the party can exercise this 
right by bringing the normal working of a contract to an end.48 Following upon rescission the 
party may have certain remedies that it can enforce. The remedy should be described as 
cancellation than rescission and reserve the word rescission for cases where, typically because of 
a misrepresentation inducing the contract, it is desired to set it aside ab initio. The object of 
cancellation is to terminate primary obligations of a contract there and then.49 Therefore, 
rescission is not the appropriate word to be best used. 
                                                          
41 Eiselen Remedies 308.  
42 Van der Merwe et al Contracts 308; Christie and Brad field Contracts  527, 538-540. 
43 Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intermarket (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 239. 
44 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 SCA 342E.   
45 Ankon CC v Tadcor Properties (Pty) Ltd (1991) (3) SA 119 ( C ) 121I- 122C. 
46 Sonia  (Pty) Ltd v wheeler 1958 1 SA 555 ( A ) 560-1. 
47 Joubert Principles 236; Christie and Brad field Contracts 561. 
48 Federal Tobacco Works v Barron & Co 1904 TS 483. 
49 Christie Contracts 596. 
10 
 
2.2.4 Cancellation 
Cancellation50 is a term that is used to depict ending or termination of contractual relationships. 
Cancellation is a drastic remedy which allows a party to terminate a contract when the other 
party has committed a serious breach that deserves ending a contract. Cancellation of a contract 
is a unilateral act which terminates certain consequences of a valid contract.51 Cancellation 
entails a drastic step of bringing the transaction to an abrupt and premature end, contrary to the 
original intentions of the parties. A party is awarded cancellation for a sufficiently serious, or 
material breach.52 This extra-ordinary remedy depends on the nature and seriousness of breach.53 
In case of a major breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to terminate the contract by cancelling 
it. However, in the case of a minor breach, a party may not cancel since it is normally only 
entitled to a specific performance and/or damages. The onus of proving that the breach is major 
lies on the party asserting it.54  
2.2.5 Conclusion  
There are a number of terms used in South Africa to show the act of termination, breaches and 
remedies which include repudiation, rescission and cancellation. Repudiation is technically a 
breach of contract and not the exercise of a remedy. Rescission is an exceptional step or remedy 
that can be used to terminate primary obligations of a contract there and then55The remedy 
should be described as cancellation than rescission and reserve the word rescission for cases 
where, typically because of a misrepresentation inducing the contract, it is desired to set it aside 
ab initio. Cancellation56 is a term that is used to depict ending or termination of contractual 
relationships. Cancellation is a drastic remedy which allows a party to terminate a contract when 
the other party has committed a serious breach that deserves ending a contract. Therefore, this 
study chooses to use the term cancellation because it is a unilateral act of a valid contract57 
which entails a drastic step of bringing the transaction to an abrupt and premature end, contrary 
                                                          
50 Sharrock Business 724-734. 
51  Christie Contracts 539 (para 11.44) 
52 Eiselen Remedies 113.    
53 Eiselen Remedies 347-8; Van der Merwe et al Contracts 327, 343 and  Hawthorn and Pretorius Contracts 341. 
54 Kerr Contracts 525. 
55 Christie Contracts 596. 
56 Sharrock Business 724. 
57  Christie Contract 539 . 
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to the original intentions of the parties.58 The next section below critically analyses the 
requirements of cancellation in South African contract law.  
2.3 Requirements for Cancellation  
2.3.1 Introduction 
There are three major requirements for cancellation under South African law.59 These factors or 
grounds for cancellation are the materiality of breach, notice of cancellation and mutual 
restitution. In terms of South African law, a breach of contract in itself does not bring the 
contract to an end. It provides to the innocent party choice of remedies, which will vary 
according to the nature and seriousness of the breach. In the case of a major breach of contract, 
the aggrieved party is entitled to terminate the contract by cancelling it. Additionally, the 
innocent party has an election between cancellation and keeping the contract intact. The innocent 
party must also exercise this election within a reasonable period of time. A failure to make the 
election within a reasonable period of time, will lead to the inevitable conclusion that the 
innocent party has elected to keep the contract intact. However, in the case of a minor breach, a 
party may not cancel since it is normally only entitled to specific performance and/or damages.  
In short, materiality of breach is a requirement for cancellation whereby a breach has to be 
serious enough to justify giving notice and electing to cancel. 
2.3.2 Materiality of Breach    
2.3.2.1 Introduction  
Van der Merwe et al60 argue that traditionally there are five forms of breaches. These forms of 
material breaches in South Africa are positive mal-performance, mora debitoris, mora creditoris, 
prevention of performance and repudiation.61 Time is an element common to all contracts and to 
decide the consequences of failure to perform a contractual obligation within the appropriate 
time the law employs the concept of mora. 62 Christie and Bradfield 63 classify these forms into 
                                                          
58 Hawthorn and Pretorius Contracts 341. 
59 Eiselen Remedies 325. 
60 Van der Merwe et al 290; Hutchinson  Breaches 306. 
61 Kerr Contracts 575;  Hutchinson and Pretorius  Breaches 278;   Van der Merwe et al 290;  Eiselen Remedies 308;  
   Joubert Principles 242. 
62 Christie and Bradfield Contracts  515. 
63 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 515. 
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negative mal-performance64(mora),positive mal-performance (defective performance), 
prevention of performance and repudiation.65  
Mora debitoris is a breach that occurs, when the debtor culpably fails to make timeous 
performance of his or her obligations66 that are due and enforceable and still possible of 
performance in spite of such failure.67 In contrast, mora creditoris occurs when the creditor 
culpably fails to cooperate timeously with the debtor so that the latter may perform his or her 
obligations.68 Prevention of performance occurs either when indivisible performance is always 
available or divisible performance is available pro tanto. Repudiation occurs where one party, 
without lawful grounds, indicates to the other party, by word or conduct, a deliberate and 
unequivocal intention that all or some of the obligations arising from the contract will 
not be performed in accordance with its true tenor.69  
Parties can determine in the contract itself what will constitute a material breach for purposes of 
cancellation.70 This is usually done in conjunction with a cancellation clause in a written 
contract.71 De Villiers J in Kangisser v Rieton (Pty) Ltd72 stated that cancellation for mora in 
contracts of sale may occur where time is of the essence of the contract either on account of the 
surrounding circumstances affecting the business of the parties or the nature of the merx, or on 
account of an express term making time of the essence of the contract. An example can be seen 
in cases of mora debitoris when a when time is of the essence. In Greenfield Manufacturers 
(Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd, 73 Wessels JA sharpened the focus 
of the traditional inquiry by stressing that what is being looked for is a tacit term that failure to 
                                                          
64 Van der Merwe et al Contracts 290-291. 
65 Ally v Courtesy Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 1996 3 SA 134 (N) 149F-150H.  
66 Hutchinson Breaches  306. 
67 LAWSA Contract, @ 217. I van Zyl Seyn Mora Debitoris volgens die Romein-Hollandse reg (1929) 
68 Hutchinson Breaches 306. 
69 Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intermarket (Pty) Ltd  2001 (2) SA 284 (SCA) at 294H–I; Metalmil (Pty) 
Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd,  at 684–685B. 
70 Louw v TrustAdministrateurs Bpk 1971 1 SA 896 (W) 903D. 
71 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310  (T) at 311; Mahabeer v 
Sharma 1985 (3) SA 729 (A), South African Forestry Company v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 12937 (SCA) at 30 
para. 38. 
72 1952 4 SA 424 (T) 428. 
73 Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1952 4 SA 424 (T) 428 
13 
 
perform by the specified time entitles the other party to cancel.74 In Goldstein and Wolff v 
Maison Blanc (Pty) Ltd 75 it was stated that if a party who relies on the fact that ‘time is of the 
essence’ were simply to aver in the pleadings (1) that a definite time for performance was agreed 
upon and (2) that, in the event of a failure to perform timeously, the party would be entitled to 
repudiate the contract.” 76 
2.3.2.2 Mora debitoris as a breach 
2.3.2.2.1 Introduction  
A debtor is in mora in respect of a particular obligation when three elements are present. First, 
the obligation must be enforceable against him.77 Second, performance must be due.78 Third, the 
debtor must be or be deemed to be aware of the nature of the performance required of him and 
the fact that it is due.79 Mora debitoris is a breach that occurs when the debtor culpably fails to 
make timeous performance of his or her obligations80 that are due and enforceable and still 
possible of performance in spite of such failure.81 The time for performance must have been 
fixed, either in the contract (mora ex re) or by a subsequent demand for the performance (mora 
ex persona) and the debtor must have failed to perform timeously.82 The concept of mora is used 
to decide the consequences of failure to perform a contractual obligation by a party within the 
appropriate time.83  
 
2.3.2.2.2 Requirements for mora debitoris  
                                                          
74 Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1952 4 SA 424 (T) 428. “In 
effect, the trial Court held that it had been proved by a preponderance of probability that the parties had agreed 
(1) expressly, that delivery was to be effected within 8 weeks from 19 June 1973 (ie by not later than 14 August 
1973) and (2) tacitly, that respondent would be entitled, at its election, to repudiate the contract in the event of a 
failure by appellant to effect delivery within the stipulated time.  
75 1948 (4) SA 446 (C) at  453. 
76 See also Rautenbach v Venner 1928 TPD 26; Racec (Mooifontein) (Pty) Ltd v Devonport Investment Holding Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 299 (W) 301–302; Kabinet van die Oorgangsregering vir die Gebied van SuidwesAfrika v 
Supervision Food Services (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 967 (SWA). 
77 Christie and Bradfield Contracts  515. 
78 whether by operation of law (mora ex lege), by the terms of the contract (mora ex re) or by demand duly made 
by the creditor (mora ex persona). 
79 Legogote Development Co (Pty) Ltd v Delta Trust and Finance Co 1970 1 SA 584 (T) 587; cf Victoria Falls and 
Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 .  
80  Van der Merwe et al 291.  Hutchinson and Pretorius Breaches 276;  Christie and Brad field Contracts 515, 513. 
81 LAWSA Contract, @ 217. I Van Zyl Seyn Mora Debitoris volgens die Romein-Hollandse reg (1929) 
82Hutchinson Breaches 306. 
83  Christie and Brad field Contracts 515, 513. 
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(c) Where time is of the essence  
Mora debitoris is terminology borrowed from English law and accepted in South African law, 
when “time is of the essence”. The following requirements must be met before the debtor can be 
said to be in mora. The obligation to pay the debt must be enforceable against the debtor. The 
debt or performance must be due.84 When one says time is of the essence of a contract one 
means that failure to perform by the time specified must be regarded as a justifying cancellation 
of the contract. 85  The circumstances in which a ‘mercantile transaction proper’ is concluded and 
the terms thereof might afford cogent evidence that the parties had in fact agreed that ‘time is of 
the essence’.86 This is a matter of fact not law proved by a tacit cancellation clause.87  
 
When time is not of the essence an express or tacit forfeiture clause, the creditor would be 
confined, on the debtor’s failure to perform even a vital term, or important term or a term going 
to the root of the contract for cancellation.88 The concept of mora is used to decide the 
consequences of failure to perform a contractual obligation by a party within the appropriate 
time89. The time for performance must have been fixed, either in the contract or by a subsequent 
demand for performance, and the debtor must have failed to perform timeously. Such failure to 
perform must be due to the fault of the debtor and the debtor must be aware of the nature of the 
performance required90:  
(a) the creditor stipulates for itself the right to resile;  
(b) the contract does not contain an express or tacit lex commissoria but the creditor notifies 
the debtor of his intention to cancel should performance not take place within a period 
stated in the notice, which period must be reasonable. Such a notice is known as a notice 
of rescission91; 
                                                          
84  Performance must be due. Performance can be due by operation of law (mora ex lege), by the terms of a 
contract or by demand made by the creditor (mora ex persona) p551,Christie 
85 Christie and Bradfield 2011  Contracts, 529. 
86 Goldstein and Wolff v Maison Blanc (Pty) Ltd 1948 (4) SA 446 (C) at p 453. 
87 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 523-24. 
88 Sweet v Ragerguhara 1978 1 SA 131 (D) 136–137. 
89 Christie and Brad field Contracts, 515, 513. 
90 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 529 
91 Hawthorn and Lotz Cases 206. 
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(c) if there is an express or implied lex commissoria (cancellation clause) to the effect that 
failure to perform timeously entitles the creditor to cancel, or if creditor has made time of 
the essence by sending the debtor a notice of rescission.  
Nel v Cloete 92 illustrates the context in which mora debitoris can be ascertained. Cloete sold a 
house to Nel and paid a deposit. Parties agreed that the balance was to be paid against transfer 
but Cloete delayed transfer. This case provides authoritative answers to the questions when the 
debtor is in culpable delay (mora debitoris) when the parties did not expressly or tacitly agree on 
a time for performance and when a creditor may resile form a contract because of delay.93 The 
general rule is that where no date for performance is stipulated, a debtor is obliged to perform 
within a reasonable time. However, should the debtor fail to do so, it is not yet in mora. The 
debtor must be placed in mora by a means of a demand plus notice of rescission94 as this notice 
does not terminate the agreement but creates the right for the innocent party to do so at a later 
date. If it then fails to perform within a reasonable time, it will be in mora ex persona.95 A 
demand will, however, only then have the effect of placing the debtor in mora if the period 
allowed in the demand was reasonable. It is argued that if the period allowed is unreasonable the 
demand is invalid and without legal effect. The debtor will have to be served with a fresh 
demand.96 In other words, when the breach of mora debitoris occurs, time is an element of 
essence common to all contracts, and enables the court to determine the materiality of the breach 
and finally allows the courts to decide the consequences of failure to perform a contractual 
obligation within the appropriate time.   
In South African law, the general principle is that, in the case of a contract in which no time for 
performance has been fixed the defaulting party should be placed in mora by an interpellatio 
coupled with a notice of rescission97 "within a reasonable time" after obligation to do so had 
arisen. In Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration,98 the onus 
was on the contractor to establish that the employer had failed to issue drawings and instructions 
                                                          
92 1972 (2) SA 150 (A).  
93 Nel v Cloet 1972 (2) SA 150 (A.) 
94 Eiselen Remedies 323.  
95 Hawthorn and Lotz Cases 207-8. 
96  Hawthorn and Lotz Cases 207-8. 
97 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310  (T) 311. 
98 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310  (T) 311. 
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timeously. Moreover in the above case, the significance of the notion "time is of the essence of 
the contract" is that it pertains to the question of cancellation and not to breach. Time would have 
to relate to the consequences of the breach and not to the breach itself. And the question whether 
a failure to perform timeously constitutes a breach of contract or not, does not depend upon 
whether time is of the essence of the contract. 
Exceptions are that, a mere failure to perform or mere non-performance in the absence of a fixed 
time for performance, although it may constitute a ground for a defense of exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus, cannot give rise to a claim for damages because it can never be a breach. It 
affords no answer to contend that interpellatio is unnecessary where a debtor happens to know or 
ought to have known when a reasonable time (within which to perform) has elapsed. The basic 
requirement of a proper demand (interpellatio) is that it must state a certain date on or before 
which the debtor is required to perform, and it must make it clear to the debtor that the creditor 
insists upon performance by that date. 
The Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 99 clearly addresses 
the issue of whether or not time is of essence to a written contract when no time for performance 
was fixed and the guilty party fails to perform timeously. The facts of the case are that the 
plaintiff and defendant entered into an engineering contract. Defended appointed an engineer. In 
terms of clause 15 (1) of the general conditions of contract, in the above case, the plaintiff was to 
execute, complete and maintain the works in strict accordance with the contract to the 
satisfaction of the engineer.  
But clause 60 (A) (iv) 100 clearly states that  
…if the contractor be dissatisfied with a decision of the employer on any matter,  
question or dispute of any kind... the contractor may within 28 days after receiving notice 
of the decision of the employer give notice to the director in writing of his intention to 
take  the matter in dispute to a court of law... Such disputes... shall not be taken to a court 
of law until after the completion or alleged completion of the works unless with the 
written consent of the employer and contractor ..."  
 
                                                          
99 1977 (4) SA 310  (T), 312. 
100 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310 (T), 312.  
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The doctrine of freedom of contract allows contracting parties to insert clauses in the agreement 
that stipulates clearly when a breach such as mora debitoris will entitle a party to cancel. In 
Goldstein and Wolff v Maison Blanc (Pty) Ltd 101 the trial court argued that  
if a party who relies on the fact that ‘time is of the essence’ were simply to aver in the pleadings 
(1) that a definite time for performance was agreed upon and (2) that, in the event of a failure to 
perform timeously, the party would be entitled to repudiate the contract. 
  
The stated position taken by the  court in the above primary case is also followed up in 
Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd. 102 In 
this case ‘definite time for performance’ was to be effected within 8 weeks from 19 June 1973 
but not later than 14 August 1973. The parties also agreed that the innocent party would be 
entitled, at its election, to repudiate the contract in the event of a failure by appellant to effect 
delivery within the stipulated time. The two cases above demonstrate the significance of time 
and choice to elect to cancel. However, what makes time of the essence is in fact a tacit forfeiture 
clause. 103 
 
But there appears to be conflict of authority in that when no time for performance is fixed but 
time is of the essence the debtor is not in mora and the creditor cannot cancel for non-
performance unless a proper demand for performance has been made.104 Trengove J pointed out 
that105 the concept of time is of the essence relates to the consequences of a breach and not to the 
breach itself. Trengove J in the above case106 can be viewed as authority to measure the validity 
of the argument about the essence of time to a written contract when no time for performance 
was fixed and the guilty party fails to perform timeously in respect of the implied obligation to 
furnish drawings and instructions. The nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances 
and the inquiry in the cases has been directed to whether it ought to be concluded that time was 
                                                          
101 1948 (4) SA 446 (C) at p 453. 
102 prompt delivery or payment is necessary to keep the wheels of commerce or industry turning.  
 In Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1976 2 SA 565 (A) 569 as 
per Wessels JA. 
103 Birkenruth Estates (Pty) Ltd v Unitrans Motors (Pty) Ltd 2005 3 SA 54 (W) [25] stated that If the debtor is in mora 
ex re and there is no tacit forfeiture clause, the creditor cannot cancel the contract but may claim specific 
performance.  
104 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 530.  
105 in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal  Provincial Administration 1977 4 SA 310 (T) 347. 
106 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310  (T) 347. 
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of the essence.107  However, in the case described above,108 time was not of the essence to the 
contract unless it was specifically made of the essence by means of an interpellatio coupled with 
a notice of rescission. Furthermore, a proper demand was a pre-requisite of the plaintiff's claim 
for damages based, as it was, on alleged mora debitoris.  
2.3.2.2.3 Conclusion to mora debitoris 
The above section debated the concept of mora debitoris. The discussion revealed that a debtor 
commits a breach if obligations are not performed at all, performed late, or performed in the 
wrong manner. Mora debitoris entitles or warrants cancellation of a contract. But certain 
requirements must be considered. These are the presence of a cancellation clause, when “time is 
of the essence”, when time is not of essence and a material breach is present. The debtor 
stipulates for itself the right to resile, when contract does not contain an express or tacit lex 
commissoria and notifies the creditor using a notice of rescission. It was also noted in the 
discussion that other critics emphasize that the significance of the notion "time is of the essence 
of the contract" relates to the consequences of the breach and not to the breach itself. Therefore, 
the question whether or not a failure to perform timeously constitutes a breach of contract does 
not entirely depend upon whether time is of the essence of the contract. There appears to be 
conflict of authority in that when no time for performance is fixed but time is of the essence the 
debtor is not in mora and the creditor cannot cancel for nonperformance unless a proper demand 
for performance has been made. Having explained the nature and grounds for mora debitoris, it 
is crucial to understand the nature and grounds for mora creditoris. 
2.3.3 Mora creditoris as a breach 
2.3.3.1 Introduction  
Whereas, mora debitoris occurs when the creditor culpably fails to make timeous performance of 
its obligations, 109 mora creditoris occurs when the creditor culpably fails to cooperate timeously 
with the debtor so that the latter may perform his or her obligations110. Delay in performance or 
                                                          
107 Swartz & Son (Pty) Ltd v Wolmaransstad Town Council 1960 2 SA 1 (T);  Stapleford Estates (Pty) Ltd v Wright 
1968 1 SA 1 (E); Louw v TrustAdministrateurs Bpk 1971 1 SA 896 (W) 903D. 
108 Alfred Mcalpine & son (Pty) ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310  (T) 347. 
109 Van der Merwe et al Contracts 290.  Hutchinson and Pretorius Breaches 306. 
110 Hutchinson and Pretorius  Breaches 306 ; Van der Merwe et al Contracts 290-291. 
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the non-performance is traceable to the creditor mora.111 In Martin Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) 
Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens, the creditor’s failure to cooperate with the debtor to the extent 
necessary to enable the debtor to perform made him liable for mora creditoris.112 The duty to 
cooperate may arise from a demand by the debtor 113 or by lapse of the time fixed by the contract 
or the debtor.114  
 
2.3.3.2 Requirements for mora creditoris  
The essence of mora creditoris is the creditor’s failure to cooperate with the debtor to the extent 
necessary to enable the debtor to perform.115  The duty to cooperate may arise from a demand by 
the debtor or by lapse of the time fixed by the contract or the debtor116. When the delay in 
performance or the nonperformance is traceable to the creditor mora creditoris arises.117   
 
In Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd 118 
Wessels JA stressed that what is being looked for is a tacit term that failure to perform by the 
specified time entitles the other party to cancel.119  The creditor is in mora when he has refused a 
valid tender of performance by the debtor. The debtor’s obligation is not thereby discharged 
unless the creditor’s refusal is such as to amount to a repudiation of the whole contract. 120 
 
Cancellation for mora in contracts of sale may occur where time is of the essence of the contract 
or when time is not of essence.121 De Villiers J in Kangisser v Rieton (Pty) Ltd 122 stated that 
                                                          
111 Christie and Brad field  Contracts 533; Van der Merwe et al Contracts 290; Hutchinson and Pretorius Breaches 
306. 
112 Martin Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens 2000 3 SA 339 (A) [17]–[19]. 
113 Government of the Republic of South Africa v York Timbers Ltd (1) [2001] 2 All SA 51 (SCA) [60]. 
114 Martin Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens 2000 3 SA 339 (A) [17]–[19. 
115 Martin Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens 2000 3 SA 339 (A) [17]–[19]. 
116 Government of the Republic of South Africa v York Timbers Ltd (1) 2001 2 All SA 51 (SCA) [60]; Martin Harris & 
Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens 2000 3 SA 339 (A) [17]–[19. 
117 Christie and Brad field Contracts 533; Van der Merwe et al Contracts 290; Hutchinson and Pretorius Breaches 
306. 
118 1976 2 SA 565 (A) 569. 
119 “In effect, the trial Court held that it had been proved by a preponderance of probability that the parties had 
agreed (1) expressly, that delivery was to be effected within 8 weeks from 19 June 1973 (ie by not later than 14 
August 1973) and (2) tacitly, that respondent would be entitled, at its election, to repudiate the contract in the 
event of a failure by appellant to effect delivery within the stipulated time. 
120 See Christie and Brad field,  (2011),  Contracts, at 538–540. 
121 Van der Merwe et al  Contracts 290 ; Hutchinson and Pretorius  Breaches 306. 
122 1952 4 SA 424 (T) 428. 
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cancellation for mora in contracts of sale may occur where time is of the essence of the contract 
either on account of the surrounding circumstances affecting the business of the parties or the 
nature of the merx, or on account of an express term making time of the essence of the contract. 
Also where time is not of the essence (1) where the time for the performance is stipulated. (2) 
where the time for performance is not stipulated. 123 In Goldstein and Wolff v Maison Blanc (Pty) 
Ltd 124 states that if a party who relies on the fact that ‘time is of the essence’ were simply to aver 
in the pleadings (1) that a definite time for performance was agreed upon and (2) that, in the 
event of a failure to perform timeously, the party would be entitled to cancel the contract.” 
 
Ranch International Pipe Lines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (Qty) (Pty) Ltd 125 
illustrates the context in which mora creditoris can occur. Ranch International Pipelines was 
awarded a contract by Flour Engineers (SA) (Pty) Ltd for the construction of a pipeline but 
subcontracted with LMG Construction. Ranch unlawfully dismissed LMG. LMG made a counter 
application requesting Ranch to be interdicted from interfering with its (LMG's) right to 
complete the work. Ranch argued that it was the right of an employer to terminate and evict a 
building contractor any time before or during the performance. Ranch in addition relied on an 
alleged reluctance on the courts to order specific performance of a building contract. The court 
dismissed Ranch’s application and granted LMG’s counter application.   
Coetzee J 126  adopted the wide interpretation of the concept mora creditoris as failure to 
cooperate, applied it in deciding that an employer has no unilateral right of stoppage of a 
building or civil engineering contract.  Coetzee J 127  concluded that the duty of cooperating was 
enforceable by an order of specific performance or an interdict restraining interference. The 
creditor is in mora when he has refused a valid tender of performance by the debtor. The 
judgment contains an emphatic recognition of a creditor’s duty to co-operate to make it possible 
                                                          
123 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 530. 
124 1948 (4) SA 446 (C) it was stated at  453) 
125 1984 (3) SA 861 (W).  
126 Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 861 (W), para. 
877B–879F. 
127 Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 861 (W), para. 
877B–879F. 
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for the debtor to render performance.128 The debtor’s obligation is not discharged unless the 
creditor’s refusal amounts to a repudiation of the whole contract. 129  
In Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens v Martins Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms)130 a contractor had 
completed work, applied for the issuing of a progress certificate and payment. The contractor 
was not given his balance of payment and not issued with a progress report. The contractor 
approached the courts and claimed for the balance of the payment. In the above case 131, mora 
creditoris occurred when contractor could not perform due to the lack of co-operation of the 
creditor. Mora creditoris arose when contractor demanded for the progress certificate from the 
creditor. The creditor did not immediately commit a breach of contract by not delivering a 
progress certificate timeously. The obligation only meant that the creditor could be called upon 
to produce a progress certificate and pay the money.  Breach of contract by mora creditoris 
occurred only when the progress report was called for and money needed. Secondly, mora 
creditoris also meant that there could only be talk of breach of contract by mora creditoris were 
such a demand had in fact been made.132 The main effect of mora creditoris is to shift 
responsibility for further delay or nonperformance onto the creditor, whether or not the debtor 
was previously in mora debitoris. 133 The risk of destruction, damage or loss lies with the 
creditor 134 and if any property which the creditor ought to have accepted remains in the hands of 
the debtor, the debtor is only liable for dolus and culpa lata in caring for it.  
 
The effect of mora creditoris in making it impossible for the debtor to perform on time is evident 
when a contract contains a lex commisoria as explained by De Villiers JP when he argued that 
the creditor cannot 135 “alter the contract dates, nor can he put the defaulting buyer in a worse 
legal position by tendering, after the expiration of the contract period, a delivery which is not, in 
fact, in accordance with the contract, as it is not made within the contract time.” The creditor is 
                                                          
128 Hawthorn and Lotz Contracts 219. 
129  Christie and Bradfield Contracts 538–540. 
130 BPK 2000 (3) SA 339 (SCA) Paragraphs [37] and [38] at 355H - 356B 
131 Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens v Martins Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms BPK 2000 (3) SA 339 (SCA) Paragraphs [37] and 
[38] at 355H - 356B 
132 Paragraphs [18] and [19] at 349C - D and 349H/I - 350A.) 
133 Christie and Bradfield Contracts 538–540, 534. 
134  D 19 2 36; D 24 3 26; D 46 3 72 pr. 
135  Leviseur & Co v Highveld Supply Stores1922 OPD  233 239;  Leviseur v Frankfort Boere Ko Operatieve 
Vereeniging 1921 OPD   80. 
22 
 
therefore not entitled to use the delay or non-performance for which he is responsible as a 
foundation for a claim for damages or cancellation against the debtor,136 but the debtor is entitled 
to claim against the creditor. 137  
Mora creditoris shifts responsibility for further delay or nonperformance onto the creditor, 
whether or not the debtor was previously in mora debitoris. The creditor is, therefore, not 
entitled to use the delay or nonperformance for which he is responsible as a foundation for a 
claim for damages or cancellation against the debtor,138 but the debtor is entitled to claim against 
the creditor.139 The risk of destruction, damage or loss lies with the creditor140 and if any 
property which the creditor ought to have accepted remains in the hands of the debtor, the debtor 
is only liable for dolus and culpa lata in caring for it.141 Sureties for the debtor’s performance are 
discharged.142  
2.3.3.3 Conclusion to mora creditoris  
Hutchinson and Pretorius143stated that mora creditoris is a material breach that occurs when the 
creditor culpably fails to cooperate timeously with the debtor so that the latter may perform his 
or her obligations.144 Van der Merwe et al 145 added that delay in performance or non-
performance is traceable to the creditor when it shifts responsibility for further delay or non-
performance on to the creditor.  However, Christie and Bradfield are of the view that the main 
effect of mora creditoris is to shift responsibility for further delay or non-performance onto the 
creditor146. The effect of mora creditoris making it impossible for the debtor to perform on time 
is explained by De Villiers JP.147 Debtor has to demand required cooperation from  creditor. Van 
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der Merwe148 adds that apart from breaches of contract by the debtor in the form of mora 
debitoris and mora creditoris two more forms of breaches which he calls defective performance 
and conduct contrary to a contractual obligation “relate to the manner in which an obligation is 
executed”.149 However, where performance on either side becomes impossible after the 
conclusion of the contract owing to the fault of either the creditor or the debtor, the contract is 
not terminated, but the party who renders performance impossible is guilty of prevention of 
performance. 
2.3.4 Positive mal-performance 
2.3.4.1Introduction 
Positive mal-performance as an act of breach of contract occurs when obligations in a contract 
are performed in the wrong manner.150 Defective performance is viewed as a form of novation 
which replaces contractual obligations by new obligations arising out of breach151, replaces  of a 
contract depends on the terms of a contract which can be consensual, ex lege or naturalia.152 
There are two requirements for positive mal-performance and these are firstly, performance by a 
debtor is done in a defective way or incomplete manner.153 Secondly, that performance rendered 
must be in conflict with a contractual prohibition by debtor conflicts with the particular 
obligation non faciendi.  
2.3.4.2 Requirements for positive mal-performance 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
In positive mal-performance an act of breach of contract is complete as soon as performance that 
is defective or incomplete has been made. The debtor does perform, but in a defective way or in 
an incomplete manner.154 The creditor bears no general duty to return performance to the debtor 
for rectifying the defects.  In BK Tooling155 Jansen JA remarked that a debtor who had not 
cancelled the contract was obliged to return the defective performance in order to enable the 
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debtor to rectify any defects. The contractant relied on the defense of reciprocity and thus 
claimed counter performance. The contractant was obliged to allow the other party to perform or 
to rectify its defective performance where performance by the other party was still possible. The 
defendant could hold back its performance until the plaintiff had performed.  
2.3.4.3 Defective conduct in conflict with a contractual obligation 
The second interpretation of what is positive mal-performance is that performance rendered must 
be defective conduct in conflict with a contractual. Fault is only a requirement for positive mal-
performance if parties so agree but the position has been taken that fault is indeed required in 
principle, but that it is usually assumed to be present, unless the contractant who is alleged to 
have committed a breach of contract proves the absence of fault. In view of the nature of breach 
of a contract, fault should not be a requirement or a defense in respect of positive mal-
performance.  
2.3.4.4 Conclusion 
Positive mal -performance may take two forms. The first form occurs where debtor has a positive 
obligation, which means a debtor duly performs, but in an incomplete or defective manner. The 
second form occurs where the debtor has a negative obligation, which means that the debtor does 
the act that it is bound to refrain from doing.156 However, mora debitoris moves further from the 
principle the debtor duly performs but in an incomplete or defective manner and adds that debtor 
culpably fails to make timeous performance of its obligations 157 that are due and enforceable 
and is still possible of performance in spite of such failure.158 
2.3.5 Prevention of Performance as a breach 
2.3.5.1 Introduction 
Nature of performance is important when one looks at mora and fault is attributed to a particular 
party. The essence of prevention is manifested where performance on either side becomes 
impossible after the conclusion of the contract owing to the fault of either the creditor or the 
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debtor. The contract is not terminated, but the party who renders performance impossible is 
guilty of prevention of performance.159  
2.3.5.2 Requirements of Prevention of Performance 
Fault is an essential element of prevention of performance, unless the debtor has guaranteed 
performance (and the creditor is not at fault). Usual remedies are available to the creditor except 
for specific performance. In the case of material prevention of performance of a divisible 
obligation, the creditor may only cancel pro tanto and counter performance will be reduced 
proportionately.160  
Whether performance is defective, depends primarily on whether the performance made 
complies with the terms of a contract. Thus, a builder renders defective performance if he 
renders a house that was not erected in compliance with the agreed building plan. Terms of the 
contract refer not only to the consensual terms which are express or tacit but also to the ex-lege 
terms or naturalia of the contract. Performance can be defective whether made before, on or after 
the time fixed for performance as in the case of Sweet v Rageerguhara NO and others161   
In the above case, an applicant had applied for an order declaring an agreement of sale of 
immovable property to have been lawfully cancelled. The purported cancellation was on the 
ground that the respondents had failed to give applicant vacant possession on the date stipulated 
in the agreement. The notice of cancellation which had been given by way of a letter called upon 
the respondents to ensure that the applicant would be given vacant possession within 30 days 
from the date of the letter.162  
Where cancellation of an agreement is claimed in motion proceedings the applicant should 
unequivocally state in its founding affidavit that the cancellation is based on a material breach of 
the agreement and it should thereafter set out fully the facts on which it relies for its assertion. If 
a contractant commits an act contrary to an express or tacit prohibition in the contract then it 
should relate to the manner in which the obligation was executed. An example is the situation 
where the seller of a business undertakes not to compete with the purchaser for a specific time 
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within a certain area and does compete with him. Or parties to a contract expressly agree that 
failure to give purchaser vacant possession on 1 January 1977 is a material breach of the 
agreement. 163  
The South African Forestry Company v York Timbers Ltd 164 provides another clear example of 
prevention of performance. In this case a contract conferred a right on one party to approach the 
minister and also to refer the matter for arbitration. After considering the dictates of good faith in 
interpreting the clause, the court found that the corollary of this right was a duty on the other 
party not to frustrate the excise of this right. The party prevented or delayed arbitration and this 
amounted to mal-performance. 165 
The case above is clear illustration of the requirements of prevention of performance. 166 Firstly, 
the debtor must have performed. Secondly, the performance made must be defective.  It is the 
element of conduct in respect of minimum performance in the form of positive mal-performance 
that can be described as conduct of the debtor that eventually results in delivery of defective 
performance. The breach must be serious. A lex commissoria must be present. The question is 
when the debtor can be said to have performed. As a rule, performance can only be made with 
the co-operation of the creditor. The debtor will have to tender performance and will only have 
performed when the tender of the performance has been accepted. Thus, if the debtor wants to 
deliver the motor vehicle that is due, the creditor will have to accept delivery before there can be 
performance and the debtor can be discharged. If the debtor tenders defective performance and it 
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is refused by the creditor, there is no question of completed performance but an attempt to 
commit mal-performance. 167 
In the above case, prevention of performance occurred through supervening impossibility when 
contractual provisions became unworkable through statutory amendment while government was 
still a party to contracts. The appellant as successor to government's rights and obligations could 
not rely on supervening impossibility created by the same government while still party to 
contract. It was a self-created impossibility as it was created by legislative amendments made by 
the government in power. It was argued that as a matter of law, sanction against reliance on self-
created impossibility was not limited to situations where an act causing impossibility could 
somehow be described as wrongful or reprehensible. In other words, implied and tacit terms are 
to be applied when obligations to act in accordance with principles of reasonableness, fairness 
and good faith cannot be implied into contract. 
The above case also illustrates the fact that when interpreting contracts, obligations to act in 
accordance with principles of reasonableness, fairness and good faith are applied. Use of such 
principles in interpreting terms of contract should be on the basis of intention of parties. While 
the court is not entitled to superimpose on clearly expressed intention of parties, its notion of 
fairness, is different when the contract is ambiguous. In such a case, the principle that all 
contracts governed by good faith are applied, and the intention of parties are determined on basis 
of what they have negotiated with one another in good faith.  From the above comments one can 
argue that prevention of performance can come from either the creditor or debtor resulting in 
both parties being prevented from completing performance of an obligation. The South African 
law makes provision calling for cancellation.168 
2.3.5.3 Conclusion to Prevention of Performance 
In conclusion, prevention of performance will warrant cancellation where performance on either 
side becomes impossible owing to the fault of either the creditor or the debtor. The contract is 
not terminated but the party who renders performance impossible is guilty of prevention of 
performance. The fault of either the creditor or the debtor a serious breach occurs and a Lex 
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commissoria must be present. The debtor can only perform with the co-operation of the creditor. 
However, it is also important to understand how the demonstration by a party, through words or 
conduct that reveals an unequivocal intention no longer to be bound by the contract can lead to 
cancellation.  
2.4 Repudiation as breach 
 2.4.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the grounds defining prevention of performance, repudiation is a form of 
anticipatory breach of contract which can take place even before performance becomes 
enforceable. Repudiation may occur where either party renders the performance impossible or 
indicate that they will not perform the contract or a substantial part of the contract or will commit 
a serious breach.169 Kerr170 uses the term repudiation in the context of both anticipatory and 
ordinary breach. Legal and non-legal usages of the word “repudiation” refer to rejection of the 
contract as a whole or an obligation of major importance.171  
The breach may lead to cancellation if the consequences are serious. The doctrine of anticipatory 
breach was received into South African law from the English law.172 The question that arose in 
the case of repudiation was how a breach of contract could be committed before the date of 
performance had arrived, especially when performance remained possible. The explanation 
originally advanced in English law was that repudiation constituted an offer from the guilty party 
to cancel the contract which offer could then be accepted or rejected by the innocent party.173 
Although the offer and acceptance theory was for a long time accepted in South African Law, the 
Appellate Division did not accept it in Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd  v Thorpe. 174  
Repudiation occurs due to words or conduct175 by the party in breach whose actions goes to the 
root of the contract that affects a vital part of the obligations or conduct that results in there being 
no substantial performance.176 Thus, repudiation contains a mental element which discloses an 
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intention of no longer wanting to be bound by a party in a contract.177 The term is commonly 
used in South African law when a refusal to perform a contract acknowledged to be binding, or 
of a declaration of inability to perform, or of other declarations of a similar nature178.The test for 
repudiation is wholly objective, the only question is whether it can be reasonably inferred from 
the repudiator’s conduct that mal-performance will take place in the future.179  The innocent 
party has a choice to rescind or affirm the contract.  
2.4.2 Requirements for Repudiation 
Repudiation is an act by the guilty party evincing a deliberate and unequivocal intention no 
longer to be bound by the agreement. The election by the innocent party to choose cancellation 
completes and confirms the breach. In Data Colour International  (Pty) Ltd v Intermarket (Pty) 
Ltd 180 it was argued that repudiation is a breach in itself. The requirements were that an innocent 
party shows by words or conduct that it has elected to cancel the contract. Once the innocent 
party decides to cancel, communication of the cancellation may be conveyed to the guilty party 
by someone other than the innocent party. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Appellant’s 
initial letters to the Respondent constituted a repudiation, and that the Respondent replied by 
treating the agreement as having been terminated.181 
 
Repudiation occurs where either party renders performance of the contract impossible 
(prevention of performance) 182 Repudiation of a contract is a serious breach and provides 
grounds for cancellation. The above case is a good illustration of repudiation in the form of 
anticipatory breach which can take place even before performance becomes enforceable. It can 
take place in the form of repudiation or prevention of performance. Repudiation occurs due to 
words or conduct183 by the party in breach whose actions goes to the root of the contract that 
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affects a vital part of the obligations or conduct that results in there being no substantial 
performance. 
Hutchinson184, argues that if “words or conduct” by a party are lawful but are misunderstood to 
be unlawful evidence by the creditor unconsciously leads the creditor into repudiation even when 
the question of who would have repudiated is posed.185 H u t ch ins on  f u r t he r  ad ds  t ha t  
r epudiation occurs where either party renders performance of the contract impossible (prevention 
of performance).186 However, Eiselen187brings a new perspective when he argues that repudiation 
can be used in the context of both anticipatory and ordinary breach.188 In particular 
circumstances conduct of a contracting party can constitute both a breach of contract in the 
form of mal-performance and repudiation. A fair example of this is to be found in the 
above case. York's conduct amounted to breach in the form of failure to comply with his 
obligations in terms of clause 3.2 and 4.4. However, at the same time York’s conduct also 
amounted to repudiation in that York conveyed the clear indication to Safcol of its intention 
not to comply with those obligations in the future. In these circumstances, the contracts were, 
in my view, duly terminated when Safcol accepted York's repudiation in its letter of 10 
November 1998.189 Legal and non-legal usages of the word “repudiation” refer to rejection of the 
contract as a whole or an obligation of major importance.190  
 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis, is a landmark case which clearly 
illustrates the remedy of repudiation in South Africa for the first time. 191According to Jansen, J. 
the doctrine of anticipatory breach originated in England and has been received by South 
Africa as a violation of “not a future, but an existing obligation”.192 The violation flows from 
the requirement of bona fides which underlies our law of contract. Jansen, J. uses the 
terminology of offer and acceptance in this regard, and to denote a creditor’s decision to act 
                                                          
184Hutchinson Breaches 306.  
185 Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 284 (SCA) at 294H–I; Metalmil (Pty) 
Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd, 1994 (3) SA 673 (A) at 684–685B).   
186 Hutchinson Breaches  306. 
187 Eiselen Remedies 348. 
188 South African Forestry Company v York Timbers Ltd 2005  JOL 12937 (SCA) para 38 , 30. 
189 South African Forestry Company v York Timbers Ltd 2005  JOL 12937 (SCA) para 31 p 38. 
190 Luanda and Hawthorn Contracts205. 
191 (1980) 1 All SA 358 (A). 
192 Tuckers Land And Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis (1980) 1 All SA 358 (A),  360. 
31 
 
upon an anticipatory breach not as an “acceptance” but as an election. It can take place in 
the form of repudiation or prevention of performance. When the respondent instituted action in 
Tuckers Land v Hovis, 193 the appellant’s duty to give transfer of the stands was not yet 
enforceable because the suspensive condition had not yet been fulfilled. One, therefore, has a 
case here in which the alleged breach of contract had occurred before the time for the 
performance had arrived. Tuckers Land v Hovis illustrates further that the offer and acceptance 
terminology should be derived from the requirement of good faith which prohibits anticipatory 
breach.194 
Data Colour International (Pty) ltd v Intermarket (Pty) Ltd 195 illustrates further the point of 
repudiation of contract as breach where an innocent party could be said to have cancelled the 
contract on being informed of impending repudiation. The case suggests that cancellation should 
be clear from the innocent party’s conduct. The questions in Data Colour International (Pty) Ltd 
v Intermarket (Pty) Ltd196 case were whether or not the appellant improperly repudiated a 
distribution agreement between the parties, and if so whether the respondent properly cancelled. 
In the above cases, the doctrine of repudiation was set out as follows: where one party to a 
contract, without lawful grounds, indicates to the other party a deliberate and unequivocal 
intention no longer to be bound by the contract, the party is said to repudiate the contract.197 
The innocent party has a right to accept the repudiation and rescind the contract. The contract 
will come to an end upon communication of its acceptance to the guilty party. The test for 
repudiation is objective rather than subjective in that the emphasis is not on the repudiating 
party’s state of mind, but on what someone in the position of the innocent party would think he 
intended to do. Repudiation is accordingly not a matter of intention; it is a matter of 
perception.198 Culverwell and another v Brown 199 showed that a repudiatory breach of contract 
justified the injured party’s action of cancelling the contract. The test whether or not conduct 
amounts to repudiation of a contract is, 'fairly interpreted', exhibits a deliberate and unequivocal 
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intention no longer to be bound' by the contract. Where the time for performance is not specified 
in the agreement, repudiation does not per se bring agreement to an end but it is only upon 
exhibition of conduct of no longer wanting to be bound by the guilty party is when the injured 
party has a right to elect whether or not to accept repudiation or specific performance.200  From 
the above case, it can be argued that until an injured party accepts repudiation, the obligations in 
the contract have to be carried out. The injured party should be given reasonable time to make an 
election to cancel or uphold the contract. The contract is cancelled only when the injured party 
elects to cancel and then does the claim for damages arise. 201 
2.4.3 Conclusion to Repudiation 
This section discussed repudiation. Van der Merwe et al202 argued that repudiation is an 
unlawful conduct which occurs when one does not intend to comply with its duties of the 
contract.203  In support of Van der Merwe’s observation, the trial courts of  Datacolor 
International (Pty) Ltd v Intermarket (Pty) Ltd, 204 and South African Forestry Co Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd.  205  reiterated that  conduct may take the form of a positive act or omission, or by 
mere failure to perform. There must be at least words or other conduct that can reasonably be 
interpreted as anticipating mal-performance.206 Kerr argued that repudiation involves the act by 
the guilty party, evincing a deliberate and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound by the 
agreement, and the act of the adversary in accepting and thus completing the breach. In support 
of Kerr’s observation Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis, 207 
revealed that repudiation is manifested in the form of anticipatory breach which can take place 
even before performance becomes enforceable. Also in Data Colour International (Pty) Ltd v 
Intermarket (Pty) Ltd 208 the emphasis is not on the repudiating party’s state of mind, on what he 
subjectively intended, but on what someone in the position of the innocent party would think he 
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intended to do. But repudiation is not merely a matter of intention as Kerr and Van der Merwe et 
al seem to argue; it is also a matter of perception.209 
This above view is elaborated by Christie and Bradfield, 210 for whom, the test whether conduct 
amounts to repudiation of a contract is whether or not 'fairly interpreted', such conduct 'exhibits a 
deliberate and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound' by the contract.211 An example was 
illustrated in the case of Culverwell and another v Brown.212  From the above analysis, it can be 
argued that until an injured party accepts repudiation the agreement or contract is still alive. 213 
The injured party should be given reasonable time to make an election to cancel or uphold the 
contract. The contract is cancelled only when the injured party accepts repudiation and then does 
the claim for damages arise.  
 2.5 Notice of cancellation 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Mora, material breach of an essential term and repudiation entitle the innocent party to cancel the 
contract.214 Notice of cancellation is a requirement for cancellation independent of the nature of 
the breach.215 Procedure for cancellation has to be followed. 216 The breaching party has to be 
notified of the intention to cancel by the innocent party within a reasonable time.217  Notice of 
cancellation is a written statement that is inserted when drawing up a written contract by the 
parties. Inserting a cancellation clause is seen as standard practice when deciding whether the 
gravity of the breach justifies cancellation in a given case that may not be clear. 
2.5.2 Requirements for Notice of cancellation  
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Notice of cancellation must be clear and unequivocal, but need not identify the cause of 
cancellation. Neinaber JA in Data Colour International  Pty Ltd  218 concluded that “ it is settled 
law that the innocent party, having purported to cancel on inadequate grounds may afterwards 
rely on any adequate ground which existed at, but was discovered after, the time’.219 A principal 
case that shows requirements of notice of cancellation is Mahabeer v Sharma.220 It was argued 
that an innocent party may cancel the contract under the following circumstances:  
• Where the contract contains  a lex commissoria, that is, a clause entitling the buyer to 
cancel the contract immediately upon non-performance on a specified date; or 
• Where the buyer has informed the seller, that if a seller should not perform by a specific 
date in the future, the buyer intends cancelling the contract. The period of time stipulated 
in this contract must be a reasonable period of time under the contract. 
• If time is of essence in the particular circumstances, the particular circumstances 
attendant upon the contract in question will determine whether time will be regarded as of 
the essence. This however, will be done in exceptional circumstances and the buyer will 
have difficult onus to acquit. 
Mahabeer v Sharma 221 also shows how late performance can result in a material breach 
warranting cancellation. The court held that notice of cancellation could terminate a right only 
where the right becomes prescribed. This case described above can be an authority as to 
requirements of a notice of cancellation. If a major breach occurs, the innocent party has an 
election between keeping the contract intact and cancellation.222 It must exercise this discretion 
within a reasonable time. Failure to make the election within a reasonable time, will lead to the 
inevitable conclusion that the innocent party has elected to keep the contract intact.  
 Bowditch v Peel & Magil 223 and Culverwell and Another v Brown224 illustrate further that once 
a breach justifies cancellation, the innocent party is faced with an election either to affirm or 
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cancel the contract. Once an election is made, it is final and irrevocable, unless the other party 
consents to its reversal. Another requirement for cancellation is that if the party elects to cancel 
the contract, it must notify the other party of the decision, and the notice of cancellation must be 
clear and unequivocal.   
Swart v Volsoo 225 can be taken as a primary source that captures further, the essence of the 
requirements for the notice of cancellation. In the above case, the requirements for cancelling a 
contract seem consequently stricter than for concluding one. Whereas a contract can, for 
instance, be entered into by posting a letter of acceptance, cancellation is only effective when the 
notice of cancellation is brought to the attention of the other party, unless, of course, the contract 
provides otherwise.  
Swart v Vosloo also sets an extremely strict requirement for the valid cancellation of a contract, 
viz, the guilty party must first acquire actual knowledge of the cancellation.226 In the above case, 
delivery of the letter of cancellation to the respondent’s office was not proper notification. Only 
after the responded had read the letter could it be said that the responded had received notice. In 
relationship to the above view, Christie and Bradfield 227 emphasize that a notice of cancellation 
takes effect from the time it is communicated to the other party. The case of Putco Ltd v TV & 
Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd illustrates the critic’s view which is that cancellation only takes 
effect if it has only been communicated to the party in breach.228 But in Middleburgse Stadstraad 
v Trans-Natal Steenkoolkorporasie Bpk and  Win Twice Properties (Pty) Ltd v Binos the courts 
pointed out that if the letter of cancellation  has not been previously communicated the notice of 
cancellation takes effect from the service of summons or the notice of motion229. This is the 
general rule. However, Sharrock argues that the position will be different where the contract 
provides expressly or tacitly that termination may occur in another way than by notice to the 
guilty party. 230 The decision to cancel once made may be communicated to the party in breach, 
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by a third party. 231 In accordance with the principle of party autonomy, the agreement between 
the parties takes precedence over the common law rules, except where such an agreement or 
clause is unlawful. In many contracts, parties will stipulate the circumstances under which the 
contract may be cancelled after a breach of contract and also the requirements that need to be 
met.232  
 
But, the decision to cancel cannot be worded as to take effect only from a future date.233 For 
example, in Sonia (Pty) Ltd v Wheler 234 it was argued that there are no formalities required for 
the act of cancellation; a simple oral or written notice will suffice. Nor is there a need for a court 
order, since the act of cancellation is decided by the innocent party instead of the court.235 But, if 
the other party disputes the validity of the cancellation, a court order can be obtained to confirm 
cancellation. Furthermore, and as demonstrable in the cases Thomas v Henry236; and Chamber of 
Mines of South Africa v National Union of Mineworkers 237 once an election is made, it is final 
and irrevocable, unless the other party consents to its reversal. Thus, if the innocent party elects 
to uphold the contract, it cannot thereafter change its mind and cancel the contract, unless the 
other party commits a fresh breach justifying cancellation.  
 
The lex commissoria gives the innocent party a right to cancel for any breach, irrespective of its 
materiality in terms of the common law rules.238 The agreement between the parties takes 
precedence over the common law rules, except where such an agreement or clause is unlawful. 
In Outorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun it was argued that a minor breach that would not 
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justify cancellation at common law may afford a right to cancel, provided it falls within the 
scope of the cancellation clause.239   
2.5.3 Conclusion on notice of cancellation 
The above section discussed cancellation. Eiselen argued that a notice of cancellation usually 
states the grounds upon which the contract is being cancelled. This was supported by the case of 
Telcordia Technologies Inc v Tellkom SA Ltd which stated that a good reason for cancellation 
should exist. The cancellation will be effective despite the fact that the innocent party has relied 
upon a wrong reason.240 Van der merwe et al 241 further argues by stating that breaching party 
has to be notified of the intention to cancel by the innocent party within a reasonable time.  This 
is supported by Mahabeer v Sharma who state that where the contract should contain a lex 
commissoria, the buyer should informed the seller and time should be is of essence.  Eiselen 
argues that once a breach justifies cancellation, the innocent party is faced with an election either 
to affirm or cancel the contract. This is supported by the case Consol Ltd v Twee Jonge Gezellen 
Pty Ltd 242 in which is it argued that the innocent party cannot blow both hot and cold, decision 
must be made to approbate or reprobate. This view is supported by Watermeyer AJ when he 
states that the innocent party can elect to take advantage of the event or elect no to do so.243 
Cancellation not only extinguishes obligations but it creates new obligations to restore or give 
back whatever performance that was received in the contract before it was cancelled. The next 
section shows how restitution places a party in the position it occupied before conclusion of the 
contract.  
2.6 Restitution 
2.6.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the concept of restitution in South Africa law. Mutual restitution requires 
both parties to restore or give back whatever performance that was received in the contract 
before it was cancelled.244 This argument is supported by Eiselen who states that cancellation not 
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only extinguishes obligations but it creates new obligations.245 In other words, a litigant sues to 
have its bargain or equivalent in money for contract246. Restitution aims to place the other party 
in the position it occupied before conclusion of the contract.247 The party claiming termination 
and restitution must tender restitution of the performance it received in its pleadings.248 
2.6.2 Requirements for restitution 
Under South African law, restitution must be made upon the cancellation of a contract.249 The 
parties may expressly provide in the contract for the type of restitution that is to occur in given 
circumstances. Sackstein v Proudfood SA (Pty) Ltd 250 illustrates that for restitution to be 
possible, both parties need to restore or give back whatever performance that was received in the 
contract before it was cancelled. In the case, on 14 April 2000 Sackstein instituted an action 
claiming restitution to recover payments made by the company to the respondent under a 
contract for the provision of consultancy services during 1 December 1997 until 29 April 1998 
when the company was placed under provisional liquidation in Namibia. Liquidation not only 
extinguished obligations but it created new or secondary obligations. It is the duty of parties to 
restore benefits received under contract. Failure to tender restitution is fatal to claim.251 
The court goes on to say that an innocent party may claim the return of any money or 
performance made in terms of the contract.252 The aim is to return the parties to the position they 
were in before the contract.253 When parties reach an agreement to discharge the contract, there 
are two general principles that apply to the restitution, irrespective of whether the topic of 
restitution was included in the contract. Firstly, an agreement to discharge the contract is 
presumed to include a tacit agreement to restore what has been delivered in part performance.254 
The buyer is hereby entitled to claim any purchase price that it has already paid,255 while the 
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seller is entitled to the return of any goods delivered in terms of the contract.256 According to 
Christie, where ownership has passed to the buyer, and the goods are in its possession, the seller 
cannot recover ownership by virtue of the cancellation alone without actual delivery.257 
 
Where ownership has passed to the buyer, the buyer may validly sell258 or pledge259the property 
to an innocent third party, despite the agreement to cancel. It is, therefore, necessary that actual 
delivery of the property be made back to the seller to prevent the alienation of the goods to a 
third party by the buyer.  
 
The court goes on to say that the second principle is that both parties are permitted to recover the 
parts of the contract already performed.260 In the instance of a lease contract having been 
terminated, the tenant is liable to pay rent for the period that it occupied the premises261 even if 
this continues after the lease is terminated.262 The rule requiring parties to make restitution may 
be modified when justice requires it.263 
 
Restitution aims to place the other party in the position it occupied before conclusion of the 
contract.264 As pointed by Christie, an innocent party may claim the return of any money or 
performance made in terms of the contract.265 However, Eiselen argues that exceptions to mutual 
restitution are available due to impossibility when it is not the fault of the party, or due to breach, 
as well as when it is due to an inherent defect. 266 This point is illustrated in the Sackstein case in 
which the appellant would have had to restore the benefits that the company received by way of 
a pecuniary substitution. In the above case the appellant's counsel argued that the consultancy 
services were no longer necessary, but Mr Neethling wanted the services of the consultancy firm 
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as it was beneficial to the company.  The above case further reveals that at times restitution may 
not occur where the goods perished due to the defect; 267 or where the goods were disposed of as 
contemplated but the proceeds are offered;268 or where the goods were partly destroyed in testing 
their quality;269 and the goods lost value while being used as contemplated.270 
 
2.6.3 Conclusion for Restitution 
The section above discussed restitution.  It was stated that restitution aims to place the other 
party in the position it occupied before conclusion of the contract.271 This view was supported by 
Christie who advocates that restitution aims to return the parties to the position they were in 
before the contract272. The argument was illustrated in Feinstein v Niggli and Cash Converters 
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Rosebud Western Province Franchise (Pty) Ltd.273 Where restitution 
occurs upon the cancellation of a contract274, a litigant sues to have its bargain or equivalent in 
money for contract.275 Christie observes further that actual delivery is an important principle 
needed to prevent the alienation of the goods to a third.276 Geldenhuys v Maree reveals that 
parties restore what has been delivered in part performance.277  
 
The second principle of restitution is the recovery of goods or duties already performed.278 This 
view is supported by Eiselen who argues that although restitution ends obligations, restitution 
also creates new duties. In other words, cancellation not only extinguishes obligations but it 
creates new ones. In Sackstein v Proudfood SA (Pty) Ltd.279, liquidation not only extinguished 
obligations but it created new or secondary obligations. These new obligations are a consequence 
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of cancellation due to breach.280 Harper v Webster further pointed out that restitution can be 
modified where and when justice requires it.281  
 
The discussion on restitution also indicated the situations that can lead to exceptions to mutual 
restitution. These conditions are (1) where the goods perished due to the defect;282 or (2) where 
the goods were disposed of as contemplated but the proceeds are offered;283 or (3) where the 
goods were partly destroyed;284 and (4) lost.285 In the Sackstein case, liquidation made it 
impossible to return what was in possession before the contract ended. The appellant would have 
had to restore the benefits that the company received by way of a pecuniary substitution. But, in 
the Sackstein case, cancellation went ahead. Trial courts cases support the view that the party 
claiming termination and restitution must highlight performance it received in its pleadings.286  
2.7 Conclusion to the chapter 
The aim of chapter two was to critically analyze cancellation in South African law. The chapter 
debated repudiation, rescission and and cancellation. It was found that repudiation is not an 
appropriate term because it is technically a breach of contract and not the exercise of a 
remedy. 287. Some critics argued that rescission is an exceptional step or remedy that can be used 
to terminate primary obligations of a contract there and then.288 Others argued that rescission 
should be reserved for cases where, typically because of a misrepresentation inducing the 
contract, it is desired to set it aside ab initio.  This study chose the term cancellation because it is 
a unilateral act of a valid contract289 which entails a drastic step of bringing the transaction to an 
abrupt and premature end, contrary to the original intentions of the parties.290 However, the 
problem is that South Africa is rather reluctant to grant this remedy. The chapter debated mora 
debitoris, mora creditoris, positive mal-performance, prevention of performance, repudiation, 
notice of cancellation and restitution. 
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The chapter debated the concept of mora debitoris. The discussion revealed that a debtor 
commits a breach if obligations are not performed at all, performed late, or performed in the 
wrong manner. Mora debitoris as a breach does not in itself cause cancellation. It is the 
substantial detriment that entitles the innocent party to choose to cancel. But certain requirements 
must be considered. These are the presence of a cancellation clause, when “time is of the 
essence”, when time is not of essence and a material breach is present.  It was also noted in the 
discussion that some critics who emphasize the significance of the notion "time is of the essence 
of the contract" relate failure to perform timeously while other critics relate to the consequences 
of the breach and not to the breach itself. There appears to be conflict of authority in that when 
no time for performance is fixed but time is of the essence the debtor is not in mora and the 
creditor cannot cancel for nonperformance unless a proper demand for performance has been 
made.  
Critics such as Hutchinson and Pretorius 291discussed in this chapter stated that  mora creditoris 
is a material breach that occurs when the creditor culpably fails to cooperate timeously with the 
debtor so that the latter may perform his or her obligations.292 Van der Merwe et al293 added that 
delay in performance or non-performance is traceable to the creditor when it shifts responsibility 
for further delay or non-performance on to the creditor.  However, Christie and Bradfield were of 
the view that the main effect of mora creditoris is to shift responsibility for further delay or non-
performance onto the creditor. 294 The effect of mora creditoris making it impossible for the 
debtor to perform on time is explained by De Villiers JP.  295 There seem to be agreement by 
mainstream critics on how mora creditoris leads to cancellation. 
 
It was observed in this chapter that positive mal -performance may take two forms. The first 
form occurs where debtor has a positive obligation, which means a debtor duly performs, but in 
an incomplete or defective manner. The second form occurs where the debtor has a negative 
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obligation, which means that the debtor does the act that it is bound to refrain from doing.296 
However, mora debitoris moves further from the principle that the debtor duly performs in an 
incomplete or defective manner and adds that debtor culpably fails to make timeous performance 
of its obligations 297 that are due and enforceable and is still possible of performance in spite of 
such failure.298 
Prevention of performance as a breach will by itself not cause cancellation. It was debated and 
revealed that prevention of performance occurs when performance on either side becomes 
impossible due to the fault of either the debtor or the creditor. Several cases were used to 
illustrate and show the application of the factors or grounds that result in cancellation as remedy 
for breach of contract in South African law.  
The chapter agreed with Van der Merwe et al 299 who argued that repudiation is an unlawful 
conduct which occurs when one does not intend to comply with its duties of the contract.300  It 
was stated that there must be at least words or other conduct that can reasonably be interpreted as 
anticipating mal-performance.301 Kerr avers that repudiation involves the act by the guilty party, 
evincing a deliberate and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound by the agreement, and the 
act of the adversary in accepting and thus completing the breach. Christie and Bradfield, 302 say 
that the test whether conduct amounts to repudiation of a contract is whether or not 'fairly 
interpreted', such conduct 'exhibits a deliberate and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound' 
by the contract.303 From the above analysis, it can be argued that the critics agree that until an 
injured party accepts repudiation the agreement or contract is still alive.304 But, it is the innocent 
party that makes an election to cancel or uphold the contract.  
The chapter observed that giving notice is the second requirement for cancellation. A notice of 
cancellation usually states the grounds upon which the contract is being cancelled. This was 
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supported by the case of Telcordia Technologies Inc v Tellkom SA Ltd which illustrated that 
where a good reason for cancellation should exist, the cancellation will be effective despite the 
fact that the innocent party has relied upon a wrong reason.305 Van der Merwe argued that the 
breaching party has to be notified of the intention to cancel by the innocent party within a 
reasonable time. According to Eiselen, once a breach justifies cancellation, the innocent party is 
faced with an election either to affirm or cancel the contract.306 Christie and Bradfield stated that 
the innocent party cannot blow both hot and cold, decision must be made to approbate or 
reprobate307. This was supported by Watermeyer AJ when he states that the innocent party can 
elect to take advantage of the event or elect no to do so.308  
But the argument of chapter was that cancellation not only extinguishes obligations but it creates 
new obligations to restore or give back whatever performance that was received in the contract 
before it was cancelled.309 This view was supported by Christie who advocated that restitution 
aims to return the parties to the position they were in before the contract.310 However, where 
restitution occurs upon the cancellation of a contract311, a litigant sues to have its bargain or 
equivalent in money for contract.312  
In short, the chapter argued that mora debitoris, mora creditoris, positive mal-performance, 
prevention of performance, repudiation are the main breaches in South African law. But as 
argued in the chapter, the breaches do not by themselves lead to cancellation. The innocent party 
must give notice and then chooses to elect to cancel in an unequivocal way. The next chapter 
debates how discharge terminates contracts under English law. 
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3.0 CHAPTER 3: Discharge under English law  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically analyses discharge as a remedy for breach of contract under the English 
Sales law. It is important to state that England is not a member of the CISG. Despite this fact 
English sales law recognizes the differences between primary contractual remedy regimes of 
common law versus civil law systems. In English sales law, damages constitute the primary 
remedy. English sales law has a strong adherence to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.313 
Therefore, this chapter will start by briefly explaining the history of English law and critically 
reviewing the legal theories developed for English law. General principles that govern the above 
systems will summarized and the requirements that govern the remedy of discharge will also be 
outlined. The chapter argues that breaches of condition and anticipatory breach justify discharge 
and that the right to discharge depends on the seriousness of the breach. The consequences for 
discharge form primary and secondary obligations, and the basis of restitution. And, the extent of 
damages rewarded when discharge is awarded as a remedy for breach of contract is an important 
part and parcel of ending a contractual relationship.  
3.2 Terms to define termination under English law 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to critically explain why discharge is viewed as a remedy for breach of 
contract under the English Law. The section will commence by defining the terms termination, 
discharge and remedy and give a general overview of what the procedure and requirements are in 
English law. Because the term breach is a literary term314, the section will define the term breach 
and will argue that the nature of breach is crucial or is of paramount importance when one 
focuses on termination as a right that leads to a remedy of ending a contractual relationship. In 
addition, the section will argue that although defective performance is the major cause of breach 
of contract, not all defective performance will result in termination because other factors such as 
the type of breach whether be it breach of term, breach of condition and anticipatory breach are 
crucial in determining factors and requirements that lead to discharge.  
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Lord Wilberforce has pointed out the lack of any agreed or consistent terminology 315 in the 
process and concepts of termination. Termination, repudiation, resciling and rescission are terms 
or words that need to be addressed when one is dealing with English law as there is some 
conceptual muddle. The injured party may be said to repudiate the contract, 316or treat the 
contract as repudiated 317  or discharged. 318 Alternatively, the contract may be discharged, 319  
rescinded, 320  cancelled, or terminated. 321 
3.2.2 Repudiation 
The notion of repudiation is mostly used to indicate a wrongful refusal to perform, or a total 
inability to perform. 322 Repudiation is a term appropriate for frustrated cases when a party 
avoids a contract without proving  that the breach has produced serious consequences which can 
be treated as ‘going to the root of the contract’ or as being ‘fundamental’. In Maredelanto 
Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH, Megaw LJ argued that the discharge should be 
done on the exact date according to the expected readiness clause. 323  In The Helvetia-S 324 the 
trial court argued that if parties avoided the contract before the due date, nominal damages would 
                                                          
315 Treitel Breaches 139.  
316 Behn v Burness (1863) 3 B & S 751 (Exchequer Chamber) 755, 122 ER 281, 283 (Williams J); J & E Kish v 
Charles Taylor & Sons & Co (1912) AC 604 (HL) 617 (Lord Atkinson); Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha Ltd (Th e Hongkong Fir) (1962) 2 QB 26 (QBD: Commercial Ct) 38 (Salmon J).  
317 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 11(2), (3), and (4);  Hallam v Avery [2000] 1 WLR 966 (CA) 969 (Judge LJ); Meikle v 
Nottinghamshire County Council (2004) EWCA Civ 859; (2005) ICR 1, para 34 (Keene LJ); Azimut-Benetti SpA v 
Healey (2010) EWHC 2234 (Comm); (2011) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 473, para 32 (Blair J). 
318 Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd v Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) (1999) CLC 1875 (QBD: 
Commercial Ct) 1915 (Moore-Bick J); TTM v Hackney LBC (2011) EWCA Civ 4; [2011] HRLR 14 para 87 
(Toulson LJ); Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Co SAL (2007) EWCA Civ 688; (2007) 2 CLC 49 
(CA) para 33 (Lloyd LJ). 
319 Humphreys v Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the University of Oxford and anor (2000) ICR 405 (CA) 423 
(Moore-Bick J); ST Microelectronics NV v Condor Insurance Ltd [2006] EWHC 977 (Comm); (2006) 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 525, para 61 (Christopher Clarke J); ENE 1 Kos Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Th e Kos) (2010) EWCA Civ 
772; (2010) 2 CLC 19, para 18 (Longmore LJ). 
320 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) 598; (Lord Lloyd of Berwick); Hanson v 
South West Electricity Board (2001) EWCA Civ 1377;([2002) 1 P & CR 35. 
321 ERG Raffi nerie Mediterranee SpA v Chevron USA Inc (t/a Chevron Texaco Global Trading) (2007) EWCA Civ 
494; (2007) 1 CLC 807, 810 (Longmore LJ); Dadourian Group International v Simms (2009) EWCA Civ 169; 
(2009) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 601, para 9 (Arden LJ); Parkwood Leisure Ltd v Alemo-Herron (2011) UKSC 26; (2011) 
IRLR 696, para 12 (Lord Hope). 
322  Azimut-Benetti Spa v Healey  (2011) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 473, para 32 (Blair J); Universal Cargo Carriers Corp v 
Citati (1957) 2 QB 401 (QBD: Commercial Ct) 426  as per Devlin J. 
323 As per Megaw LJ,  p 129 c and g, p 134 e and c and p 138 d to f, post). See also Finnish Government (Ministry 
of Food) v H Ford & Co Ltd (1921) 6 Lloyd LR 188 and Samuel Sanday & Co v Keighley, Maxted & Co (1922) 91 
LJKB 624. 
324 (1960)1 Lloyd’s Rep 540 at 540. 
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be awarded. Though repudiation is a breach, it is not the appropriate term to describe a situation 
where the refusal or inability to perform is justified. Rescission is a term where a contract is 
avoided ab initio,325 as for instance when one party is guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.326    
3.2.3 Rescission  
Rescission is claimed by a party who claims to be innocent and is valid when there is a material 
breach. Treitel327 states that though a party can undo the contract by terminating or rescinding, 
ending a contract by withholding performance is better known as ‘default termination’.328 The 
right to rescind in the sense of refusing to perform depends on the provisions or stipulations of 
the contract with regards to the order in which the parties are to perform.329 However, it would 
be better to talk of termination or discharge rather than rescission when the innocent party 
chooses to treat the contract as having ended. 330 This is in contrast to the situation where the 
defaulting party still remains under what is termed a ‘secondary obligation’ to pay damages for 
the breach. 331  
3.2.4 Discharge 
In English law, to avoid a contract is to make or render it void, that is, to cancel and withdraw 
from it.332  Much of the difficulty regarding the ‘termination’ of a contract and its effect on the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages arise from uncertain or inconsistent terminology; in particular (per 
Lord Wilberforce) the use of rescission’ as an equivalent for discharge, though justifiable in 
some contexts, may lead to confusion in others. 333  Discharge is a useful term as it refers to the 
ending of the obligations under the contract. 334 Discharge is a term better used as it represents 
the point at which one party is no longer bound by its’ obligations under the contract. 335 It is not 
the contract itself that is terminated, but rather the obligations of the injured party to perform his 
                                                          
325  Eminence Property Developments Ltd v Heaney [2010] EWCA Civ 1168; [2010] 3 EGLR 165, para 23 (Etherton 
LJ); Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 (HL) 392–3 (Lord Wilberforce); Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport 
Ltd (1980) AC 827 (HL) 844 (Lord Wilberforce); 
326 Poole Contracts, 601. 
327 Treitel Breaches 319. 
328 Beale Cases 547 
329 Treitel Breaches 320. There is the condition precedent, concurrent conditions  and ,independent covenants. 
330 Johnson v Agnew (1980) AC 367, (1979) 1 ALL ER 883 
331 Moschi v Lep Air Services [1973] AC 332 (HL) 350 (Lord Diplock). 
332 Atiyah Contracts 48. 
333 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 556 
334 TTM v Hackney LBC (2011) EWCA Civ 4; (2011) HRLR 14 para 87 (Toulson LJ); Masri v Consolidated 
Contractors International Co SAL (2007) EWCA Civ 688; [2007] 2 CLC 49 (CA) para 33 (Lloyd LJ). 
335 Furmston et al Contracts 18 ; Beatson Contracts13–16.  
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or her obligations under that contract.  336 Discharge is treated as a remedy when a breach occurs. 
The injured party exercises this right to bring an end to contractual obligations and then claim 
damages aimed at putting the party in the position it would have had been had the contract not 
been performed. The aim of discharging is to terminate, undo, and cancel the contract by the 
innocent party. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
The discussion above underlined the fact that discharge of a contract refers to the ending of the 
obligations under the contract337 and represents the point at which one party is no longer bound 
by its obligations under the contract. Discharge is a term better used when a contract ends due to 
breach as it represents the point at which one party is no longer bound by its’ obligations under 
the contract. 338 It is not the contract itself that is terminated, but rather the obligations of the 
injured party to perform his or her obligations under that contract. Rescission means the 
retrospective cancellation of a contract ab initio, as for instance, when one party is guilty of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. In the case of the innocent party treating the contract as having 
ended, it would be better to talk of termination or discharge rather than rescission.339 The right to 
rescind in the sense of refusing to perform depends on the provisions or stipulations of the 
contract with regards to the order in which the parties are to perform.340 There is the condition 
precedent341, concurrent conditions 342 and independent covenants343. As a remedy, discharge is 
a useful term and better term as it refers to the ending of the primary obligations and creation of 
secondary obligations under the contract. 344 Discharge as a process requires the injured party to 
give notice, elect to discharge contractual obligations, and claim restitution.  
 
3.3 Requirements for Discharge  
3.3.1 Introduction 
                                                          
336 Johnson v Agnew (1980) (HL) 350 (Lord Diplock) 350; Heyman v Darwins (1942) AC 356 (HL) 373 (Lord 
Macmillan); Moschi v Lep Air Services (1973) AC 332. (HL) 350 (Lord Diplock , 350. 
337 Martin and Turner Contracts 400. 
338 Furmstone et al Contracts 18–20; Beatson Contracts13–16. 
339 Poole Contracts 601. 
340 Treitel Contracts 320. 
341 Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council (1987 AC 539 AT 561, and 574   
342 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s28.  
343 Taylor v Webb (1937) 2KB  283.   
344 Martin and Turner Contracts 400. 
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The section above argued that discharge is a remedy for ending primary contractual obligations 
due to breach. 345 Performance of primary obligations would not have been met in a satisfactory 
manner or when one party has failed to complete some oral agreement of their primary 
obligations. It was also explained that secondary obligations occur if a party fails to complete its 
primary obligations.346  But there has to be a fundamental breach by the guilty party. English law 
classifies terms breached to establish if a breach justifies discharge.  
3.3.2 Forms of breach and discharge  
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
Commercial and consumer contracts often contain express rights of termination, and the question 
then arises as to how these relate to the right to terminate for breach at common law. 347 The 
right to discharge for breach under English law depends on whether the term broken is a 
‘condition’; ‘warranty’ or ‘intermediate term.348 Not all breaches lead to discharge as discharge 
calls for restitution.  
3.3.2.2 Breach of Condition 
Breach of condition is where a breach always gives rise to a right to terminate. 349 According to 
s11(1)(b) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, a condition is described as a term ‘the breach of which 
may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated’ but not breach of warranty.350  This is 
supported by Fletcher Moulton LJ who advocates that a breach of condition gives rise to the right 
to terminate,351 The word ‘condition’ is used in many different ways in the law of contract, 352 
and in the present context it can be used to mean not only an important term of the contract but 
also some agreed contingency that must occur before a particular obligation becomes due for 
                                                          
345 Redmond and Stevens Contracts 157. 
346 Martin and Turner Contracts 400. 
347 Carter and Goh Concurrent 33. 
348 Treitel  Conditions 185; Carter Condition  90. 
349 Per Megaw LJ Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos [1970] 3 All 
ER 125.  138 f, p 540 j, p 541 f to j, p 542 a b d to j, p 543 j to p 544 c and j to p 545 b and g to p 546 e, p 549 h to p 
550 e, p 551 d to g and p 554 d, post); dictum of Diplock LJ in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd (1962) 1 All ER at 485–489. 
350 Sale of Goods Act 1893, s 11(1)(b) and the  Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 11(3). 
351 Wallis, Son and Wells v Pratt and Haynes (1910) 2 KB 1003 (CA) 1012 (Fletcher Moulton LJ (dissenting)). The 
appeal was allowed, and the sentiments of Fletcher Moulton LJ were approved, by the House of Lords at (1911) AC 
394 (HL). 
352 A ‘chameleon-like word that takes on its meaning from its surroundings’: Skips A/S Nordheim and ors v Syrian 
Petroleum Co Ltd and anor (The Varenna) (1984) QB 599 (CA) 618 (Donaldson MR); SJ Stoljar, ‘Th e Contractual 
Concept of Condition’ (1953) 69 LQR 485. 
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performance.353 In accordance with the general law of contract, which had been expressly 
preserved by s 61(2)a of the 1893 Act, it was the duty of the court to construe a stipulation to see 
if it was a condition in the strict sense, in which case any breach of the stipulation by the party 
would entitle the other to treat himself/herself as discharged. 354 If the stipulation was not a 
condition, the court was then required to look into the extent of the actual breach; if it went to the 
root of the contract the other party was entitled to treat himself/herself as discharged. 355 
3.3.2.3 Breach of warranty 
Breach of warranty is where a breach never or at any rate, hardly ever gives rise to a right to 
terminate. According to s11(1)(b) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, a warranty is a term ‘the 
breach of which may give rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject the goods and 
treat the contract as repudiated’.356A breach of warranty occurred in Cahave NV v Bemer 
Handelsgesllschaft mbH.357 A German company sold US citrus pulp pellets to a Dutch company 
but part of the cargo in one hold was found to be severely damaged and resulted in the buyers 
rejecting the whole cargo. The fact that the pellets could only be resold at a reduced price since 
they had subsequently been used for the purpose for which they were commonly sold, ie, for 
cattle food, suggests that the buyers were not entitled to reject the cargo since there had been no 
breach of that condition  but a breach of warranty. In the same way, the word ‘warranty’ has 
been used to denote not only a minor term of the contract, but also: (1) a term of the contract as 
opposed to a ‘mere representation’;358 (2) a guarantee of goods or services; 359 (3) a fundamental 
term in an insurance contract; 360 and even (4) a fundamental term generally.  
                                                          
353 Treitel 1990  LQR 185; Carter 1990-91 JCL 90. 
354 Cahave NV v Bemer Handelsgesllschaft mbH (1975) 3 ALL ER 739.  The stipulation in cl 7 that the goods were 
to be shipped ‘in good condition’ was not a condition in the strict sense and the sellers’ breach of it did not go to the 
root of the contract. Accordingly the buyers were not entitled to reject the whole cargo because of the breach of that 
stipulation but where only entitled to claim damages. 
355 NV v Bemer Handelsgesllschaft mbH  (1975) 3 ALL ER 739   p 746 g to p 747 a c d and f to h, p 748 a to c, p 
754 b and c, p 755 a and f, p 756 b g and h, p 757 d to h, p 765 f and g, p 766 d to f and 767 c to e, post); dicta of 
Upjohn and Diplock LJJ in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 1 All ER at 487, 487 
applied. 
356 Wallis, Son and Wells v Pratt and Haynes [1910] 2 KB 1003 (CA) 1012 (Fletcher Moulton LJ (dissenting)). The 
appeal was allowed, and the sentiments of Fletcher Moulton LJ were approved, by the House of Lords at [1911] AC 
394 (HL). 
357 (1975) 3 ALL ER 739; (see p 748 e, p 749 e to p 750 a, p 761 a to d, p762 j, p 763 g and h and p 764 e, post); 
dictum of Lord Reid in Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1968] 2 All ER at 451 applied. 
358 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 (CA) 377 (Hodson LJ); Dick Bentley Productions Ltd and anor v 
Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623 (CA) 627 (Lord Denning MR). 
359 Bernstein v Pamson’s Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] RTR 384 (QBD) 393 (Rougier J); Dandara Holdings 
Ltd v Co-operative Retail Services Ltd [2004] EWHC 1476 (Ch); [2004] 2 EGLR 163, para 70 (Lloyd J); National 
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Breach of an innominate or intermediate term is where a breach sometimes gives rise to a right to 
terminate. In the Hongkong Fir case, 361 Diplock LJ  added that not all contractual terms could 
be classified as ‘conditions’ or ‘warranties’, but there were some terms of which the breach 
might or might not give rise to a right to terminate, depending on the gravity of the 
consequences.362 In Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd, 363 the Court 
of Appeal rediscovered and reaffirmed that English law recognizes contractual terms which, on a 
true construction of the contract of which they are part, are neither conditions nor warranties but 
are, to quote Lord Wilberforce’s words 364  ‘intermediate’. This type of term has been classed as 
an ‘innominate’ or ‘intermediate’.365 However, neither of these terms are free from ambiguity.  
3.3.3 Conclusion  
In summary, conditions are situations where a breach always gives rise to a right to terminate, 
warranties occurs where a breach never or at any rate, hardly ever gives rise to a right to 
terminate, and innominate or intermediate terms is a situation where a breach sometimes gives 
rise to a right to terminate. Given that the right to terminate for serious breaches can arise quite 
independently of the construction of the contract, it can be argued that this threefold analysis is 
over-subtle.366 In short, one would better simply to speak of: (1) conditions (where breach 
always gives rise to a right to terminate); and (2) warranties (where this can only be done if the 
consequences of the breach are sufficiently serious). However, courts have accepted the idea of 
an innominate term. 367  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
House Building Council v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (2010) UKFTT 326 (FT); (2010) STI 2655, para 62 
(Sir Stephen Oliver QC). 
360 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 33(3); De Maurier (Jewels) Ltd v Bastion Insurance Co (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 550 
(QBD: Commercial Ct) 560 (Donaldson J); Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) (1992) 1 AC 233 (HL) 262 (Lord Goff ); Global Process Systems Inc v Syarikat 
Takaful Malaysia Bhd (Th e Cendor Mopu) [2011] UKSC 5; [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 560, para 56 (Lord Mance). 
361 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (Th e Hongkong Fir) (196)] 2 QB 26 (CA). 
362 The Hongkong Fir , 70 
363 (1962) 1 All ER 474, (1962) 2 QB 26 
364 in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 at 113, 
365 Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft MBH (Th e Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44 (CA) 82 (Ormrod LJ); Bunge 
Corp v Tradax Export SA (1981) 1 WLR 711(HL) 714 (Lord Wilberforce); Dominion Corporate Trustees Ltd v 
Debenhams Properties Ltd (2010) EWHC 1193 (Ch); [2010] 23 EG 106 (CS) para 22 (Kitchin J. 
366 Carter, JW, (1998), Classification (1981) CLJ 219. 
367 Carter, (1998),  Classification (1981), 219. 
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3.4 Fundamental breach 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Broadly speaking, termination for breach of contract at common law can take place in two cases, 
the first being where the other party has broken a condition of the contract, and the second where 
there has been some other breach with very serious consequences. Since deciding whether a 
particular term is a condition is primarily a matter of construction368because the distinction 
between termination for breach of condition and termination under a contractual right can be a 
very difficult one to draw. According to The Hongkong Fir, 369 the right to discharge may be 
exercised not only for breaches of condition but for other serious breaches too. Such breaches are 
described in various ways; for instance ‘fundamental’ breaches, 370 ‘frustrating’ breaches, 371  
‘repudiatory’ breaches, 372 or breaches that go to ‘the root of the contract’. 373 Unfortunately 
none of these terms are without difficulty. 
 
3.4.2 Forms of fundamental breach 
3.4.2.1 Definition of terms  
 Lord Diplock argued that when a fundamental breach occurs, fulfilment of primary contractual 
obligations is no longer possible and the innocent party chooses to end to all primary obligations 
                                                          
368  Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd (197) AC 235 (HL); Tradax Export SA v European Grain & 
Shipping Co (1983) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 100 (QBD: Commercial Ct); George Hunt Cranes Ltd v Scottish Boiler and 
General Insurance Co Ltd (2001) EWCA Civ 1964; (2003) 1 CLC 1. 
369 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (Th e Hongkong Fir) (1962) 2 QB 26 (CA). 
370 Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederiena AB (Th e Antaios  (1983) 1 WLR 1362 (CA) 1375 (Fox LJ); 
Hurst v Bryk and ors (1999) Ch 1 (CA) 9 (Peter Gibson LJ); Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavrilis Salvage 
International Ltd (Th e Great Peace) (2002) EWCA Civ 1407; (2003) QB 679, para 82 (Lord Phillips). 
371 Th e Hongkong Fir , 35 (Salmon J) (n 58); Suisse Atlantique Société d’Armement Maritime SA v NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1967) 1 AC 361 (HL) 436 (Lord Wilberforce); Trade and Transport Inc v Iino 
Kaiun Kaisha (Th e Angelia) (1973) 1 WLR 210 (QBD) 221 (Kerr J). 
372 Miles v Wakefi eld Metropolitan District Council [1987] AC 359 (HL) 562 (Lord Templeman); Esanda Finance 
Corp Ltd v Plessnig (1989) 63 ALJR 338 (HCA) 242 (Brennan J); Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton (1997) CLC 634 
(CA) 637 (Simon Brown LJ); Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV (2008) EWHC 1265 (Comm); (2008) 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 35, para 55 (Field J). 
373 London Transport Executive v Clarke [1981] ICR 355 (CA) 362 (Lord Denning MR); Millers 
Wharf Partnership Ltd v Corinthian Column Ltd (1991) 61 P & CR 461 (Ch D) 478 (Knox J); ACG Acquisition XX 
LLC v Olympic Airlines SA [2010] EWHC 923 (Comm); (2010) 1 CLC 581, para 35 (Hamblen J). 
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of both parties remaining unperformed. 374 The innocent party will further demand compensation 
from the guilty party and the guilty party will perform secondary obligations.  ‘Breach of 
condition’ should be confined to the situation where the contracting parties have agreed, whether 
by express words or by implication of law, that any failure by one party to perform a particular 
primary obligation irrespective of the gravity of the event that has in fact resulted from the 
breach shall entitle the other party to elect to put an end to all primary obligations of both parties 
remaining unperformed.375 
The concept of ‘fundamental breach’ has been used in the past in a totally different connection, 
that is to say a breach of such gravity as to bar the party responsible from relying on an 
exemption clause in the contract. 376 Though this doctrine has long since been discredited, 377 
there is still debate as to whether breaches of condition are also necessarily ‘fundamental’ in the 
present context. 378 To talk of a ‘frustrating’ breach creates the risk of confusion with the modern 
doctrine of frustration; and it may not be appropriate to describe all breaches of this sort as 
‘repudiatory’.379 The notion of a breach going to the ‘root of the contract’ has a long and 
respectable pedigree and for this and other reasons has been preferred by some judges, 380 but it 
has been described as a misleading metaphor. 381 Given that there is now no longer any risk of 
confusion with the law of exemption clauses, it is probably best to use the term ‘fundamental 
                                                          
374 Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos (1970) 3 All ER 125 Per 
Megaw LJ. An expected readiness clause in a charterparty ought to be regarded as being a condition of the contract, 
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(CA);  Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd (1970) 1 QB 447 (CA); Montrose, (1964), ‘Some 
Problems about Fundamental Terms,’ CLJ 60. 
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Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd  (1980) AC 827 (HL). 
378 Montrose, (1964), Some Problems about Fundamental Terms,  60. 
379 Thus repudiation suggests an unwillingness or inability to perform in the future, whereas an injured party may 
terminate purely on the basis of the consequences of the breach that have already occurred. For this and other 
reasons it is argued by Carter  that the doctrine in The Hongkong Fir operates independently from that of 
repudiation. 
380 Decro-Wall International SA v Practitioners in Marketing Ltd (1971) 1 WLR 361;  (CA) 374 (Sachs LJ). 
381 Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co (1919) AC 435 (HL) 459 (Lord Sumner) 
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breach’ for a breach that goes to the root of the contract, whilst leaving open for the present the 
question whether it necessarily includes a breach of condition. 382  
Two tests are conducted for one to see the nature of breach before it is called fundamental 
Breaches.383 Firstly, courts may find the decisive element in the importance which the parties 
would have attached the term which has been broken to be of serious or minor importance. 
Secondly, the seriousness of the consequences that would have resulted from the breach also 
decides whether or not a breach is fundamental. Descriptions such as the degree of breach going 
to the whole root of the contract and not merely part of it or the breach affecting the whole 
substance of the contract are taken into consideration.  
In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd,384 a fundamental breach occurred when 
defendants contracted to guard a factory against fire instead caused fire which destroyed the 
factory. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages on the ground that they were liable for 
the act of their employee. The defendants pleaded, inter alia, an exception clause in the contract, 
to the effect that ‘under no circumstances’ were the defendants to be ‘responsible for any 
injurious act or default by any employee. But the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding 
that there had been a fundamental breach of the contract by the defendants which precluded them 
from relying on the exception clause. 385 
The defendants appealed to the House of Lords and according to Lord Diplock 386 the expression 
‘fundamental breach’ should be confined to an event resulting from the failure by one party to 
perform a primary obligation which has the effect of depriving the other party of substantially 
the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that he should obtain from the contract, 
so that the party not in default may elect to put an end to all primary obligations of both parties 
remaining unperformed. 387 It was held that because the parties were free to agree to whatever 
exclusion or modification of their obligations they chose and, therefore, the question whether an 
                                                          
382  Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) 1 All ER 556, p560 b-d 
383 Willoughby v CF Capital plc (2011) EWCA Civ 1115, (2012) ICR 1038, para 21 (Rimmer LJ), Geldof 
Metaalconstructie  NV v Simon Carves Ltd (2010) EWCA Civ 667,(2010) 1CLC 782, para 10 (Longmore LJ) 
384 (1980) 1 All ER 556. 
385 (1978) 3 All ER 146. 
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exception clause applied when there was a fundamental breach, breach of a fundamental term or 
any other breach, turned on the construction of the whole of the contract, including any 
exception clauses.388 Also the parties were free to reject or modify by express words both their 
primary obligations to do that which they had promised and also any secondary obligations to 
pay damages arising from breach of a primary obligation.  
3.4.3 Breach of Condition  
According to s 61(2)(a) of the 1893 Act, it was the duty of the court to construe a stipulation to 
see if it was a condition in the strict sense, in which case any breach of the stipulation by the 
party would entitle the other to treat himself/herself as discharged. 389 If the stipulation was not a 
condition, the court was then required to look to the extent of the actual breach; if it went to the 
root of the contract the other party was entitled to treat himself/herself as discharged. 390A breach 
of condition shows the different implications when it comes to deciding what rights and remedies 
the injured party may have in addition to the basic right to terminate. 391 In particular, a party 
who terminates for breach of condition may be in a much stronger position when it comes to 
damages than one who merely exercises a contractual right.392 There are other problems 
associated with the distinction. For instance, to what extent can a party that wrongfully refuses to 
perform to meet a claim for wrongful repudiation by arguing that it had made a bona fide 
mistake in interpreting the scope of a right to terminate that was expressly given by the contract, 
and that therefore his/her refusal to perform should not be construed as a refusal to be bound by 
                                                          
388 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) 1 All ER 556 p 560 b to d, p 561 c to f, p 565 b, p 566 c 
to e, p 567 f g, p 568 a h and p 570 a to d . 
389 Cahave NV v Bemer Handelsgesllschaft mbH (1975) 3 ALL ER 739.  The stipulation in cl 7 that the goods were 
to be shipped ‘in good condition’ was not a condition in the strict sense and the sellers’ breach of it did not go to the 
root of the contract. Accordingly the buyers were not entitled to reject the whole cargo because of the breach of that 
stipulation but where only entitled to claim damages. 
390 NV v Bemer Handelsgesllschaft mbH  (1975) 3 ALL ER 739   p 746 g to p 747 a c d and f to h, p 748 a to c, p 
754 b and c, p 755 a and f, p 756 b g and h, p 757 d to h, p 765 f and g, p 766 d to f and 767 c to e, post); dicta of 
Upjohn and Diplock LJJ in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 1 All ER at 487, 487 
applied. 
391 Sweet and Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd (1964) 2 QB 699 (CA);  Federal Commerce and 
Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) (1979) AC 757 (HL);  Woodar Investment Development Ltd v 
Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd (1980) 1 WLR 277 (HL). 
392 Financings Ltd v Baldock (1963) 2 QB 104 (CA); Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth (1987) 1 QB 527 
(CA). 
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that contract? 393  Again, to what extent can contractual rights of termination be taken to exclude 
a concurrent right of termination under the common law? 394 Given the importance of contractual 
rights in the commercial context, these questions are of crucial importance. The English law has 
still not fully worked out a satisfactory approach to the problem.  
3.4.4 Non- performance and discharge 
One of the most important aspects of the right to discharge is the right to refuse performance.  In 
the words of Lord Diplock, termination puts an end to the ‘primary obligations’ of the party not 
in default in so far as they have not already been performed at the time of the termination. 395 
The right to withhold performance may often crystallize into a right to terminate once the time 
for the other party’s performance has passed, or in other cases where it is clear that he/she will 
not be able to perform. In Damon Cia Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA,396 non-
performance occurred when the memorandum was not signed and deposit not paid even after a 
contract for the sale of three ships took place between the sellers and the intending buyers for 
US$2,365,000. Clause 2 provided for payment of a deposit of 10% on the execution of the 
contract and cl 13 provided that in the event of the buyers failing to pay the purchase price the 
sellers could cancel the contract and retain the deposit.  Therefore, a deposit of 10% was to be 
paid by the buyers on signing of the memorandum of agreement. The sellers argued that a 
fundamental breach occurred as memorandum was not signed and deposit not paid. The court 
held that there was no indication that the agreed terms of sale were intended to be subject to the 
execution of a memorandum. Secondly, actual payment of the deposit was not necessarily a 
condition precedent to the formation of a contract.397 
 
However, a party that is entitled to refuse performance is not necessarily entitled to discharge.398  
                                                          
393 Sweet and Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd (1964) 2 QB 699 (CA);  Federal Commerce and 
Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) (1979) AC 757 (HL);  Woodar Investment Development Ltd v 
Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd (1980) 1 WLR 277 (HL). 
394 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co (No 2) (2002) EWCA Civ 889; (2002) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 436; Stocznia 
Gdynia SA v Gearbulk Holdings Ltd (2009) EWCA Civ 75; (2010) QB 27; Shell Egypt West Manzala GmbH v 
Dana Gas Egypt Ltd (2010) EWHC 465 (Comm). 
395 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd (1973) AC 331 (HL) 350. In this context Lord Diplock speaks 
of ‘rescission’, but he is referring to the process which in the present work is called ‘discharge’ 
396 The Birkenstein (1985) 1 All ER 475. 
397 see p 481 e f and h to p 482 a, p 484 a to f, p 485 f to h, p 488 j, p 489 c to j, p 490 e to p 491 b and p 492 g, post); 
dictum of Goulding J in Myton Ltd v Schwab-Morris [1974] 1 All ER at 331 and Millichamp v Jones [1983] 1 All 
ER 267 applied; Myton Ltd v Schwab-Morris [1974] 1 All ER 326 disapproved in part. 
398 Beale Remedies 91. 
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Thus an employer is normally entitled to withhold the payment of wages in certain 
circumstances, but this does not mean that the contract is terminated. The employee would have 
to be properly dismissed.399  Again, if a seller tenders goods that are not in conformity with the 
contract, the buyer may reject them, but this does not mean that the contract is terminated, as the 
seller may still have time to produce other goods that do meet that specification.400 The buyer 
may only refuse a fresh tender of performance if it is made too late,401 or alternatively if the 
original tender was so bad as to amount to a repudiation of the contract. 402  
 
The right to withhold performance may often crystallize into a right to terminate once the time 
for the other party’s performance has passed, or in other cases where it is clear that he/she will 
not be able to perform.  This is well illustrated by the famous case of Cutter v Powell403 , where a 
seaman agreed to serve on board ship for a voyage from Jamaica to Liverpool. The contract 
provided that his wages were to be paid ten days after arrival, provided that he had performed all 
his duties on the voyage. The seaman having died during the course of the voyage, it was held 
that his widow could recover nothing. In this case what was originally merely a right to withhold 
performance (until ten days after the arrival of the ship at Liverpool) was effectively converted 
by the seaman’s death into a right to terminate. 
 
This case also illustrates another reason for the difficulty, which is historical. Prior to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, questions of discharge were often couched in terms of 
whether a party to a contract had performed all the necessary ‘conditions precedent’ required to 
earn the right to demand performance from the other side.  
 
                                                          
399 Thus an employee will normally have to work for a certain period before wages become due, and wages may also   
be withheld for non-performance in certain cases without the contract being terminated: see G Mead, ‘Employer’s 
Right to Withhold Wages’ (1990) 106 LQR 192. 
400  Agricultores Federados Argentinos Sociedad Co-operativa Lda v Ampro SA Commerciale, Industrielle et 
Financiere [1965] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 157 (QBD: Widgery J); Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refi neries SA v Shipping 
Corp of India (Th e Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391 (HL). This can cause problems where the seller seeks 
to repair and re-tender defective goods after they have been rejected by the buyer: see J & H Ritchie v Lloyd Ltd 
[2007] UKHL 9. 
401 Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders and Shippers Ltd [1954] 2 QB 459 (QBD: Devlin J). 
402 Texaco Ltd v Eurogulf Shipping Co Ltd (The Texaco) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541 
(QBD: Commercial Ct); Beale, Remedies for Breach of Contract (n 20); Peel, Treitel , para 17-004 (n 15). 
403 Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 TR 320, 101 ER 573 (KB). 
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Thus, in Cutter v Powell404  the key finding of the court was that performance of the complete 
voyage was intended as a condition precedent to the right to recover wages.405  Nevertheless, it is 
important that the two rights in question are not confused. The right to withhold performance is 
essentially a temporary one, and depends basically on the agreed order of performance; if the 
contract provides that A should not have to perform until B has performed, then party A is 
entitled to withhold performance until this has happened. The right to discharge, on the other 
hand, assuming that it is not waived by the injured party, is fixed and final in nature, and depends 
not only on the intention of the parties but also on the nature and consequences of the other 
party’s breach. 
3.4.5 Repudiatory Breach 
Breach by anticipatory repudiation is a doctrine that justifies the plaintiff’s action of avoiding 
wasteful expenditure of preparing for performance which it had been already told would not be 
accepted.406 According to the Sale of Goods Acts repudiation implies wrongful refusal to 
perform.407 This is echoed by Lord Wright 408 who argues that the word ‘repudiation’ can be 
used in a wide sense to describe any ‘fundamental’ breach, 409 or in a narrower sense to mean a 
refusal by a party to perform his or her obligations under the contract. 410  In some cases the term 
is used to describe, justified or unjustified, refusal.411   
For a repudiatory breach to occur, a party intimates by words or conduct that it does not 
intent to honor its contractual obligations when they fall due in the future and discharges 
                                                          
404 Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 TR 320, 101 ER 573 (KB). 
405 Cutter v Powell  (1795) 6 TR 320, 325, 101 ER 573, 576 (Ashhurst J). 
406 Poole Contracts 334. 
407 Sale of Goods Act 1893, s 11(1)(b); Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 11(3); Chancery Lane DevelopmentsLtd v Wades 
Departmental Stores Ltd (1987) 53 P & CR 306 (CA) 310 (Slade LJ); Credit Suisse Asset Management Ltd v 
Armstrong and ors [1996] ICR 882 (CA) 891 (Neill LJ); Golden Ocean GroupLtd v Salgaocar Mining 
Indus3.4.5tries Pvt Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm); [2011] 1 CLC 125, 128(Christopher Clarke J). 
408  Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 (HL) 378 (Lord Wright); Carter, Carter’s Breach of Contract , paras 7-
03–7-04 
409 UCB Leasing Ltd v Holtom (t/a David Holtom & Co) [1987] RTR 362 (CA) 369 (Lloyd LJ); Glencore Grain 
Rotterdam BV vLebanese Organisation for International Commerce [1997] CLC 1274 (CA) 1281 (Evans LJ); Gisda 
Cyf v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41; [2010] ICR 1475, para 24 (Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore). 
410 Shearson Lehman Bros Inc v Maclaine, Watson& Co Ltd (Damages: Interim Payments) [1987] 1 WLR 480 (CA) 
488 (Lloyd LJ); Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir (1998) CLC 566 (CA) 581 (Potter LJ); Pittack v Naviede 
(2010) EWHC 1509 (Ch); (2010) 1 WLR 1666, para 24 (Mark Herbert QC). 
411 Behn v Burness (1863) 3 B & S 751 (Exchequer Chamber) 755, 122 ER 281, 283 (Williams J); Goodman v 
Winchester & Alton Rly plc (1985) 1 WLR 141 (CA) 144 (Lawton LJ); Lancaster v Bird (2000) 2 TCLR 136 (CA) 
141 (Chadwick LJ). 
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the contract when the party is not entitled to do so lawfully. 412 Repudiation can be implicit 
or explicit. An explicit repudiation occurred in Hochester v De la Tour, 413 where the 
defendant agreed to employ the plaintiff as his courier in April but changed his mind on 
May 11 through a letter. Plaintiff sued for damages before 1 June and succeeded. An 
implicit repudiation occurs when the reasonable inference from the defendant’s conduct is 
that it no longer intends to perform its’ side of the contract. 414 In cases of repudiation, the 
innocent party acquires an immediate cause of action, but need not immediately enforce it.  
The plaintiff can either stay its hand and wait for the day of performance to arrive or treat 
the contract as having been discharged and take immediate action. According to Delvin J 
the injured party is allowed to anticipate an inevitable breach from the moment that the 
actual breach becomes inevitable and not wait for the breach to occur.415 The assumed 
inevitable failure of performance at a future date when performance would have been 
required is what leads the contract to come to an end. It is a promissory or prospective or 
possible breach, which may never occur. 416 
 
                                                          
412 As per Megaw LJ, in Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos (1970) 3 
All ER 125 p145; per Upjohn LJ Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd (1962) 1 All ER 474 
at 474and  484. The remedies open to the innocent party for breach of a stipulation depend entirely on the nature of 
the breach and its foreseeable consequence. Breaches of stipulation fall, naturally, into two classes. First, there is the 
case where the owner by his conduct indicates that he considers himself no longer bound to perform his part of the 
contract; the innocent party may accept the repudiation and treat the contract as at an end. The second class of case 
is, , due to misfortune such as the perils of the sea, engine failures, incompetence of the crew and so on, the owner is 
unable to perform a particular stipulation precisely in accordance with the terms of the contract. Does the breach of 
the stipulation go so much to the root of the contract that it makes further commercial performance of the contract 
impossible or is the whole contract frustrated? If yea, the innocent party may treat the contract as at an end. If nay, 
his claim sounds in damages only. 
413 (1853) 2 E & B  678. 
414 Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ observing Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Exch at 114, (1861–73) All ER Rep at 225 as per  
Edmund Davies LJ. In Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos (1970) 3 All 
ER 125 p135. 
415 Universal Cargo Carriers Corpn v Citati, (1957) 2 All ER 70 at 85, (1957) 2 QB at 438; Maredelanto 
Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos as per Mocatta J (1970) 1 All ER 673 at 
684, (1970) 2 WLR at 922. 
416 In Frost v Knight, where the defendant had promised to marry the plaintiff as soon as the defendant’s father 
died but nevertheless married another during his father’s lifetime, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover damages while the father was still alive, Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ observing ((1872) LR 7 Exch at 114, 
(1861–73) All ER Rep at 225); Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corpn v Citati, founding himself largely on the fact 
that a renunciation, when acted on, became final, and that is  essential to the concept of anticipatory breach that 
(1957) 2 All ER at 85, (1957) 2 QB at 438. 
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Though repudiation in this sense will normally amount to a fundamental breach, not every 
fundamental breach will be repudiation. The distinction is that whereas the emphasis in 
fundamental breach is on what the defaulting party has done (or rather, not done) in the past , the 
emphasis in repudiation is on what he or she is likely to do (or rather, not do) in the future.  
 
An example is to be found in a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered by installments 
which are to be separately paid for. Either the seller makes short deliveries or the buyer neglects 
to pay for one or more installments. A default of either kind does not necessarily leads or amount 
to a discharge. The Sale of Goods Act of 1979 417 suggests that discharge depends upon the 
uniqueness of each case, terms of the contract and the particular circumstances whether or not 
the breach is repudiation of the contract as a whole or merely as a ground to recover damages418. 
According to Male Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wmbley) ltd 419 it will often be 
difficult in a contract for delivery by installments to decide whether or not a particular breach 
defeats the whole object of the contract so as to amount to a complete repudiation of obligations 
by the party in default. However, the chief considerations are the ratio quantitatively which the 
breach bears to the contract as a whole and the degree of probability or improbability that such a 
breach will be repeated.420 
3.4.6 Conclusion 
The section above analyzed the concept of repudiation and demonstrated that it is the 
assumed inevitable failure of performance, by the injured party, at a future date when 
performance would have been required. Poole states that repudiation is a doctrine that 
justifies the plaintiff’s action of avoiding wasteful expenditure of preparing for 
performance which it had been already told would not be accepted. 421 According to the 
Sale of Goods Acts repudiation implies wrongful refusal to perform.422 The section 
                                                          
417 S 31 (2) 
418 Decro-Walling International SA V Practitioners in Marketing Ltd (1971) 2 ALL ER 216 and (1971) 1 WLR 361. 
419 (1934) 1 KB 148 at 157. 
420 Court Of Appeal in  Male Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wmbley) ltd (1934) 1 kb 148 at 157. 
421 Poole Contracts 334. 
422 Sale of Goods Act 1893, s 11(1)(b); Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 11(3); Chancery Lane DevelopmentsLtd v Wades 
Departmental Stores Ltd (1987) 53 P & CR 306 (CA) 310 (Slade LJ); Credit Suisse Asset Management Ltd v 
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revealed that it is a term used to describe, justified or unjustified, refusal 423 to perform 
contractual obligations in frustrated contracts. 424 Evans LJ in   Glencore Grain Rotterdam 
BV vLebanese Organisation for International and  Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore Gisda Cyf v 
Barratt support the above statement by adding that the word ‘repudiation’ can be used in a 
wide sense to describe any ‘fundamental’ breach, 425 or,   according to   Lloyd LJ; Potter 
LJ and Mark Herbert QC, in a narrower sense to mean a refusal by a party to perform his 
or her obligations under the contract.426  The section revealed that conditions under which 
repudiation occurs depend on the nature of the contract. Megaw LJ, in Maredelanto 
Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos427; words or conduct 
from the guilty party implied that it does not intent to honor its contractual obligations 
when they fall due in the future. According to Upjohn LJ Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd 
v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd 428 misfortunes and fundamental breach frustrates the 
contract and lead to discharge.429  
 
However, Frost v Knight used the term to describe a promissory or prospective or possible 
breach, which may never occur. 430 The above case illustrates that though repudiation in this 
                                                          
423 Behn v Burness (1863) 3 B & S 751 (Exchequer Chamber) 755, 122 ER 281, 283 (Williams J); Goodman v 
Winchester & Alton Rly plc (1985) 1 WLR 141 (CA) 144 (Lawton LJ); Lancaster v Bird (2000) 2 TCLR 136 (CA) 
141 (Chadwick LJ). 
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425 UCB Leasing Ltd v Holtom (t/a David Holtom & Co) [1987] RTR 362 (CA) 369 (Lloyd LJ); Glencore Grain 
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488 (Lloyd LJ); Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir (1998) CLC 566 (CA) 581 (Potter LJ); Pittack v Naviede 
(2010) EWHC 1509 (Ch); (2010) 1 WLR 1666, para 24 (Mark Herbert QC). 
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429 As per Megaw LJ, in Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH The Mihalis Angelos (1970) 3 
All ER 125 p145; per Upjohn LJ Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd (1962) 1 All ER 474 
at 474and  484. The remedies open to the innocent party for breach of a stipulation depend entirely on the nature of 
the breach and its foreseeable consequence. Breaches of stipulation fall, naturally, into two classes. First, there is the 
case where the owner by his conduct indicates that he considers himself no longer bound to perform his part of the 
contract; the innocent party may accept the repudiation and treat the contract as at an end. The second class of case 
is, , due to misfortune such as the perils of the sea, engine failures, incompetence of the crew and so on, the owner is 
unable to perform a particular stipulation precisely in accordance with the terms of the contract. Does the breach of 
the stipulation go so much to the root of the contract that it makes further commercial performance of the contract 
impossible or is the whole contract frustrated? If yea, the innocent party may treat the contract as at an end. If nay, 
his claim sounds in damages only. 
430 In Frost v Knight, where the defendant had promised to marry the plaintiff as soon as the defendant’s father 
died but nevertheless married another during his father’s lifetime, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
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sense will normally amount to a fundamental breach, not every fundamental breach will be 
repudiation. The Sale of Goods Act of 1979 431 suggests that discharge depends upon the 
uniqueness of each case, terms of the contract and the particular circumstances whether or not 
the breach is repudiation of the contract as a whole or merely as a ground to recover damages.432 
According to Male Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wmbley) ltd 433 it will often be 
difficult in a contract for delivery by installments to decide whether or not a particular breach 
defeats the whole object of the contract so as to amount to a complete repudiation of obligations 
by the party in default. Whereas, repudiation was demonstrated as the assumed inevitable failure 
of performance, by the injured party, at a future date, the next section analyses how failure to 
perform on time leads to discharge. 
3.4.7 Late performance  
3.4.7.1 Introduction 
This section debates the notion of late performance and demonstrates the different ways   
common law and equity have approached the question courts have had to administer both sets of 
principles since the Judicature Act of 1873. Nevertheless, the section will reiterate that whilst 
there has been a fusion of jurisdictions, equity and common law still continue to exist as separate 
bodies of doctrine. To paraphrase the famous words of Walter Ashburner,434whilst the two 
streams now run in a common channel, the waters are not yet merged.435  The section argues that 
as far as discharge for breach is concerned, ‘time is of essence’, and ‘election’ are two sets of 
rules which have not been met with universal approval by equity lawyers.  
3.4.7.2 Time is of essence  
The most obvious area of tension, at least from an historical perspective, has been the different 
approach of common law and equity to time stipulations. According to the traditional approach, 
the courts of common law were more ready to allow termination for breach of a time stipulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
recover damages while the father was still alive, Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ observing ((1872) LR 7 Exch at 114, 
(1861–73) All ER Rep at 225); Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corpn v Citati, founding himself largely on the fact 
that a renunciation, when acted on, became final, and that is  essential to the concept of anticipatory breach that 
(1957) 2 All ER at 85, (1957) 2 QB at 438. 
431 S 31 (2) 
432 Decro-Walling International SA V Practitioners in Marketing Ltd (1971) 2 ALL ER 216 and (1971) 1 WLR 361. 
433 (1934) 1 KB 148 at 157. 
434 Browne Ashburner 18; Martin Hanbury  paras 1-020–1-023. 
435 United Scientifi c Holdings v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904 (HL) 925 Lord Diplock declared that this 
metaphor was no longer helpful, but the extent to which a fusion of principles has taken place continues to be a 
matter of hot dispute among equity lawyers. 
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than those of equity, or as it was said, time was generally of the essence at common law, but not 
in equity. This is well expressed by Maitland in his famous lecture on specific performance:436  
… As a general rule a man cannot sue upon a contract at law if he himself has broken that 
contract, though of course as you know there are many exceptions to this statement. Now 
in contracts for the sale of land it very frequently happens that a breach of the terms of 
the contract has been committed by the person who wishes to enforce it. Such a contract 
will be full of stipulations that certain acts are to be done within certain times. . .   
 
Equity held as a general rule that these stipulations as to time were not of the essence of the 
contract—that for example a purchaser might sue for specific performance although he had not 
in all respects kept the days assigned to him/her by the contract of sale for his/her various acts. 
This was the general rule—these stipulations as to time were not essential unless the parties 
declared them to be so.  
 
The passage above is noteworthy for three reasons. The first is that it shows the close connection 
between the equitable rules as to time and the doctrine of specific performance. The common law 
approach is to ask whether the innocent party can terminate, the general rule being that this can 
only be done if the breach is a sufficiently serious one. Equity, on the other hand, looks at the 
problem as it were from the other end, by asking whether or not the defaulting party can enforce 
the contract, the general rule being that this can be done provided that the breach is not too 
serious.  Secondly, in declaring that someone ‘cannot sue upon a contract at law if he himself has 
broken that contract’, it assumes that the common law regarded termination as the norm in cases 
of breach rather than as the exception.437 Thirdly, it shows that the whole point of the equitable 
rule in this regard was to enforce contracts which could be validly terminated at law. Indeed, for 
this reason, the equitable grant of specific performance in these cases was often accompanied by 
what was called a ‘common injunction’ to prevent the injured party taking proceedings at law on 
that basis.438 The status of these rules following the Judicature Act of 1873 has long been a 
matter of controversy.439 Section 25(7) of the Act provided that stipulations in contracts, as to 
time or otherwise, which would not prior to the passing of the Act, have been deemed to be or to 
                                                          
436 Maitland Equity CUP. 
437 Lang v Gale (1813) 1 M & S 111 (KB) 105 ER 42, Stowell v Robinson (1837) 3 Bing NC 928 (Common Pleas), 
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have become of the essence, should henceforth receive in all courts the same construction and 
effect that they would have had in equity. 
 
However, according to the House of Lords in Stickney v Keeble,440 this did not change the 
substantive law; in particular, the defaulting party would not be given relief where formerly a 
decree of specific performance would not have been granted.441 The effect of this was to 
preserve the equitable jurisdiction in a kind of bubble, insulated from the rest of the law. 
However, in 1978 an attempt was made by Lord Simon, in United Scientific Holdings v Burnley 
Borough Council, 442 to reformulate the equitable doctrine in common law terms.  In the words 
of Lord Simon 443  
The law may well come to inquire whether a contractual stipulation as to time is (a) so 
fundamental to the efficacy of the contract that any breach discharges the other party 
from his contractual obligations (‘essence’), or (b) such that a serious breach discharges 
the other party, a less serious breach giving rise to damages (if any) (or interest), or (c) 
such that no breach does more than give a right to damages (if any) (or interest) (‘non-
essential’ 
 
To put it in another way, to say that time is of the essence would be another way of saying that 
timely performance is a ‘condition’. To say that time is not of the essence would mean that it is a 
‘warranty’. There is also the possibility that it is an ‘intermediate’ or ‘innominate’ term, though 
this possibility is not reflected in the equitable classification. 
  
Attractive though, the above analysis444 in may be at first sight, there are a number of problems 
with it. In particular, while it works reasonably well for cases where time is of the essence, it 
falls down in cases where it is not. One can agree that where time is of the essence, untimely 
performance will be a breach of condition, and specific performance will not be available to the 
party in default. However, to equate a non-essential time stipulation with one ‘such that no 
breach does more than give a right to damages’ does violence to the historical roots of the 
doctrine, which was grounded on the assumption that the breach did give a greater right at 
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common law, namely the right to terminate.  Furthermore, the whole point of the doctrine was 
that where time was not of the essence, a decree of specific performance would be granted.  But 
even though it may now be true to say that a party whose untimely performance amounts to a 
breach of warranty may obtain specific performance in some cases, such a remedy is by no 
means available in all situations.  
3.4.7.3 Election 
Stipulations as to time in mercantile contracts were generally to be treated as conditions (breach 
of which, no matter how minor, entitled the innocent party to treat the contract as at an end). 445 
The expression ‘fundamental breach’ should be confined to an event resulting from the failure by 
one party to perform a primary obligation which has the effect of depriving the other party of 
substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that he/she should obtain 
from the contract, so that the party not in default may elect to put an end to all primary 
obligations of both parties remaining unperformed. 446 For the purposes of the common law 
doctrine of election, where a person had an unrestricted choice between two mutually 
inconsistent courses of action which affected his rights, knowledge of the right to elect was a 
precondition to making an effective election and there could be no knowledge of the right to 
elect unless the person knew his legal rights as well as the facts giving rise to those rights. 447 
 If a party no longer intends to be bound to the contract it makes an offer to the other party that 
the contract be discharged. If the innocent party chooses the contract to be in force, with full 
knowledge of the facts, makes it clear by words or even by silence, the contract remains in being 
for the future for both sides.448 If the innocent party elects to treat the contract as discharged, it 
must make its decision known to the party in default. Once it has done this, the innocent party’s 
election is final and cannot be retracted.  
                                                          
445 Bunge Corporation v Tradax SA (1981) 2 All ER 513 p 540 j); dictum of Diplock LJ in Hong Kong Fir Shipping 
Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (1962) 1 All ER at 485–489 distinguished. to (see p 540 j. 
446  Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) 1 All ER 556. 
447 Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd (1970) 2 All ER 871 
448 Johnson v Agnew  (1980) AC 367; (1979) 1 ALL ER 883 and Horsler v Zorro (1975) 1 ALL ER 584.  
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In Peyman v Lanjani and others,449 it was stated that the plaintiff was not aware of his right to 
rescind by the 9 of February and by his actions the plaintiff could not be said to have elected to 
affirm the contract by his subsequent actions distinguished. In The Mihalios Xilas,450 if the 
plaintiff had, by an unequivocal act or statement, demonstrated to the defendant that he/she still 
intended to proceed with the contract notwithstanding the defendant’s breach, and if the 
plaintiff’s conduct had been adverse to the defendant or caused him/her to act to his/her 
detriment, the plaintiff would then have been deemed to have elected to affirm the contract. On 
the facts, however, the plaintiff’s actions after he had learnt of the deception of the landlords by 
the impersonation could not be construed as an unequivocal representation to the defendant that 
the plaintiff was affirming the contract, nor were they adverse to the defendant, nor did the 
defendant act on them to his detriment.451  Termination must be clear and unequivocal; mere 
inactivity will not normally suffice, although in the circumstances it may convey a decision to 
terminate.452 The innocent party is not bound to elect at once and can wait for performance or 
negotiate in the hope of settlement.453  
 
However, as Rix LJ454 explains, the innocent party runs a risk while making up his/her mind. 
Election to terminate the contract must generally be communicated to the contract breaker, but it 
requires no particular form.  The aggrieved party need not personally, or by agent, notify the 
repudiatory party… It is sufficient that the fact of the election comes to the repudiating party’s 
attention.455 The effect is to discharge future contractual obligations as from the moment the 
election is communicated to the party in breach. The breach does not operate retrospectively but, 
the previous existence of the contract is still relevant with regards to the past acts and defaults of 
                                                          
449 (1984) 3 All ER 703. ( p 721 g h, p 724 j, p 725 j, p 728 h j, p 729 j to p 730 a, p 731 c to f, p 734 f to h, p 735 b c 
and p 736 j, post); dicta of Romilly MR in Vyvyan v Vyvyan (1861);  Matthews v Smallwood [1908–10] All ER Rep 
536, Evans v Bartlam (1937) 2 All ER 646; Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1946] 1 All ER 98 and Leathley v 
John Fowler & Co Ltd (1946) 2 All ER 326. 
450 The Mihalios Xilas (1979) 2 All ER 1044; Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Melevende [1965] VR 433 and China 
National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp v Evlogia Shipping Co SA of Panama.  
451  Peyman v Lanjani and others (1984) 3 All ER 703 (see p 725 f h j, p 727 f to j, p 728 a d h j, p 731 c to f, p 735 d 
e and g to j and p 736 b to d and g to j, 
452 Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (The Santa Clara) (1996) 800, HL at 811 
453 China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corporation v Evlogia Shipping Co SA of Panama The Mihalios 
Xilas (1976) 3 All ER 657)  The Mihalios Xillas (1978) at 1272. 
454 StoczniaGdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co (No2),  (2002) para 87 
455 Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd per Lord Steyn  at 810. 
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the parties. Thus the party in default is liable in damages both for any earlier breaches and also 
for the breach that has led to the discharge of contract, but excused from further performance.456 
3.4.7.4 Conclusion 
The section above analyzed the concept of late performance and demonstrated it to mean failure 
to perform contractual stipulations on time. The section argued that time is of essence and 
election is grounds for late performance. However, the section argued that if the innocent party 
no longer intends to be bound to the contract it has an election to affirm or rescind the contract. 
But after electing to end the contract either unilaterally or bilateral, by notice, statute, law, 
implication, one is expected to give notice, seek extension of time then discharge. 
Attractive though, the above analysis457 is at first sight, there are a number of problems with it. 
Firstly, where time is of the essence, untimely performance will be a breach of condition, and 
specific performance will not be available to the party in default. Secondly to equate a non-
essential time stipulation with one such that no breach does more than give a right to damages 
does violence to the historical roots of the doctrine, which was grounded on the assumption that 
the breach did give a greater right at common law, namely the right to terminate.  Where time 
was not of the essence, a decree of specific performance would be granted.  But even though it 
may now be true to say that a party whose untimely performance amounts to a breach of 
warranty may obtain specific performance in some cases, such a remedy is by no means available 
in all situations.  
3.4.7.5 The notice procedure 
The doctrine of equity allows for time to be made of the essence by notice.458 This can happen in 
two cases, one being where the other party is in breach of a non-essential time stipulation,459 and 
the other being when time was originally of the essence but the right to timely performance has 
been waived. 460  
 
                                                          
456 Mussen v Van Diemen’s Land Co (1938)  ch 253 at 260, (1938) 1ALL ER 210 at 216; R v Ward Ltd  v Bignall 
(1967) 1 QB 534 at 548, (1967) ALL ER 499 at 455 as per Lord Diplock Lj. 
457 Borough Council (1978) AC 904 (HL) 
458 Stannard Delay 29, 178 
459 Taylor v Brown (1839) 2 Beav 180 (Rolls Court) 183, 48 ER 1149, 1150 (Lord Langdale MR); Green v Sevin 
(1879) 13 Ch D 589 (High Ct); Compton v Bagley [1892] 1 Ch 313 (High Ct); Re Barr’s Contract [1956] Ch 551 
(High Ct); Behzadi v Shaftesbury Hotels (CA) [1992) ch1. 
460 Charles Rickards Ltd v Oppenhaim (1950) 1 KB 616 (CA). 
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The issue of such a notice can result in setting a deadline for performance by the defaulting 
party; if this is not forthcoming, the right to specific performance is lost and the other party may 
terminate. As in the case where time is originally of the essence, attempts have been made to 
reformulate the equitable doctrine in common law terms. However, in United Scientific Holdings 
Ltd v Burnley Borough Council 461 Lord Simon got round this problem by making use of the 
notion of repudiation, saying 462 
The notice operates as evidence that the promisee considers that a reasonable time for 
performance has elapsed by the date of the notice and as evidence of the date by which 
the promisee now considers it reasonable for the contractual obligation to be performed. 
 
The promisor is put on notice of these matters. It is only in this sense that time is made of the 
essence of a contract in which it was previously non-essential. The promisee is really saying, 
‘Unless you perform by such-and-such a date, I shall treat your failure as a repudiation of the 
contract.’ Once again, this is an attractive approach, and has the particular advantage of covering 
both types of case in which the procedure operates (that is to say cases where time was not of the 
essence to start with, and cases where an essential time stipulation has been waived). 463  
 
The use of the notice procedure in the latter situation is clearly not confined to cases where a 
decree of specific performance may be granted. However, once again the fit between the notice 
procedure and the doctrine of repudiation is not an exact one; in particular, whereas failure by a 
party in default to comply with a properly served notice allows the other party to terminate more 
or less as a matter of course such failure, as Lord Simon concedes, can at best be evidence of 
repudiation. Once again, therefore, it is probably still too early to dispense with the distinction 
between the doctrines of common law and equity in the present context.464 In the next section, 
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the chapter will focus on the right, requirements, limitations and exceptions for restitution under 
English law. 
3.5 Restitution  
3.5.1 Introduction 
This section analyzes the concept of restitution and demonstrates that it is available to both 
parties as a consequence of breach.465 This section will illustrate that restitution places a claimant 
in the same position as if contractual obligation of the contract were performed. Restitution is 
available for failure of consideration, that is, where there is a failure in the performance of the 
other party’s consideration. A claimant’s restitutionary interest is the most worthy of protection 
since the claimant’s minus is reflected in the defendant’s corresponding plus. However the 
contract takes priority and in general, restitution is only available if the contract has been 
discharged for breach.466  
3.5.2 Requirements for Restitution 
Restitution is the form of damage that will place the innocent party in the same situation as if the 
contract was completed. The innocent party puts an end to the primary obligations of both 
parties. Compensation in the form of restitution is a requirement for discharge and is claimed by 
the innocent party when a fundamental breach occurs.  Primary obligations of the guilty party are 
replaced by secondary obligations to pay damages to the innocent party. The claimant has a right 
to recover the benefit conferred on the defendant where: the expectation and /or the reliance 
losses are too speculative to quantify and the benefit conferred is substantially the claimant’s 
whole loss. 467 
Traditionally, a claimant can only recover money if there has been a total failure of consideration 
in the sense that the claimant received little or nothing of the performance it contracted for. In 
Damon Cia Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA The Blankenstein,468 Goff LJ argued 
that the sellers were entitled to restitutionary damages that would place them in the same position 
as if the company’s contractual obligation to sign the memorandum had been performed. It is 
also argued that receiving benefits from the guilty party does not bar recovery if it is not what 
                                                          
465 Kwei Tek Chao v British traders and Shippers Ltd (1954)2 QB 459-473 and Damon Cia Naviera SA v 
Hapag-Lloyd International SA The Blankenstein, (1985) 1 All ER 475. 
466 Kwei Tek Chao v British traders and Shippers Ltd (1954) 2 QB 459-473. 
467 Chen-Wishart, (2005) Contracts, p522. 
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was contracted for.469 Recovery of benefits is barred if the defendant has conferred any part of 
the contractual benefit. 470 However, the requirement is unfair, unnecessary and it is subject to 
exceptions. 471 
 
However, the innocent party’s claim for restitution of non-monetary benefits is guaranteed. For 
example, a party that has completed its non-monetary performance can sue for the agreed price. 
In De Bernard v Harding (1853) H, in a breach of contract, did not pay D for arranging the sale 
of tickets to see the Duke of Wellington’s funeral procession. Alderson B recognized D’s right to 
sue for breach or to terminate and sue on a quantum meruit for the work actually done. Such 
non-money claims have never been explicitly conditional on the other party’s failure of 
performance. The controversy here is in identifying and measuring the enrichment. What is 
more, a difficult case is Planche´ v Colburn (1831) where P agreed to write a book for a series 
published by C for £100. After P had done much work, C abandoned the project. P was entitled 
to a £50 quantum meruit award although he/she never handed over any of his/her work and could 
not be said to have conferred any meaningful benefit on the defendant. Beatson argues that this 
has more to do with protecting the claimant’s injurious reliance than with reversing the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment. 472  
 
Restitution cannot be claimed in addition to expectation if this would amount to double recovery. 
In Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd,473 it was argued that one cannot get back X (restitution) 
and claim what one gave X. In general, restitution can be combined with a reliance claim if it 
does not amount to a double recovery but it cannot be combined with a claim for expectation 
damages since this would amount to double recovery.474  
 
In English law, the question of how much can be claimed for is also addressed. For example, 
restitution is a type of a reliance loss but it excludes wasted expenditure or loss which does not 
                                                          
469 Chen-Wishart Contracts 522. 
470 Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd (1987); it was argued that you cannot get back X (restitution) and claim what 
you gave X in order to get (expectation). 
471 Chen-Wishart Contracts 522. 
472 Beatson Restitution 5-8; 21; 31-9. 
473 Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd (1987) QB 933-574,577.  it was argued that you cannot get back X 
(restitution) and claim what you gave X in order to get (expectation). 
474 Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd (1987) QB 933, 933-934. 
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enrich the defendant. The claimant is entitled to choose the basis upon which to make their 
claim, but there are certain restrictions or limitations. Where the claimant has made a 'bad 
bargain' they will not be entitled to claim restitution putting them in a better position than they 
would have been in had the contract been performed. In any event, it is for the defendant to 
prove that the claimant has made a bad bargain. In the case of C and P Haulage v Middleton 
(1983), the claimant had hired a garage for 6 months and it was agreed that any improvements 
would be the property of the defendant. When the defendant breached the contract, the claimant 
sued for the cost of the improvements. The court held that even if the contract had not been 
breached, the expenditure would have been wasted. 
 
In general, restitution can be combined with a reliance claim if it does not amount to a double 
recovery but it cannot be combined with a claim for expectation damages since this would 
amount to double recovery. 475  
 
Claims for restitution are available even if they would allow claimants to escape from bad 
bargains. In Bush v Canfield 476 B paid a $5,000 deposit on an agreement to buy wheat at $7 a 
barrel. When C failed to deliver, B was allowed to recover his deposit although the market price 
had fallen to $5.50 a barrel. Similarly in Wilkinson v Lloyd477  W paid for L’s share s in a mining 
company, but did not receive the shares. He recovered the purchase price, although the shares 
had fallen in value. Claimants for the restitution of non-money performance can even make a 
claim in excess of what the defendant would have paid under the contract. In Lodder v Slowey478 
L terminated the contract for S’s breach and was awarded a quantum meruit for his part 
performance although he could not prove that he could have made a profit from full performance 
under the contract. More dramatically, in Boomer v Muir 479 M’s breach entitled B to quit his 
work and recover $250 000 as the reasonable value of his work, although only $20, 000 was due 
under the contract. According to Chen-Wishart 480, it is arguable that allowing the claimant to 
circumvent a bad bargain by making the contract breaker give back the claimant’s payment is 
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quite different from making the contract breaker pay for the claimant’s non-money performance 
to the recipient is the contract valuation agreed. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
Restitution is a requirement for discharge and is awarded to a claimant as a consequence of 
breach. Restitution places a claimant in the same position as if contractual obligations of the 
contract were performed. It is awarded to both the innocent party and the guilty party. A party 
can recover both monetary and non-monetary benefits but are limited to the contractual value. 
However, the contract takes priority and in general, and restitution is only available if the 
contract has been discharged for breach.481 Furthermore, restitution can be combined with a 
reliance claim if it does not amount to a double recovery but it cannot be combined with a claim 
for expectation damages since this would amount to double recovery.482 There are also problems 
concerning the relationship between discharge and damages. One problem is the extent to which 
the two overlap. The other problem is that the right to restitution damages can exist without there 
being any question of discharge; this will be the case where there has been a breach of contract, 
but the term broken is not a condition and there is no evidence of repudiation or fundamental 
breach. A party to a contract may also be discharged from the obligation to perform without 
having any right to damages. In Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd, 483 the exclusion 
clause had the effect of excusing the ship owner, but gave him no right. 484 In the words of 
Bramwell 485 ‘…the fact that the charterer had no right to damages did not…’ deprive him of the 
right to throw up the charter. The above brings out an important point which is that though 
termination is an important remedy for breach of contract the discharge of contractual 
obligations is by no means confined to that situation.  
 
                                                          
481 Kwei Tek Chao v British traders and Shippers Ltd (1954) 2 QB 459-473. 
482 Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd (1987) QB 933-574,577. 
483 (1874–75) LR 10 CP 125 (Exchequer Chamber). where a charter party from Liverpool to Newport, and there load 
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A further problem is that the quantum of damages recoverable may vary depending on the basis 
upon which termination took place. Where the termination has been occasioned by repudiation or 
fundamental breach, the law allows the injured party to recover damages not only for the 
particular breach but for loss of the expected benefit of the contract as a whole. 486 The same 
principle has been held to apply to breaches of condition, on the ground that these are deemed to 
amount to a repudiation of the contract. 487 But where the termination takes place under an 
express clause giving the right to do so, damages can only be recovered for the breach that has 
actually occurred.488 The distinction between these different cases can be an exceedingly fine 
one, and can lead to seemingly arbitrary results. For this reason it has been suggested that the law 
would be better if the two issues were separated. In particular, the fact that termination is 
available should not necessarily carry with it a right to damages either at a particular level 489 or 
indeed at all.  
3.6 Conclusion to the chapter 
The discussion in this chapter debated the terms used for ending a contract in English law. It was 
argued that though repudiation is a breach, it is not the appropriate term to describe a situation 
where the refusal or inability to perform is justified. It was revealed that rescission is claimed by 
a party who claims to be innocent and is valid when there is a material breach. But it was 
considered more appropriate to talk of termination or discharge rather than rescission when the 
innocent party chooses to treat the contract as having ended.490 The chapter then debated 
discharge, and stated that it refers to the ending of the obligations under the contract.491 The 
chapter argued that discharge is a term better used when a contract ends due to breach as it 
represents the point at which one party is no longer bound by its’ obligations under the 
contract. 492 It is not the contract itself that is terminated, but rather the obligations of the injured 
party to perform its obligations under that contract. Discharge as a process requires the injured 
party to elect to discharge contractual obligations, give notice and claim restitution.  
                                                          
486 Yeoman Credit v Latter (1961) 1 WLR 828, (CA) 168; Overstone Ltd v Shipway (1962) 
1 WLR 117, 587. (CA). 
487 Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth [1987] QB 527 (CA); Wallis, Son and Wells v Pratt and Haynes (I910) 
2 KB 1003 (CA) 1012.  (Fletcher Moulton LJ). 
488 Financings Ltd v Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104 (CA) 514; Shevill and anor v Builders’ Licensing Board (1982) 149 
CLR 620 (HC Australia). 
489 Stannard Delay 178. 
490 Johnson v Agnew (1980) AC 367, (1979) 1 ALL ER 883 
491 Martin and Turner Contract, 400. 
492 Furmstone Contracts, chs 18–20; Beatson Contracs chs 13–16. 
74 
 
 
The chapter proceeded to analyze the requirements for discharge. It was found out that the 
breach of condition gives rise to a right to terminate, while the breach of warranty is where a 
breach never or at any rate, hardly ever gives rise to a right to terminate. Furthermore it was 
observed that courts have accepted the idea of an innominate term.493 The chapter analyzed the 
concept of repudiation and demonstrated that it is the assumed inevitable failure of performance, 
by the injured party, at a future date when performance would have been required. Poole stated 
that repudiation is a doctrine that justifies the plaintiff’s action of avoiding wasteful expenditure 
of preparing for performance which it had been already told would not be accepted.494 According 
to the Sale of Goods Acts repudiation implies wrongful refusal to perform.495 The argument of 
this chapter was that repudiation describes, justified or unjustified, refusal496 to perform 
contractual obligations in frustrated contracts.497  
 
The chapter then analyzed the concept of late performance and demonstrated that it means failure 
to perform contractual stipulations on time. It was argued that time is of essence and election is 
necessary grounds for late performance. However, the chapter argued that after electing to end 
the contract either unilaterally or bilateral, by notice, statute, law, implication, one is expected to 
give notice, seek extension of time then discharge. Attractive though, the above analysis498 is at 
first sight, there are a number of problems with it. Firstly, where time is of the essence, untimely 
performance will be a breach of condition, and specific performance will not be available to the 
party in default. Secondly, to equate a non-essential time stipulation with one such that no breach 
does more than give a right to damages does violence to the historical roots of the doctrine, 
which was grounded on the assumption that the breach did give a greater right at common law, 
namely the right to terminate. Where time was not of the essence, a decree of specific 
performance would be granted.  But even though it may now be true to say that a party whose 
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untimely performance amounts to a breach of warranty may obtain specific performance in some 
cases, such a remedy is by no means available in all situations.  
 
The chapter showed that there problems concerning the relationship between discharge and 
damages. One problem is the extent to which the two overlap. The right to restitution damages 
can exist without there being any question of discharge; this will be the case where there has 
been a breach of contract, but the term broken is not a condition and there is no evidence of 
repudiation or fundamental breach. A party to a contract may also be discharged from the 
obligation to perform without having any right to damages. In Jackson v Union Marine 
Insurance Co Ltd,499 the exclusion clause had the effect of excusing the ship owner, but gave 
him no right.500  In the words of Bramwell B501 ‘…the fact that the charterer had no right to 
damages did not…’ deprive him of the right to throw up the charter. This brings out an important 
point which is that though termination is an important remedy for breach of contract the 
discharge of contractual obligations is by no means confined to that situation.  
 
A further problem is that the quantum of damages recoverable may vary depending on the basis 
upon which termination took place. Where the termination has been occasioned by repudiation or 
fundamental breach, the law allows the injured party to recover damages not only for the 
particular breach but for loss of the expected benefit of the contract as a whole.502 The same 
principle has been held to apply to breaches of condition, on the ground that these are deemed to 
amount to a repudiation of the contract.503 But where the termination takes place under an 
express clause giving the right to do so, damages can only be recovered for the breach that has 
                                                          
499 (1874–75) LR 10 CP 125 (Exchequer Chamber). where a charterparty from Liverpool to Newport, and there load 
a cargo of iron rails for San Francisco. Soon after leaving Liverpool the ship went aground and was severely 
damaged, by which time the charterer had thrown up the charter and chartered another ship. A claim was 
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actually occurred.504The distinction between these different cases can be an exceedingly fine 
one, and can lead to seemingly arbitrary results. For this reason it has been suggested that the law 
would be better if the two issues were separated. In particular, the fact that termination is 
available should not necessarily carry with it a right to damages either at a particular level 505 or 
indeed at all. The next chapter will focus on avoidance as remedy under the CISG. 
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4.0 Chapter 4: Avoidance as a Remedy for Breach of Contract under the CISG 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the necessary requirements of avoidance under the CISG. 
The CISG was promulgated by the United Nations through its Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1980.  It came into force on January 1, 1988 following adoption by 
eleven states.  It is now 2016 and there are 84 members in the CISG. This brings diverse 
traditions of contract law, thus enriching it, but also provided uniformity and certainty to law 
governing commercial transactions.506 Without a unifying international convention in place, an 
international commercial transaction would be subject to a myriad of non-uniform laws of the 
nations involved in the transaction. The CISG is a Convention which has not been changed and 
is unlikely to be changed due to the fact that there are 85 member countries at this time.507 The 
point is that the CISG is interpreted and through application and interpretation it may be 
understood or applied in a new way. Organizations like the CISG Advisory Council and 
UNCITRAL aims to aid uniform interpretation and allocation by publishing Opinions or Case 
Digest. 
One advantage of the broadly defined, clearly elaborated and closely nuanced provisions of 
contract law such as those found in the CISG is that when “two parties are evenly matched, much 
time and energy [is] saved by agreeing not on a neutral law but a unified law [that] keeps 
transaction costs…at a low level [and]…the logical extension to the CISG is also to include 
UNIDROIT principles or PECL into the contract”.508 The United States and more than sixty-one 
other nations representing quite different legal systems (common law, civil law, and other types 
of legal systems) participated in the working groups and provided their input thereby further 
enriching CISG laws to enable it to anticipate unforeseen disputes on avoidance as a remedy for 
breach of contracts.509 Within the CISG international academics, corporations, traders, 
diplomats, and lawyers have weighed in with their research contributions to the amending of the 
laws and this brings or introduces different perspectives to CISG law reform and principles that 
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are “internationally accepted which constitute a concise, comprehensive and workable set of 
rules”510. The existence of the CISG law in officially several languages such as Arabic, Chinese, 
English511 adds new vocabulary used to describe concepts that would otherwise have remained 
confined to municipal laws. The CISG upon adoption becomes the domestic law of the country. 
However, there is an imperative in relation to Art 7 of the CISG, to interpret it in view of its 
international nature. It, therefore, creates a parallel sales regime, one for domestic sales and 
another for international sales.512  
Substantive work done on remedies, breaches and performance in contract law by well-known 
academic writers and legal scholars, worldwide has been carried out under the Vienna 
Convention for International Sale of Goods (CISG) for more than 30 years.513 This has created a 
repertoire of legal rules and regulation for the principles of the CISG on interpretation of 
contracts that have been readily accepted by more 85 countries.514 Article 25 defines a 
fundamental breach. Articles 45-52 summarize remedies available to the buyer due to breach of 
contract by the seller. Article 49 sets out the preconditions for the buyer’s right to avoid the 
contract in the event of the seller’s breach of contract. Articles 61 – 64 state seller’s remedies for 
breach of contract by the buyer.515  
The cornerstone requirement of avoidance is fundamental breach in Article 25.516 Article 25 
further describes the forms of conduct detrimental to a contract and reveals the scope and 
purpose of each form of breach under the CISG. A contract takes precedence under the CISG 
(Article 6). Since avoidance is a remedy of last resort under the CISG, the chapter also critically 
analyses the importance of the Nachfrist period and its requirements when establishing the 
occurrence of a fundamental breach. The chapter argues that under the CISG, opting for 
avoidance as the remedy of last resort also imposes on the aggrieved party further requirements 
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to observe and uphold restrictions on time limits, notice and burden of proof that are essential to 
avoid. It is the choice of the innocent part to avoid. This argument of the chapter will be 
illustrated through the use of selected cases to explain the link between fundamental breach and 
avoidance. 
New researchers are encouraged to make use of cases from “…several jurisdictions from around 
the world, both domestic and international”.517  The significance of using cases from domestic 
and international jurisdictions is that it may provide comparisons of how cases are interpreted in 
different contexts. It also may allow critics to evaluate the applicability of concepts from 
different regions. Therefore, this chapter four follows the wise and correct advice offered by 
scholars on the CISG518 who argue that “a casebook serves as a selection process whereby those 
cases of particular interest and significance are emphasized and their legal reasoning 
discussed”.519 This view is relevant to my study and also realistic because as the scholars on the 
CISG further argue, “it is not only impractical, but also in efficient and laborious to discuss every 
case ever decided….”520 The section below discusses critical terms of the chapter. 
4.2 Definition of Terms 
4.2.1 Introduction 
There are a number of terms used to describe the ending of a contractual relationship under the 
CISG. These terms include avoidance and rescission, but not all of them are suitable to justify a 
remedy as a last resort or explain the seriousness of a breach.    
4.2.2 Rescission  
The concept and the terminology most often used in relation to rescission is important when 
deciding its suitability as a term under the CISG. Common law uses the terms "rescission of a 
contract," "repudiation," "cancellation," "termination" and "rejection of the goods” 
interchangeably to denote the effects of termination or the end of a contractual relationship.521 
Rescission is a term commonly used to describe the termination of a contractual relationship 
obtained through fraudulent means.  The meaning of the term rescission in the English language 
does not reflect the real nature of the remedy under the CISG. "Rescission" of the contract ab 
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initio is in principle retrospective. "Termination" is not retrospective and may be exercised when 
the party is guilty of breach of contract.522 Because the term rescission does not conform to 
principles of good faith it cannot be used as a remedy to end contractual relationships.523 In 
Photo production Ltd v Securior Transport Ltd, 524 per Curiam it was stated that 
Much of the difficulty regarding the ‘termination’ of a contract and its effect on the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages arise from uncertain or inconsistent terminology; in 
particular (per Lord Wilberforce) the use of rescission’ as an equivalent for discharge, 
though justifiable in some contexts, may lead to confusion in others.  
On the basis of the reasons mentioned above, rescission is not the appropriate term.525  
 
4.2.3 Repudiation 
Repudiation is a term used when the conduct by a party to a contract makes it clear that it will 
not perform its contractual obligations in the future. The failure amounts to a fundamental breach 
as it calls for an early ending to contractual relationship before the due date. According to Article 
72 of the CISG,526 repudiation incorporates all forms of breach. Critics who favored the term 
repudiation also emphasize the idea that it is a central term that incorporates all material breaches 
which are likely to happen in the future.527 However, mainstream critics believe that the term 
repudiation is not appropriate because it is not concerned with the fact whether the breach is 
caused by the guilty party or by circumstances beyond its control528. It is further argued by these 
critics that the term repudiation is also not appropriate because a party does not have to wait for 
the due date of performance and can hasten to end the contract despite the fact that it is not due 
to the fault of the other party. It appears therefore, that different countries have different concepts 
of repudiation making it difficult to harmonize and adopt it as a suitable term for ending a 
contractual relationship. But as I will argue below, it is not always the case that the conduct of 
the other party will necessarily lead to a material breach. Eventually and because of the 
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limitations of the term repudiation, mainstream critics found it fit to adopt a technical term which 
they called avoidance. 
4.2.4 Avoidance 
Article 25 of the CISG states that: 
a breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect 
under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of 
the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.529 
Avoidance is a term that is used to show the end of a contractual relation between two parties 
when a fundamental breach occurs. The concept of avoidance refers to a legal remedy under 
contract law, which takes effect in situations when a party to a contract is aggrieved as a result of 
not obtaining the performance for which it bargained for. The aggrieved party wishes to 
terminate or end the contractual relation due to breach of fundamental contractual principles.530 
The 1964 Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on International Sale( ULIS arts. 43 and 
62)  and the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
CISG arts. 49 and 64) adopted the term "to avoid a contract."  “Avoidance" under the Vienna 
Convention is a term which denotes an early end to the contract and comprises international 
concepts of rescission as well as termination.531 "Avoidance of the contract" is technical term, 
adopted and given a uniform meaning, in the Convention whose wording or expression in other 
languages does not always have the same definite legal significance attributed to it.532  
The question of terminology is closely connected to the problem of which interpretation should 
be applied under the Convention533 without referring to the meaning of the terms in national 
legal systems.534 The precise and detailed legal significance of term "avoidance" was defined 
autonomously535taking into account its context and function. Such a compromise536on 
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terminology was accepted by the legislators during the Vienna Conference.537 The interpretation 
of the terminology used should was based on its contents, having regard to the international 
character of the CISG.  
The CISG was drafted partly as a compromise between Common Law and Civil Law and the 
drafters wished to avoid the baggage that came with certain terms such as rescission, termination 
and repudiation.  Diverse domestic rules needed to be replaced with uniform international laws. 
Compromise and Consensus was reached between lawyers representing different cultural and 
legal backgrounds and a neutral language upon which they could reach an agreement was 
adopted538 were accepted and achieved on the  norm or principle to be used when the term 
avoidance was accepted without referring to the meaning of the terms in national legal systems. 
A compromise and consensus had to be reached and accepted by the legislators on the suitability 
of the use of the term avoidance.539 Such a compromise emphasizes the need to replace diverse 
domestic rules with uniform international law. 540  
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
The section above discussed and argued that avoidance ends contractual relationships where the 
conduct by one party in the contract deprives the other party of what it is entitled to receive or 
expect under the contract. The debate on the meaning of avoidance is governed by art. 61.541  
From the debate it emerged that the CISG was drafted partly as a compromise between Common 
law drafters and Civil Law drafters who wished to avoid the baggage that came with certain 
terms such as rescission, termination and repudiation. Furthermore, the discussion above 
revealed that critics arrived at the word ‘avoidance’ as a technical term, adopted and given a 
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uniform meaning in the Convention whose wording or expression in other languages does not 
always have the same definite legal significance attributed to it. Diverse domestic rules needed to 
be replaced with uniform international laws. The section argued that a compromise and 
consensus had to be reached and accepted by the legislators on the suitability of the use of the 
term avoidance.542 Furthermore the discussion maintained that under the Vienna Convention 
avoidance denotes an early end to the contract and comprises national concepts of rescission and 
termination.543  
4.3 Seller’s right to avoidance 
The seller’s right to avoid a contract is governed by Art 61 of the CISG. Article 61 of the 
CISG544states that  
(1) if the buyer fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or the Convention, the seller may:  
(a) Exercise the rights provided in Articles 62 to 65; 
(b) Claim damages as provided in Articles 74 to 77; 
(2) The seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to either 
remedy. 
(3) No period of grace may be granted to the buyer by a court or arbitral tribunal when the seller resorts to a 
remedy for breach of contract.  
Article 61 provides a cohesive catalogue of the principal remedies available to the seller if the 
buyer does not comply with any of its duties under the contract.545 A right for the seller to 
declare the contract avoided is also governed by the Nachfrist period under Article 63 and 64 of 
the CISG.546 The Nachfrist period stipulates that a seller may fix an additional period of time for 
performance by the buyer. The aim of the Nachfrist is to notify buyer of non-performance and 
demand performance within that period.547 A Nachfrist notice is limited to non-payment of 
goods and taking delivery and where the seller wants to provide the basis for avoidance without 
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proof that the delay constitutes a fundamental breach.548 Seller is limited from avoidance if there 
is late performance or any fundamental breach.549 
4.3.1 Buyer’s right to avoidance  
Remedies550 available to the buyer when the seller breaches contractual obligations are provided 
in Article 45 of the CISG 551 which states the following: 
(1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, 
the buyer may: 
(a) Exercise the rights provided in Articles 46 to 52; 
(b) Claim remedies as provided in Articles 74 to 77; 
(2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his 
right to other remedies; 
(3) No period of grace may be granted to a seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the 
buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract;  
Article 45 of the CISG contain an overview of the buyer’s remedies in the event of the seller’s 
failure to perform contractual obligations 45 and 61, which set forth reciprocal remedies for the 
buyer and seller, respectively. Art. 45(1) gives right to performance, right to avoid the contract, 
right to claim damages, and the right to reduce the price.552 Article 45 (2) CISG clarifies that 
Article 45(1) (a) and (b) can operate concurrently, a question that was disputed in the German 
legal systems.553 Article 45(3) CISG alludes to and clarifies the position under legal systems 
based on French Law.554 
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In an ICC International Court of Arbitration, Award No, 9978/199555, a dispute arose due to non-
delivery of goods to the seller though documents were delivered and amount was paid. Claimant 
had a right to damages under Article 45 (1) and right to avoid the contract as failure to deliver 
constituted a fundamental breach. A causal relationship exists between the breach and the right. 
The buyer’s right to avoid a contract under the CISG is based on fundamental breach of contract. 
Non-compliance with the Nachfrist period is also a fundamental cause for avoidance under the 
CISG. The Nachfrist notice is governed by Articles 47 and 49(1)(b) of the CISG.556 The meaning 
of Nachfrist to the buyer is that an additional period to perform is added and failure to perform 
results in avoidance of contract.557 The purpose or aim is to warn the buyer of avoidance due to 
non-delivery of goods and delivery of an aluid. The seller’s non-compliance with the Nachfrist 
might result in automatic avoidance as a notice would have been sent already.  
4.4 Requirements for Avoidance  
4.4.1Introduction  
The main requirements of avoidance are a fundamental breach, notice of avoidance including the 
Nachfrist period and restitution. These requirements are discussed below beginning with the 
concept of fundamental breach. 
4.4.2 Fundamental Breach  
4.4.2.1 Introduction  
Article 25 558  of the CISG states that: 
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in 
such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and 
a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen such a result. 
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From the definition above, the three elements that define fundamental breach are detriment, 
substantial deprivation and foreseeability. The first element is substantial detriment of what the 
other party is entitled to expect under the contract.559 The first part of Art.25 qualifies the 
detriment caused by one party to the other party, which substantially deprives him/her of what 
he/she is entitled to expect under the contract. The content of the provision relies on a distinction 
between elements relating to the aggrieved party and elements concerning the party in breach. 
"Substantial detriment" and "contractual expectation" relate to the aggrieved party.  
 
The second element is whether or not the party in breach or a reasonable person of the same kind 
in the same circumstances as the party in breach would have foreseen such substantial 
detriment.560 The second part of art.25 is conditional and allows the party in breach to prevent 
avoidance provided that the party proves that it did not foresee and a reasonable person of the 
same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.561  The third 
element is the content of the provision which relies on elements concerning the party in breach 
which are "foreseeability" and "the reasonable person of the same kind standard". 
 
However, art. 25 CISG does not provide guidelines for a distinction between fundamental and 
non-fundamental breach. The article simply provides general interpretive guidelines.562 In 
addition, on further analyzing the above three elements, it emerges that there are two limbs to the 
fundamental breach test set out above.563  Of these two limbs, one relates to the aggrieved party 
and the other to the guilty party. The next section is going to analyze elements relating to the 
aggrieved or innocent party.  
4.4.2.2 Elements relating to the aggrieved party: "substantial detriment" and "contractual 
expectation"  
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Graffi states that the CISG does not contain any definition for the terms “substantial detriment" 
and "contractual expectation" but gives general interpretive guidelines.564 But it is unclear if 
detriment refers to actual injury, damage, or material loss or intangible loss.565 The Secretariat 
Commentary on the 1978 Draft Convention states that the determination whether or not the 
injury is substantial must be made in the light of circumstances in each case.566  It appears that 
art 25 makes a tautology between the adjectives fundamental and substantial, which makes it 
hard to establish when substantial detriment equals fundamental breach.567 Schlechtriem believes 
that substantiality is tied to the aggrieved party's detriment and causes the aggrieved party to lose 
what it expected in the contract. Substantial deprivation is fundamental regardless of whether it 
occurred in respect of a main obligation or an ancillary obligation.568  Moreover, "detriment does 
not equal damage nor does it equal loss or any similar international or national term of art" but 
much broader than that of damage.569 Subjective interests, contractual agreements on 
performance are crucial for establishing if substantial deprivation occurred.570 The party's special 
interest in receiving performance is also a key element for establishing whether a breach is 
substantial.571 For determining the party's contractual expectation two blended concepts of 
substantial detriment and contractual expectation can lead to fundamental breach if the aggrieved 
party has lost interest in receiving performance. According to Koch it is not the objective weight 
of the breach of contract, or the extent of the damage that determines whether a breach is 
fundamental, but rather the significance of the contract for the creditor is the key 
consideration.572 Two more concepts that further define substantial detriment are discussed 
below. These are foreseeability and reasonable person of the same kind. 
4.4.2.3. Elements concerning the party in breach: "foreseeability" and the "reasonable 
person of the same kind" standard  
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This section is going to discuss elements concerning the party in breach which are foreseeability 
and the reasonable person of the same kind. The foreseeability element is a filter, which enables 
the party in breach to escape from contract avoidance.573 The conditional clause states that: 
“unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen such result’’. This phraseology means that foreseeability 
is not only a burden of proof rule but requires taking into account the breaching party’s 
knowledge or foreseeability of the harsh consequences of the breach in determining whether or 
not it is fundamental.574 Lack of foreseeability is a ground or excuse, and, if proven, will prevent 
or limit the rights of the aggrieved party and also helps to determine the severity of breach. 575 
 Conversely, when the contract does not clearly state the importance of an obligation, the 
conduct of the party in breach may be interpreted with more tolerance 576 if business people of 
the same trade sector would have foreseen the event. 577 Therefore, the foreseeability test serves 
only to exempt the party in breach, and cannot contribute to qualifying breach as 
fundamental. 578  
From the above analysis, it should be noted that the CISG does not define detriment, substantial 
deprivation and foreseeability. But the fact that the CISG mentions these terms implicitly provide 
some directions to critics to interpret the terms in the different ways they do. This point is 
important because it is the courts and commentators that describe detriment, substantial 
deprivation and foreseeability with regards to different forms of breach and the context of the 
case. In addition, it should be stated that the courts and commentators also differ in what they 
emphasize. On one hand some courts and commentators focus and give different emphasis on 
high percentage of defective goods. On the other hand other courts and commentators focus on 
the merchantability of goods, defective documents, wrong destination and failure to give notice 
of avoidance to define detriment, substantial deprivation and foreseeability.  
4.4.3 Conclusion 
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The above section discussed detriment, substantial deprivation and foreseeability and 
demonstrated that these are guidelines used by courts and commentators to define fundamental 
breach. The section argued that fundamental breach entitles a party to remedies that lead to 
termination of the contract.579 However, some critics believe that detriment does not equal 
damage nor does it equal loss or any similar international or national term of art. 580 In the above 
view, it appears that the notion of detriment is much broader than that of damage.581 Other 
critical voices insist that subjective interests and contractual agreements are crucial to 
establishing if substantial deprivation occurred. 582 Unfortunately, these elements are defined too 
generically to enable the interpreter to grasp the concept of fundamental breach. 583 Koch agrees 
with the above view by saying that it is not necessarily the objective weight of the breach of 
contract, or the extent of the damages that determines whether a breach is fundamental, but 
rather the significance of the contract for the creditor is the key consideration.584  
The section further revealed that the foreseeability element is a filter, which enables the party in 
breach to escape from contractual avoidance.585 This can mean that foreseeability is not only a 
burden of proof but an element 586 but can prevent or limit the rights of the aggrieved party and 
determine the severity of breach.587 However, it was also noted in this section that when the 
contract does not clearly state the importance of an obligation, the conduct of the party in breach 
may be interpreted with more tolerance.588 Therefore, the foreseeability test serves only to 
exempt the party in breach, and cannot contribute to qualifying breach as fundamental.589 The 
next section debates how substantial detriment and foreseeability manifest as forms of 
fundamental breaches.  
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4.5 Forms of Breach of Contract 
4.5.1 Introduction  
The aim of this section is to describe and critically analyze the nature of performance in a 
contract that determines the type of breach. There are a number of breaches found under the 
CISG, but not all of them lead to avoidance. The assumption of the discussion in this section is 
that a fundamental breach warrants avoidance but it is the decision or choice of the innocent 
party to exercise the remedy. This section focuses on non-performance, non-conformity, late 
performance or late delivery, and anticipatory breach and highlights the significance of the 
Nachfrist period as a core requirement for avoidance. The section discusses these forms of 
breach showing the rights, requirements, limitations and exceptions of the buyer and the seller.  
As each breach is discussed, it is linked to the concepts of detriment, substantial deprivation and 
foreseeability. It is argued in the sections below that it is the choice of the innocent part to avoid 
the contract. 
 
4.5.2 Non-Performance   
Article 49 (1) CISG590 makes avoidance available if a fundamental breach of a seller’s obligation 
occurs and if there is non-delivery of goods within the additional period of time under Art 49 (1) 
b CISG. Article 49 (1) reads; 
       The buyer may declare the contract avoided:  
(a) If the failure by the seller to perform any of its obligations under the contract amounts to 
a fundamental breach; or 
(b) In case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional 
period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of  article 47  or 
declares that he will  not deliver within the period so fixed. 
 
4.5.3 Requirements 
Two alternative requirements of non-performance are fundamental breach and Nachfrist period. 
Non-performance is a form of fundamental breach which calls for the ultima ratio remedy or 
remedy of last resort available.591  By fixing additional period of time in the case of non-
                                                          
590  Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 382. 
591 Yovel CISG-PECL 397-410. 
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delivery, a potentially non-fundamental breach is elevated to a fundamental one.592  Non-
performance of a contractual obligation has detrimental effects to the parties and substantially 
deprives the aggrieved party of what it is entitled to receive in the contract. This breach violates 
the principle of good faith making the other party to foresee the possibility of a fundamental 
breach.  
 
Under the CISG “violation of a duty that the seller was obliged to fulfill under the contract is the 
first element in establishing a fundamental breach”593 that may entitle the buyer to avoid the 
contract. Article 49(1) (a) states that “The buyer may declare the contract avoided if failure by 
the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a 
fundamental breach of contract.” The notion of the right to avoid for fundamental breach under 
Article 49 (1) (a) of the CISG must be understood in conjunction with article 25 of the CISG. In 
the Chinese Compound fertilizer case594, non-performance of the contract was regarded as a 
fundamental breach as seller was not able to deliver the goods. 
 
4.5.4 Article 49(1)(b) Nachfrist  
According to Article 49(1)(b)595 of the CISG non-delivery is not a fundamental breach that 
allows avoidance but buyer may avoid the contract after an  additional period of time has lapsed 
for the seller to  perform its obligations.596  Article 49(1)(b)of the CISG permits a buyer to avoid 
a contract following suitable notice in the event of non-delivery in instances in which the 
contract may not indicate that late delivery shall be regarded as a fundamental breach of contract. 
The buyer does not have to prove the occurrence of a fundamental breach.  Article 51(2)597 of the 
CISG empowers the buyer to declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the failure to 
make delivery completely or in conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental breach of 
the contract.598 
 
                                                          
592 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 386. 
593 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 387. 
594China 30 January 1996 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Compound fertilizer case)  
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130c1.html].  
595 Yovel CISG –UP  187. 
596 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 386, 399. 
597 Ying Art 33/52 360. 
598 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales 386, 399. 
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In an ICC Arbitration Case,599 the facts were that the respondent refused to deliver the letter of 
credit. In addition, the respondent declared in its telefax dated 14 April that it will not accept any 
further shipment before July [of that year]. The conduct of the respondent caused a fundamental 
breach in two ways. Firstly, the respondent delayed and finally refused the delivery of the 
required letter of credit, thus causing claimant to re-book the shipment which resulted in more 
costs for the claimant. This conduct alone constitutes a fundamental breach because it deprived 
the claimant of what it could expect under the sales contract. Secondly, the respondent refused to 
accept any installment before July. According to the contract concluded between the parties, the 
last installment was to be shipped in July/August. Thus, the statement of respondent in its telefax 
dated 14 April can be seen as a final refusal to perform because the installment following the 
April installment was already due for May/June. Consequently, the respondent declared that it 
would not accept the April installment.  A final refusal of performance constituted a fundamental 
breach in the sense described in Article 25 read with art 72. 600 
 
4.5.5 Failure to establish a letter of credit by buyer  
In the Downs Investments case, 601 an Australian court determined that the refusal to establish a 
timely letter of credit was clearly a fundamental breach within the meaning of Article 25 and 
Article 64(1)(a) of the Convention.602 This case underscores the significance of a letter of credit, 
and how, not submitting it causes fundamental breach and avoidance of contract.603 Article 54 of 
the Convention provides that the buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps 
and complying with such formalities as may be required under the contract or any laws and 
regulations to enable payment to be made. Not establishing a letter of credit in the circumstances 
of this case was a failure by the buyer to meet his/her “obligation to pay the price” of the goods 
under the contract of sale. 
4.5.6 Refusal to take delivery by buyer 
                                                          
599 ICC Arbitration Case No. 10274 of 1999 [English text] [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990274i1.html]. 
600 CISG Article 72, 19 I.L.M. p. 688. (If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the 
parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the  other party may declare the contract avoided.) 
601 Australia 17 November 2000 Supreme Court of Queensland (Downs Investments v. Perwaja Steel) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001117a2.html). 
602 Helen Kaminiski Pty Ltd v Marketing Products Inc (US Dist CT 21 July 1997 per Cote J) 
603 Trans Trust SPRL v Danubien Trading Company Ltd. (1952) 2 QB 297 per Lord Denning at 305. 
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Besides the failure to provide a letter of credit, the refusal to take delivery by the buyer is also a 
ground leading to avoidance due to fundamental breach. In the Belgian Van Heygen Staal 
case,604 the buyer refused without sufficient reason to accept delivery of goods. The Court ruled 
that the seller wrongly alleged that avoidance took place when it (Seller) decided to avoid the 
contract and that it still had to grant Buyer an additional period of time for undue receipt of the 
goods. It appears at first that Seller proceeded with the cover sale even before declaration of 
avoidance on 12 June 1996 and without any cogent reason, which means implicitly but certainly, 
that it considered the contract to be avoided. It further appeared that Buyer was not willing to 
accept the delivery even before the steel coils were offered for delivery. The Buyer’s letter of 27 
September 1995, read: “Since the delivery dates were not met, we are forced to annul both 
contracts.” The Buyer confirmed this position in two letters of 11 October 1995 and 26 October 
1995. Such unlawful refusal of acceptance is a fundamental breach, which would in itself justify 
an avoidance of contract after an additional period of time.  
4.5.7 Conclusion   
The discussion above debated non-performance. It was argued that it does not lead to avoidance. 
The analysis showed that fixing additional period of time in the case of non-delivery, can 
potentially elevate a non-fundamental breach to a fundamental one.605 The sticky point is that 
when language is vague and ambiguous on what amounts to a fundamental non-performance this 
is left to the discretion of the aggrieved party. It was clarified that non-performance is a form of 
fundamental breach which calls for the ultima ratio remedy which means a remedy of last resort 
available. The discussion also revealed that failure to establish a letter of credit and a refusal to 
take delivery by a buyer are possible fundamental breaches of non-performance that justify 
avoidance. This is so because commentators still differ in their interpretation on whether it is the 
buyer or the seller who has the final say when contractual stipulations are not followed. Whereas 
in non-performance obligations are not fulfilled, in non-conformity a party performs but not to 
required standard. 
4.6 Non-conformity 
                                                          
604 Belgium 20 October 2004 Hof van Beroep (Appellate Court) Gent (NV Van Heygen Staal v. GmbH Stahl- und 
Metalhandel Klockner) [http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/041020b1.html]. See also Switzerland 12 December 
2002 Kantonsgericht (District Court), Zug (Methyl tertiary-butyl ether case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021212s 1.html). 
605 Schwenzer, Fountoulakis and Dimsey Sales  386. 
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Delivery of goods which do not follow contractual stipulations and obligations may amount to a 
fundamental breach. Contractual stipulations and obligations are of paramount importance when 
deciding on a fundamental breach due to deficiencies in the products. The nature of deficiency 
and failure to follow obligations by contractual parties leads to the concept of non-conformity in 
goods. According to Article 35 606 of the CISG, non-conformity can be defined as the delivery of 
defective goods which are deficient according to the contract in relation to quality, quantity, 
description, texture or packaging. Delivery of an aluid, estimated cost of repairing the goods and 
failure to carry out contractual obligations can be viewed as possible fundamental breaches. 
  
Delivery of goods which do not follow contractual stipulations and obligations can be regarded 
as a fundamental breach, but it depends on the seriousness of the deficiency and interpretation of 
the court. This is supported by Graffi, 607 who states that: 
The delivery of defective goods is certainly the most recurrent situation in international 
sales litigation. The number of decisions dealing with this issue is remarkably high, but 
often it is rather problematic to establish which kind of deficiencies in the goods may 
amount to a fundamental breach.  
 
 In the CISG, the notion of lack of conformity or kinds of “deficiencies  in the goods” are 
explained in Article 35(1), which states that “the seller must deliver goods which are of the 
quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in 
the manner required by the contract.” In Delchi v. Rotorex 608 it was ordered that the buyer had a 
right to avoid the contract because 93% of the goods did not conform to the contracted samples 
and did not satisfy the quality controls standards (the air condition compressors had low cooling 
capacity). In Landshut (District Court) 609 the court held that the buyer had suffered substantial 
detriment because the entire lump of sportswear delivered had shrunk about 10 to 15% after 
being washed. Under the CISG, the delivery of an aliud is also treated as delivery of non-
conforming goods. In determining what type of deficiency may lead to a fundamental breach, the 
cases below seems to favor an economically oriented approach, based on the actual loss suffered 
                                                          
606 Henschel Art 35 166. 
607   Graffi Breaches 338–349. 
608 United States Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D. N.Y. 1994), a|'d in part, rev'd in part, 
71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 609Germany 5 April 1995 (District Court) Landshut (Sportclothing case)   
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950405g1.html).  
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by the aggrieved party. 610 Under the CISG, the delivery of an aliud is also treated as delivery of 
non-conforming goods. In determining what type of deficiency may lead to a fundamental 
breach, the cases below seems to favor an economically oriented approach, based on the actual 
loss suffered by the aggrieved party. 611 Article 35(2) lists specific standards, which represent a 
conditio sine qua non for the conformity of the goods.   
 
However, the same Article 35 (2) also points out that except when the parties have agreed 
otherwise, the goods that do not conform with the contract, as pointed out in case law: or unless 
they are fit for the purposes for which goods of the description would ordinarily be used; or 
unless they possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a model or 
sample; and unless the goods are packed in the usual and necessary manner. 612  
In the Hamm Court of Appeals,613 the percentage of defective goods was considered too small to 
justify the buyer's declaration of avoidance. In August 1989, the parties concluded a contract for 
the purchase and sale of 200 tons of frozen skinless bacon, which was to be delivered in ten 
installments. There was a disagreement in that the buyer wanted wrapped bacon, but the seller 
delivered unwrapped bacon. Four partial deliveries of 83.4 tons were made and 116.6 tons were 
outstanding. The buyer paid DM 821.21 but rejected  the remaining of bacon though the sales 
contract was concluded with a suspensory condition applicable to the remaining amount of 116.6 
tons as part of the previous four deliveries. The seller then declared the contract avoided because 
the buyer's failure to take delivery of more than half of the goods constituted a fundamental 
breach of contract.  The seller also claimed damages in the amount of DM 30,652.00. The court 
held that the seller was entitled to claim damages according to articles 61(1)(b) and 74 CISG 614. 
To assess damages, priority had to be given to the method of calculation under article 75 CISG. 
                                                          
610 United States Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D. N.Y. 1994), a|'d in part, rev'd in part, 
71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) and Germany 5 April 1995 (District Court) Landshut (Sportclothing case)   
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950405g1.html). 
611 United States Delchi Carrier, SpA v  Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D. N.Y. 1994), a|'d in part, rev'd in part, 
71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) and Germany 5 April 1995 (District Court) Landshut (Sportclothing case)   
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950405g1.html). 
612 Enderlein, and Maskow Sales Article 35.  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/enderlein.html#art35.  
Henschel Art 35 Sales 167. 
613 Germany 22 September 1992 Oberlandesgericht (Appellate Court) Hamm (Frozen bacon case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920922g1.html). 
614 Hottler and Blasé  Art 74 CISG-PECL 465-477. 
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In mitigating its loss, however, the seller was obliged to undertake a profitable resale of the 
goods under article 77 CISG. 615 Lastly, the court granted the outstanding purchase price under 
article 52 of the CISG and interest under article 78 of the CISG. 616 
From the figures above, it can be deduced that only a very high percentage of defective goods 
may entitle the buyer to declare the contract avoided. In this kind of situation fundamental breach 
is easy to assess, since virtually all the goods are defective and they are useless for the buyer. But 
other approaches to non-conformity favor the estimated cost of repair.  
 
The estimated cost of repair was used in the Austrian-Chinese case.  The scaffoldings provided 
by the seller did not conform to the sample given by the buyer. The buyer declared the contract 
avoided and the court approved. This judgment by the court is appropriate since the buyer would 
have incurred the costs of sorting out the defects that would have compared to one third of the 
total purchase price.  
 
The Frankfurt Court of Appeals 617 favored the merchantability of defective goods approach to 
determine the non-conformity of goods. The court noted that the buyer did not specify whether 
the shoes were just below standards or totally unfit for resale, as a result avoidance was denied. 
In the Cobalt Sulphur Case618 the court did not focus on unfitness for resell but on the fact that 
only one third was not conforming and, therefore, did not qualify for avoidance. In the United 
States Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp, 619 the facts were that the parties agreed that the 
goods should be of British origin and that the seller should supply certificates of origin and of 
quality. After the receipt of the documents, the German buyer declared the contracts to be 
avoided, since the cobalt sulphate was made in South Africa and the certificate of origin was 
                                                          
615 Zeller Sales 486. 
616 Honnold Uniform Law 453 (Art. 76); Koch Sales 240.  (fundamental breach (gravity of consequences of breach): 
contract's overall value and monetary loss suffered by aggrieved party;  Bernstein & Lookofsky, (2003)  CISG ss 3-8 
n.71; ss 4-5 n.55; Graffi, (2003)  Breaches,  338-349; Schlechtriem and Schwenzer Commentary CISG Art. 8 paras. 
19, 34;  Art. 9 para. 21;  Art. 18 para. 8; Art. 19 para. 13;  Art. 64 para. 6 Art. 75 paras. 2, 3;  Art. 76 paras. 1, 2, 4, 7, 
9;  Art. 77 para. 10; Schwenzer and Fountoulakis Sales 158;  Cross Homeward Trend 156-157. 
617Germany 18 January 1994 Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Frankfurt (Shoes case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940118g1.html). 
618 Germany 3 April 1996 Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] (Cobalt sulphate case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/960403 g1.html). 
619 United States Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).  
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wrong. The Delchi Case appears stricter in that it looks at the non-conformity of documentation 
and not the goods. From the above analysis of the concept of non-conformity it appears that the 
CISG offers wide interpretation of non-conformity which is acceptable and an effective solution 
on both domestic and international levels. However, the idea of wide interpretation can be a 
thorny issue because as it is rather problematic to establish which kind of deficiencies in the 
goods may amount to a fundamental breach. 620 
 
In support of the above view, Schlechtriem 621 argues that the decisive factor is not only the 
objective damages but the risk of non-conformity. Packaging is an element of conformity (Art. 
35(d). With respect to this obligation622 therefore, wrong packaging can warrant avoidance, not 
only on damaging or endanger goods, but also on whether or not the packaging explicitly 
demanded by the buyer was necessary for further shipment or resale. 
 
In the German Used Shoes case,623 the Seller had fundamentally breached the contract concluded 
between the parties by delivering shoes not in conformity with the contract. The shoes delivered 
were not in conformity with the quality classes one and two agreed upon in the contract. As the 
Seller argued that the shoes were not perishable items and therefore could not “rot” in a container 
in a warehouse. The court held 624 that the seller was not entitled to any payment under Articles. 
45(1)(b), 74, 8[4](1) CISG nor under any other provision due to the non-conformity of the shoes. 
Delivering lower grade shoes was seen as a fundamental breach which led to avoidance. And 
hence no payment was made to the seller.  
 
Also in the American Delchi Carrier case625, shipping non-conforming goods to a buyer led to 
justified avoidance. The quality of the product and value deteriorated because the cooling power 
                                                          
620 Graffi Breaches 338–349. 
621 Schlechtriem Commentary 23. 
622 Schlechtriem Commentary  60 
623 Germany 11 April 2005 Landgericht [District Court] Frankfurt, (Used shoes case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.html). Germany 26 November 1999 Oberlandesgericht (Appellate 
Court) Hamburg,  (Jeans case) (http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991126g1.html). 
624Germany 11 April 2005 Landgericht [District Court] Frankfurt, (Used shoes case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.html). See also Germany 26 November 1999 Oberlandesgericht 
(Appellate Court) Hamburg (Jeans case) (http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991126g1.html). 
625 United States Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995). Netherlands 28 June 2006  
(District Court) Arnhem (Silicon Biomedical Instruments B.V. v. Erich Jaeger GmbH) 
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and energy consumption of an air conditioner compressor were non-conforming. This case 
shows that non-compliance in the manner or mode of transport by which goods are transported 
can result in the change of quality of goods when they arrive at the appropriate destination. In the 
Chinese Bud rice case,626 the Seller exchanged high quality rice with moldy and deteriorated 
goods while loading without the knowledge of the Buyer. In this case seemingly fraudulent 
conduct led to avoidance. 
4.6.1 Conclusion  
In this section it was demonstrated that Article 35 defines non-conformity as the delivery of 
defective goods which are deficient according to the contract in relation to quality, quantity, 
description, texture or packaging. Cases were used and analyzed to illustrate that failure to 
examine the delivery of an aluid, high estimated cost of repairing the goods and failure to carry 
out contractual obligations can cause avoidance. Fraudulent conduct by the seller and shipment 
of non-conforming goods are conditions that can lead to creating grounds for avoidance. But this 
wide interpretation is a thorny issue because the commentators and courts in both domestic and 
international spheres differ on the interpretation of which elements of non-conformity warrants 
avoidance. The discussion in this section also revealed that the same Article 35 (2) also points 
out that except when the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods that do not conform with the 
contract, as pointed out in case law would ordinarily be used. 627  But the bone of contention is 
that it is not only the destruction of the goods because under the CISG, the buyer loses, in 
principle, its right to declare the contract avoided if it cannot return the goods in substantially the 
same condition in which it received them.  It was argued in the section above that it is the choice 
of the innocent party to avoid the contract. Whereas in non-conformity performance occurred but 
failed to reach the expected standards, in late delivery standards of goods are as expected but 
delivery is not on time. 
4.7 Late delivery 
4.7.1 Introduction  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060628n1.html) for an example dealing with software supplied to hospitals 
that were held to be so defective as to amount to a fundamental breach. 
626China 12 April 1999 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding, (Bud rice dregs case), 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990412c1.html). 
627 Enderlein and Maskow Sales  Article 35.  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/enderlein.html#art35.  
Henschel Art 35 167. 
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In late delivery a delay in performance in itself will not constitute a fundamental breach as 
required by Article 25. 628 However, there may be special circumstances which either expressly 
or implicitly indicate that time of performance is of particular importance to the other party. 629 
4.7.2 Requirements 
Certain requirements have to be met to warrant avoidance. These are late delivery or delay in 
performance, circumstances given on time of performance and notice to breaching party with the 
Nachfrist period. In the Fashion textile case, autumn goods were delivered late resulting in the 
buyer refusing to accept them and sent a notice of avoidance. But, because of failure by the seller 
to give additional period, avoidance was denied.  In the German Shoes case, 630 the court held 
that the buyer was not entitled to declare the contract avoided with respect to the shoes not yet 
delivered without fixing an additional period of time for performance by the seller. In the first 
case above time was of essence because autumn clothes had to be worn in a specific time. In the 
second case the time for wearing shoes was not emphasized. Failure to give additional time was 
crucial in both cases. 
 
In the Chinese Silicon and Manganese Alloy case,631 the buyer issued the Letter of Credit (L/C) 
late. The seller reminded the buyer to correct the situation but the buyer refused and made it 
difficult for the seller to hand over the goods. Liability for failure of delivery of the goods would 
have been imposed on the buyer but the seller had not declared the contract avoided. Therefore 
late delivery occurred but did not amount to a fundamental breach. Late performance or a delay 
in performance in itself did not constitute a fundamental breach as required by Article 25. 
Requirements for fundamental breach and avoidance in the above case appear to be stricter in 
that avoidance was denied.  
In a Russian Arbitration Proceeding 632 the concept of additional time was flexible and lenient in 
that the Seller got two and half years instead of six months in additional time but still failed to 
                                                          
628 Ferrari Breaches 389-400 ; Fletchner et al  Contracts,   
629 Schlechtriem Commentary 281-298;  Schwenzer Avoidance 437-442. 
630 Germany 1 July 2002 Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] München (Shoes case) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020701g1.html]. 
631 China 1 February 2000 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Silicon and manganese alloy case) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000201c1.html]. See also China Arbitration award of June 1999 (Peanut kernel 
case) [http://cisgw 3.law.pace.edu/cases/990600c1.html]. 
632 Russia 25 June 2004 Arbitration proceeding 120/2003 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040625r1.html]. See 
also Valero Marketing & Supply Company v. Greeni Oy, 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 666 (D.N.J. 2006) where the 
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deliver. This entitled the buyer to declare the contract avoided by virtue of Article 49(1)(a) of the 
CISG. 633 
4.7.3 Conclusion 
This section has stated that late delivery is not performing contractual obligations on time. But 
the section has argued that late performance or a delay in performance in itself will not constitute 
a fundamental breach as required by Article 25. Where the contract deals with seasonal goods, or 
goods ordered for a special event, or where the buyer has informed the seller that it has a fixed 
date of delivery with its own sub-buyers a delay will constitute a fundamental breach.634 The 
innocent party has a right to avoid when a fundamental breach occurs. The innocent party can, 
however, turn the delay into a fundamental breach by giving notice to the other party of its 
breach and setting an additional reasonable time. It is argued in the section above that it is the 
choice of the innocent part to avoid the contract. 
4.8 Anticipatory breach 
4.8.1 Introduction  
The conduct by a party to a contract that makes it clear that the other party will not perform its 
contractual obligations in the future amounts to a fundamental breach called anticipatory breach.  
Article 72635 is believed to be one of the substantive rules of greatest practical significance for 
international sales 636 in that it incorporates all forms of breach and includes both the buyer and 
the seller. This section analyses the provisions of Article 72637 and defines the term “anticipatory 
breach” and states requirements necessary for anticipatory breach to occur. 
4.8.2 Requirements 
Article 72(1)638 states that “If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one 
of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the 
contract avoided.” In the Magellan International case, the court639 held that under the 
Convention an anticipatory repudiation pleader need simply allege (1) that the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
question was raised but referred back for further evidence. 
633 Tune I Hague Conf. Records 365 (1964).  
634 Schlechtriem and Schwenzer ICM ss37–41; Staudinger and Magnus ICM ss20–23. 
635 Eiselen Art 71/72 461. 
636 Lookofsky CISG 63. 
637 Eiselen  Art 71/72 461. 
638 Eiselen  Art 71/72 462. 
639United States Magellan Intern. Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH,  1999, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927, 53 Fed. R. Evid. 
Serv. 563, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 321 (N.D. Ill.). 
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intended to breach the contract before the contract's performance date and (2) that such breach 
was fundamental. Magellan pleaded that Salzgitter's March 29 letter indicated its pre-
performance intention not to perform the contract. Magellan also alleged that the bill of lading 
requirement was an essential part of the parties' bargain and that Salzgitter's insistence upon an 
amendment of that requirement would indeed be a fundamental breach. International sales are, to 
a large extent, documentary sales where many of the obligations of the parties consist of the 
handing over of agreed documentation such as letters of credit, invoices, insurance documents, 
and bills of lading. This is recognized by the CISG in Article 34. Failure to deliver such 
documents, or delivering defective documents, may force one to anticipate a fundamental breach 
and then avoid the contract. 640  
 
In the Doolim Corp case, 641 the seller first withheld performance due to a clear indication that 
the buyer would not be able to pay for future installments and then avoided the contract. Doolim 
permissibly withheld delivery of the November Surplus Garments to Doll because it became 
apparent that Doll would not be able to make any payments for those Garments.642 Doolim 
cancelled the contract and permanently withheld delivery of the November Garments and the 
Surplus Garments because Doll's persistent failure to pay for the garments it ordered 
demonstrated that it was unable or unwilling to pay the agreed upon price for these garments. 643 
By the end of January 2008, Doll had failed to secure the letter of credit for the K-M Article 
Garments, had failed to make the payments totaling $530,000.00 that were due on December 14 
and 28, 2007 and January 11 and 25, 2008, and had failed to give Doolim any security. Thus, it 
was evident that Doll would likely continue to breach its obligations under both the Modification 
Agreement and the purchase orders for the November and the Surplus Garments.  In this 
situation, the seller appeared justified in anticipating failure to perform.  
 
                                                          
640 Babiak Breaches 114. 
641 United States Doolim Corp. v. R Doll, LLC, 2009 WL 1514913 (S.D. N.Y. 2009). 
642 CISG Article 71(1) 19 ILM 687–88.  (A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the 
conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his 
obligations as a result of . . . a serious deficiency in his ability to perform . . . 
643 CISG Article 72, 19 ILM 688. (If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the  
parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the  other party may declare the contract avoided.) 
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Azeredo da Silveira644 seems to agree with the above explanation by adding that Article 72(1) of 
the CISG requires, as a first condition, that the party that intends to declare the contract avoided 
should ensure that it is “clear” that the other party will commit a fundamental breach of contract. 
A mere suspicion, even a well-founded one, is not sufficient. Even though Article 72 CISG645 
does not explicitly identify the degree of clarity or certainty that ought to be reached, a higher 
degree of clarity is required for the application of Article 72 CISG than for the application of 
Article 71 CISG. Nevertheless, scholars and courts agree that Article 72 CISG does not require 
absolute and unshakable certainty that a breach will be committed.   
 
Khoo646 argues that the Convention suggests that any questions concerning the burden of proof 
are to be left to the aggrieved party. The consensus was that such questions must be left to the 
court as matters of procedural law.647 In the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Pressure sensors 
case 648 the tribunal dealt with the onus and a lack of sufficient evidence and concluded that the 
Buyer had failed to establish that the sensors were defective. The Buyer had no right to avoid the 
agreement, nor had it any right to claim damages. In such a case, Mullis advises that “burden of 
proof” should be taken into account to the extent to which it solves such questions.649 However, 
Reczei opines that at the center of anticipatory breach hinges the emphasis upon preservation of 
the contract as respect for solutions to concerns of developing and socialist countries.650 He 
states that the approach which would have the termination of the contract as the first sanction of 
a breach of contract cannot be reconciled with a planned economy whose targets can be achieved 
by the performance of the contract and not by its ending. Audit and Honnold agree with Reczei 
on the need to preserve the contract but their reasons are that rescission would lead to unwanted 
inconvenience and expense of litigation.651   
 
                                                          
644 Azeredo da Silveira Breaches  (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azeredo.html).  
645  Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
646  Bianca and Bonell Commentary 39; Enderlein and Maskow Commentary 34  
647  Official Records 295-298; Honnold Uniform Law ss183; Will, Bianca and Bonell Commentary 208; Graff Sales 
150. 
648 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award of 5 April 2007 (Pressure sensors case) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070405s5.html]. 
649 Mullis Breaches 326–355. 
650 Reczei Rules  55. 
651Audit Sales 139–141. 
103 
 
In a Russian arbitration case,652 the tribunal had to decide whether or not the provision of faulty 
preliminary sketches constituted a fundamental breach or whether or not the buyer should have 
afforded the seller further opportunities to correct the faulty sketches. In the Tribunal's opinion, 
the buyer had presented sufficient evidence at least of the fact that the preliminary sketches 
contained substantial flaws. The seller had the burden of proving that it was able to timely 
correct the flaws detected and to manufacture and deliver the equipment in accordance with the 
terms of the contract of 27 April 1992. The seller had not presented such evidence. By refusing 
to present relevant evidence, the contract was avoided.  
4.8.3 Conclusion 
The section above debated the concept of anticipatory breach and defined it as a high probability 
that a failure to perform contractual obligations by the other party is likely to lead to an 
avoidance of the contract.  If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one 
of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the 
contract avoided.” The section further demonstrated that Article 72653 requires a higher 
probability of certainty that the breach will occur. Failure to deliver such documents, or 
delivering defective documents, may force one to anticipate a fundamental breach and then avoid 
the contract. It furthermore requires that the breach would be a fundamental one.654 There should 
be no need for the innocent party to await the anticipated breach. The conduct or circumstances 
that make it clear that such a breach will occur leads to the result that the other party is already in 
breach entitling the innocent party to avoid the contract. It does not matter whether the breach is 
caused by the guilty party or by circumstances beyond its control. In the latter instance, that party 
will have a defense against a claim for damages under Article 79, but the innocent party is still 
entitled to avoid the contract.655 Although an anticipatory breach of contract by one of the parties 
can establish a fundamental breach and may entitle the innocent party to avoid the contract 
forthwith, the guilty party must be given notice to avoid by the innocent the contract.  
 
4.9 Notice to avoid 
                                                          
652 Russia 25 April 1995 Arbitration proceeding 161/1994 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950425r3.html]; See 
also Germany 14 January 1994 (Appellate Court) Düsseldorf (Shoes case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940114g1.html). 
653 Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
654  Hager Art 72 ss11–12;  Bridge Sales 415–416 . 
655 Azeredo da Silveira, (2005) (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azeredo.html). 
104 
 
4.9.1 Introduction 
In the previous sections above the chapter debated fundamental breach as the first requirement 
for avoidance. In this present section, the chapter is going to critically explore the concept of 
notice as a second requirement for avoidance. When conduct or circumstances by a guilty party 
makes it clear that performance will no longer be possible, a warning on the time limit has to be 
sent. If performance has not been completed by that given date, avoidance of the contract will 
occur. Articles 26 and 72 of the CISG require timely notice for avoidance to take place.656 
Failure to declare a notice may result in avoidance being null and void.  
4.9.2 Requirements 
Article 26 allows reasonable time to be given before avoidance takes place. Any form of notice 
is required under Article 26 of the CISG. An anticipatory breach is governed by a notice under 
Article 72 of the CISG. There are two notices that may become relevant in terms of Article 72.657 
The first notice is the one to declare the contract avoided. This provision of Article 72(1)658 
repeats the requirement contained in Article 26659 which is that in order for the avoidance to 
become effective, the innocent party must declare the contract avoided and notify the other party. 
Failure to notify the other party renders the declaration ineffective.660 The second notice, in 
terms of Article 72(2),661 requires that the innocent party must give notice of its intention to 
avoid the contract where time allows so as to permit the other party to give an adequate 
assurance of performance. But the party need not give this notice where time is pressing or 
where the other party has made a positive declaration that it will not perform its obligations. The 
object of this notice is to ensure that the contract is not avoided where there is still a possibility 
that the contract may be saved.  
 
In the ICC Metal concentrate case, the buyer began making cover purchases, which led to the 
assumption that there was an ipso facto avoidance of the contract rather than a suspension of 
                                                          
656 Anderson Art 26/39 133-138. 
657 Eiselen Art 71/72 461. 
658 Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
659 Anderson Art 26/39 133. 
660China 1989 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Thai-made Emulsion case) 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/890000c1.html). 
661 Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
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avoidance under Article 71.662 The CISG does not recognize the concept of ipso facto 
avoidance. 663 In the CISG, the contract is avoided as a result of the Buyer's breach only if the 
Seller declare(s) the contract avoided. Automatic or ipso facto avoidance was deleted from the 
remedial system in this Convention because it led to uncertainty as to whether the contract was 
still in force or ipso facto avoided. Under Article 60 of CISG the contract is still in force unless 
the Buyer has affirmatively declared it avoided. Thus, pursuant to CISG Article 72(2),664 in the 
above case, buyer was required to give notice of its intent to declare the contract avoided and 
issue a subsequent declaration of avoidance. But Buyer did not give notice of intention although 
Buyer gave a declaration of avoidance in a letter dated 23 January 1995. However, this 
declaration was inconsequential because it was clearly not within a reasonable time after the 
circumstances. 665  
 
In the Chinese Compound fertilizer case666, the tribunal stated that avoidance of the contract and 
the declaration of avoidance under the circumstances of Seller’s breach667, gave the buyer the 
right to declare the contract avoided. In fact, on 2 June 1994, the seller wrote to the buyer stating 
that, “It is impossible to deliver the goods. We will try to find other sources, but because it is 
hard to find such goods, the possibility is low . . . .” 
 
This fax shows that the seller expressed clearly that it would not perform its delivery obligation. 
According to Article 72(3), under such circumstances, the party intending to declare the contract 
avoided need not notify the other party. Although the parties did not use the words “avoiding the 
contract” or “declaring the contract avoided”, the intention of the parties to avoid the contract 
was clear. Therefore, the buyer needed not officially declare the contract avoided again. The 
notice of intention demands adequate assurance of performance from the defaulting party. 668 
 
                                                          
662 Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
663 Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales, Kluwer (1989): . . . 
664 Eiselen Art 71/72 462. 
665 Article (49) (2) CISG, Felemegas Article 49 (2) 397. 
666China 30 January 1996 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding (Compound fertilizer case)  
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130c1.html).  
667 Felemegas Article 49, 397, 451, 461.  
668 Azeredo da Silveira Breaches  ([http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azeredo.html). 
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Notification has problems with what is required timeliness and specificity under the CISG. The 
issue of time frame is so flexible and subject to different guidelines in its interpretation of a 
reasonable time. 669 Conflicts might arise as what is acceptable in one system of law is 
unacceptable in the other.670  The notice to avoid should clearly show the breach and the 
intention to avoid the contract.  
4.9.3 Conclusion 
This section debated the notion of notice to avoid and observed that automatic avoidance is not 
permitted under the CISG. It was argued that the innocent party must sent a notice of avoidance 
when a fundamental breach occurs or is about to occur. The contents of the notice should show 
the time frame and specify that avoidance will occur. However, problems with notice are evident 
when dealing with the flexibility of timeliness. For example, different countries have different 
guidelines when interpreting reasonable time. Also, conflicts might arise as what is acceptable in 
one system of law is unacceptable in the other. Though failure to notify the other party renders 
the declaration of avoidance ineffective, it is not always possible to give a notice in all situations.   
The object of this notice is to ensure that the contract is not avoided where there is still a 
possibility that the contract may be saved. When a contract has been avoided, the innocent party 
is entitled to restitution.  
4.10 Restitution  
4.10.1 Introduction 
This section will analyze the concept of restitution as governed by Article 82 of the CISG. The 
section will demonstrate that restitution is traditionally an equitable remedy at common law and 
is viewed as a consequence of avoidance. Requirements for restitution involve both parties and 
are confined to performance received. Metallic covers case,671 as well as the Printing machine 
case 672   can be used to illustrate the requirements of restitution. Restitution is linked to the 
amount of goods that the seller supplied or to the amount of money that the buyer has already 
paid in respect of goods ordered. However, parties that cannot make restitution at all, or who 
                                                          
669 Anderson Art 26/39 136. 
670 Anderson Art 26/39 138. 
671Spain 28 April 2004 Appellate Court Barcelona (Metallic covers case)  
(Cite as: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040428s4.html).  
672 Simancas Ediciones, S.A. v. Miracle Press Inc. Printing machine case) [Cite as: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050926s4.html]  
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cannot make restitution of the goods in substantially the same condition in which they received 
them, will lose the right to declare the contract avoided.673 The section below debates the 
requirements of restitution. 
4.10.2 Requirements 
The first requirement is that both the buyer and the seller have a right to claim restitution when 
declaring a contract avoided.674 Restitution is made concurrently if both parties received 
performance.675 Both parties are released from all obligations of the contract. 676 The second 
requirement is that this right is limited to what has been supplied or paid under the contract. 677 
Avoidance is barred if one is not able to give back what it got under the contract. Avoidance is 
possible if goods can be returned substantially in the same condition buyer received them in. 678 
The third requirement is that payment of interest and compensation for the benefits which a party 
derived from the goods, mainly from their use (Article 84). As in Article 78, the rate of interest 
has been deliberately left open. Equally, as in Article 78, this gap has to be filled by redress to 
the applicable national law as determined by the rules on conflicts of law.  
In the Metallic covers case,679 the buyer claimed restitution due to non-conformity. The buyer 
was awarded 50% of what it had claimed for because it had also contributed to the non-
conformity by ordering wrong covers. There is nothing in the CISG preventing the aggrieved 
party from claiming damages in addition to restitution.680 Restitution is not equivalent to 
damages. 
 In the Printing machine case 681 a printer manufactured by the seller was seriously unfit for the 
particular purpose and seller refused to repair the machine and the buyer replaced it. The buyer 
sought avoidance of the contract and asked for loss suffered due to failure of machine to work 
                                                          
673 Article 82 (1) ILM  A similar approach is seen in the instance of specific performance where a party is denied the 
right to claim substitute goods in certain instances where they can no longer make restitution. 
674 Schlectriem Article 81 259 discusses the effects of avoidance, but does not state the manner in which 
restitution must be pleaded.  
675 Mazotta CISG-PECL 515. 
676 Mohs CISG-UP 252. 
677 Mohs CISG-UP 252. 
678 Mazotta CISG-PECL 515. 
679Spain 28 April 2004 Appellate Court Barcelona (Metallic covers case)  
(Cite as: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040428s4.html).  
680  Articles74, 75, 76, 81(2), 84. ILM 
681 Simancas Ediciones, S.A. v. Miracle Press Inc. Printing machine case) [Cite as: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050926s4.html]  
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including the costs for the substitute purchase. The court granted buyer restitution pursuant to 
Article 45 and 74 of the CISG. This included the purchase price for the substitute machine less 
its resale price. The buyer was directed to return the printer and the seller was ordered to pay € 
1,194,798.50 plus interest in arrears to buyer.   
The buyer has three exceptions to avoidance under Article 82(2) of the CISG when the buyer 
will not lose its right to avoid the contract despite not being able to make restitution. Firstly, the 
buyer may avoid when the impossibility to perform is not due to the buyer’s negligence. 682 
Secondly, the buyer may avoid the contract if the goods, or part thereof, have perished or 
deteriorated as a result of the examination provided for in Article 38 of the CISG.683 Thirdly, the 
buyer may avoid the contract if the goods, or part thereof, have been sold in the normal course of 
business or have been consumed or transformed by the buyer in the course of normal use before 
it discovered, or ought to have discovered, the lack of conformity. 684 
 
Avoidance can occur where the breach caused by the defect is fundamental or non-fundamental. 
This can cause confusion in cases where the buyer cannot make restitution of the goods, but has 
set a reasonable period of time in which the seller can perform its obligations. In such 
circumstances the buyer may possibly still lose its right to declare the contract avoided despite 
having set a reasonable time for performance with which the seller fails to comply. But, the 
buyer must make such restitution where it elected to declare the contract avoided or requested 
substitute goods, despite it being impossible for it to make proper restitution of the goods in 
whole, or part, or in substantially the same condition in which it received them.685 
4.10.3 Conclusion  
The section above analyzed the concept of restitution under the CISG and demonstrated that it 
occurs when the contract has been avoided due to a fundamental breach. The above section 
revealed that both parties are released from all obligations of the contract and can claim the right 
to restitution, but are limited to what has been supplied or paid under the contract.  However, 
restitution is barred if one is not able to give back what it received under the contract. Payment 
                                                          
682 Kritzer and Eiselen Article 82(2) (a). ILM. 
683 Kritzer and Eiselen ICM Article 82(2) (b). Article 38 requires the buyer to examine, or have examined the goods 
as soon as is practicable after the time of delivery, ICM. 
684 Kritzer and Eiselen ICM Article 82(2) (c). 
685 Kritzer and Eiselen ICM Article 84 (2) (b). 
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of interest and compensation for the benefits which a party derived from the goods, mainly from 
their use is governed by Article 84 of the CISG. Equally, as in Article 78 of the CISG, this gap 
has to be filled by redress to the applicable national law as determined by the rules on conflicts 
of law. The CISG has to address the expenses incurred in making restitution, the right acquired 
by third parties and the location where restitution is to be made.   
4.11 Conclusion of the chapter  
This chapter debated the concept of avoidance under the CISG. The chapter began with a 
discussion of the different terms used to describe and explain the term avoidance. Rescission is a 
term commonly used to describe the termination of a contractual relationship obtained through 
fraudulent means.  The meaning of the term rescission in the English language does not reflect 
the real nature of the remedy under the CISG. "Rescission" of the contract ab initio is in 
principle retrospective but "termination" is not retrospective and may be exercised when the 
party is guilty of breach of contract. 686 Some critics discussed in this chapter argued that the 
term rescission is not appropriate for avoidance. It was averred by these critics that rescission 
does not conform to principles of good faith because it is not always the case that a contract is 
ended due to fraudulence. 687 Most contracts that end are guided by good faith principles and 
they do not necessarily end because of a criminal element implied in the phrase fraudulent 
conduct. This narrow interpretation of why a contract ends as described in rescission may have 
encouraged other critics to adopt the term repudiation to indicate the ending of a contract. Critics 
who favored the term repudiation emphasized the idea that it is a central term that incorporates 
all material breaches which are likely to happen in the future. However, it emerged from   
analysis in this chapter that while this is true, it is not always the case that the conduct of the 
other party will necessarily lead to a material breach. Eventually and because of the limitations 
of the above terms mainstream critics found it fit to adopt a technical term which they called 
avoidance. “Avoidance" under the Vienna Convention is a term which denotes an early end to 
the contract and comprises international concepts of rescission as well as termination. 688 
"Avoidance of the contract" remains a technical term adopted and given a uniform meaning, in 
the Convention whose wording or expression in other languages does not always have the same 
                                                          
686 Atiyah Contracts  339. 
687 Pacta sunt servanda" 
688 Enderlein and Maskow Sales 340;  Enderlein Rights and Obligations 195; Tallon Avoidance 602.  
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definite legal significance attributed to it.689 What is uniform is that (1) avoidance can explain 
rescission and repudiation, (2) avoidance is broad enough to include breach such as non-
performance, non-conformity, late performance, repudiation and restitution; (3) avoidance allows 
one to specify what is fundamental or explain substantial deprivation. (4) Opting for avoidance 
as the remedy of last resort rests on observing the existence of fundamental breach as defined 
under article 25 of the CISG and upholding restrictions on time limits, giving notice and 
providing burden of proof that are essential to avoid. 
 
The discussion on fundamental breach argued that the key words detriment, substantial 
deprivation and foreseeability are guidelines used by courts and commentators to determine the 
materiality of breach.690 Non-performance, non-conformity, late performance, anticipatory 
breach and restitution are forms of fundamental breach found under the CISG and analyzed in 
this chapter. It was stated that a right for the seller to declare the contract avoided is governed by 
the Nachfrist period under Article 63 and 64 of the CISG which allows additional time for buyer 
before contract is avoided. A Nachfrist notice is limited to non-payment of goods and taking 
delivery and where the seller wants to provide the basis for avoidance without proof that the 
delay constitutes a fundamental breach. The seller’s non-compliance with the Nachfrist, might 
result in automatic avoidance as a notice would have been sent already. 
 
It was shown in this chapter that non-performance on its own does not lead to avoidance. But if 
there is non-delivery of goods within the additional period of time it is the choice of the innocent 
party to avoid the contract. The innocent party has to uphold restrictions on time limits, giving 
notice and providing burden of proof that are essential to avoid a contract. The analyses of non-
conformity revealed that substantial detriment refers to the delivery of defective goods which are 
deficient according to the contract in relation to quality, quantity, description, texture or 
packaging.  
 
The chapter also debated the views of commentators and courts that differ on their understanding 
and interpretation of which elements of non-conformity that can warrant avoidance. The bone of 
                                                          
689 Enderlein and Maskow Sales 340 . 
690 Schlechtriem and Schwenzer ICM 87. Lookofsky Contracts 63; Ferrari  Article 25 489–550; Magnus, Avoidance 
423–436; Zeller Sales 81–94. 
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contention was that non-conformity may not refer to the destruction of the goods because under 
the CISG, the buyer loses, in principle, its right to declare the contract avoided if it cannot return 
the goods in substantially the same condition in which it received them. The innocent part not 
only elects to avoid but should also uphold restrictions on time limits, giving notice and 
providing burden of proof that are essential to avoid. 
 
The chapter critically analyzed late or a delay in performance, and revealed that late performance 
in itself will not constitute a fundamental breach as described in Article 25 of the CISG. Critics 
agreed that only when the contract deals with seasonal goods, or goods ordered for a special 
event, or where the buyer has informed the seller that it has a fixed date of delivery with its own 
sub-buyers, a delay will constitute a fundamental breach. The innocent party can turn the delay 
into a fundamental breach by giving notice to the other party of its breach and setting an 
additional reasonable time. Furthermore, when opting to avoid, the innocent party still has to 
uphold restrictions on time limits, give notice and provide burden of proof that are essential to 
avoid. 
 
The discussion on anticipatory breach argued that a higher probability of certainty must exist that 
the breach will occur.691 It was also noted that repudiation is key to understanding the detriment 
and foreseeability in all material breaches. There should be no need for the innocent party to 
await the anticipated breach. The conduct or circumstances that make it clear that such a breach 
will occur can lead to the assumption that the other party is already in breach and this entitles the 
innocent party to avoid the contract. Some critics whose views were debated in this chapter 
argued that it does not matter whether or not the breach is caused by the guilty party or by 
circumstances beyond its control. In other words, while the guilty party can have a defense 
against a claim for damages under Article 79, the innocent party is still entitled to avoid the 
contract. The failure by a party to give adequate assurances that it will perform when properly 
requested to do so under Article 71(3) of the CISG may help make it “clear” that it will commit a 
                                                          
691 Germany 15 September 1994 Landgericht [District Court] Berlin (Shoes case) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html]. 
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fundamental breach. Azeredo da Silveira 692 added that Article 72(1) CISG requires, as a first 
condition, that the party who intends to declare the contract avoided must ensure that it is “clear” 
that the other party will commit a fundamental breach. In other words, “repudiation involves 
conduct on the part of one party to the contract which when viewed objectively is such “as to 
convey to a reasonable person in the situation of the other party repudiation or disavowal either 
of the contract as a whole or of a fundamental obligation under it.” 693   
 
The chapter discussed restitution as a remedy that occurs when the contract has been avoided or 
ended earlier due to a fundamental breach.  It was stated in the analysis on restitution that both 
parties are released from all obligations of the contract. A party loses the right to declare the 
contract avoided if it cannot return the goods in substantially the same condition in which they 
were received them.694 It was then argued that it is possible that the right to avoid is excluded 
unless full restitution of the goods is performed. But some critics discussed in this chapter are of 
the opinion that partial restitution comes into play if full restitution of the goods is impossible. 
This above argument means that the right to restitution is limited to what has been supplied or 
paid under the contract.  
 
Payment of interest and compensation for the benefits which a party derived from the goods, is 
not fixed and governed by Article 84 of the CISG. Equally, as in Article 78, this gap has to be 
filled by redress to the applicable national law as determined by the rules on conflicts of law. The 
analysis on restitution showed that the CISG still has to address the following on restitution; the 
expenses incurred in making restitution, right acquired by third parties and the location where 
restitution is to be made.   
 
The chapter finally argued that ‘automatic’ avoidance is not permitted under the CISG. The 
innocent party must sent a notice of avoidance when a fundamental breach occurs or is about to 
occur. The notice should show the time frame and specify that avoidance will occur. However, 
                                                          
692 (2005) “Anticipatory Breach under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods” Nordic Journal of Commercial Law .[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azeredo.html].  
693  Laurinda (Pty) Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre (Pt)y Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623 per Deane and Dawson JJ. 
694 Article 82 (1) ILM  A similar approach is seen in the instance of specific performance where a party is denied the 
right to claim substitute goods in certain instances where they can no longer make restitution. 
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problems with notice are evident when dealing with the flexibility of timeliness. Different 
countries have different guidelines when interpreting reasonable time. Conflicts might arise as 
what is acceptable in one system of law is unacceptable in the other. Although failure to notify 
the other party renders the declaration of avoidance ineffective, it is not always possible to give a 
notice in all situations. These exceptions show that the CISG is on one hand flexible in its 
requirements to avoid, and on the other hand, the CISG is sometimes inflexible as preservation 
of a contract its cornerstone principle. Avoidance is only considered as remedy of last resort. 
And even when that is granted, the innocent party must not only exercise the right to avoid but is 
required to uphold  restrictions on time limits, give notice and provide burden of proof that are 
essential to avoid. Chapter 5 offers a critical and comparative analysis of the legal systems.  
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5.0 CHAPTER 5: Critical comparison of the concept of termination in South Africa, 
                          England and the CISG 
 
5.1 Introduction   
The aim of this chapter is to critically compare cancellation in South Africa, with discharge in 
England and avoidance for the CISG. There is a need to provide a brief context that should 
justify why it is important to compare English sale law, South Africa sale law and the CISG. 
Changes in socio-political and economic levels of advancement in the context of globalization 
affect legislative intention, legislative history, and influence or engineer the laws that States 
construct, use, amend or adopt in dealing with dispute resolution in contracts law. England and 
South Africa are not members of the CISG. Despite this fact English and South African sales law 
recognize the differences between primary contractual remedy regimes of common law versus 
civil law systems. However, in English sales law, damages constitute the primary remedy. Civil 
law systems have a strong adherence to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda .695 The differences 
between the primary remedies for breach of contract under South African and English law are 
most relevant for interpreting and understanding the differences between cancellation and 
discharge under South African law and English law respectively.  
Furthermore, it is imperative to compare the two systems with the CISG that accommodates 
common law and civil law systems. CISG is most relevant for England which is a European 
Union member in light of the fact that all EU member states with the exception of Portugal are 
CISG contracting states.696 The complexity of the CISG is that upon adoption it becomes the 
domestic law of the country. There is an imperative in relation to Art 7 of the CISG, to interpret 
it in view of its international nature since the CISG creates a parallel sales regime, one for 
domestic sales and one for international sales,697 it is important to evaluate how the differences 
between domestic legal system and the convention can assist or enhance English and South 
Africa’s sales law. At the same time, the CISG is constantly evolving, through revision, adding 
and amending of its sales laws.  
                                                          
695 South Africa has a mixed legal system evidencing both common law and civil law influences. 
696 My study does not address the new development that saw England successfully vote to move out of the EU after 
a referendum on the 23rd of June 2016. This study was carried out before BREXIT. 
697  
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The chapter argues that all the three terms relate to the same remedy, namely the lawful 
termination of the contractual relationship by one of the parties due to a breach by the other 
party. But there are significant differences in the application of cancellation, discharge and 
avoidance that warrant a final critical reflection in this concluding chapter of the study. This 
chapter will do so by critically analysing whether the questions of the study have been answered 
and the objectives met.  
5.2 Terms for termination under South Africa, English legal system and the CISG 
5. 2 .1   Introduction to terms  
The first question of the study was: 
What are the terms used to define termination under South Africa, England and the 
CISG? 
The study critically analysed three terms namely; cancellation for South Africa, discharge for 
English Law and the CISG.   
5. 2 .2 South Africa: cancellation 
This study stated that cancellation698 is the term used under South African law to terminate a 
contractual relationship due to a breach. Cancellation is an extraordinary remedy699 available to 
the innocent party if the breach is sufficiently serious or material. Cancellation is aimed at the 
rescission of a contract.   
5. 2.3 English law: discharge 
England has a number of terms such as ‘rescission’700, ‘cancellation’701, and ‘termination’ to 
refer to undoing or ending a contractual relationship702. However, to avoid conceptual muddle703, 
                                                          
698Eiselen Remedies 308; Hutchinson and Pretorious Contracts 304; .Hutchinson Breaches 278; Van Der Merwe et 
al Contracts 399. 
699Eiselen Remedies 304; Eiselein Comparison 15; Christie Contracts 539.  
700Tropical Traders Ltd v Goonan(1964) 111 CLR 41 (right to ‘rescind’ sale of land contract); Hyundai Heavy 
Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos (1980)1 WLR 1129;(1980) 2 All ER 29 (right to ‘rescind’ shipbuilding contract); 
Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1 (sale of land would become ‘rescinded’ on failure to 
remedy default following notice). 
701 Bunge Corp v Tradax Export SA (1980) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 294 at 309 (affirmed sub nom Bunge Corp New York v 
Tradax Export SA Panama (1981) 1 WLR 711). See also International Therapeutics Inc v McGraw-Edison Co, 721 
F 2d 488 at 492 (5th Cir, 1984). 
702 Beale, Bishop Furmstone Cases 546; Treitel Contracts 319; Beatson Contracts 568; Furmstone Contracts 604;  
Atiyah Contracts 48; Poole Textbook 9. 
703 McBride 
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the term discharge was used in this study to refer to the state where a contract may be 
‘avoided’704 or is brought to ‘an end’.705 
5. 2 .4 CISG: avoidance 
The study also established and argued that avoidance706 is the term used under CISG to end a 
contractual relationship and entitles a party to rescind a contract due to a fundamental or material 
breach707. Rescission is seen as an extraordinary remedy which should only be countenanced in 
the most serious of cases where the seriousness of the breach justifies avoidance. 708 Avoidance 
of a contract is generally viewed as a remedy of last resort under the CISG.709  
5. 2 .5 Conclusion on terms 
In conclusion to the section describing the terms used in this study it was shown that South 
Africa, England and the CISG use cancellation, discharge and avoidance respectively, as 
analogous to termination of a contract. This study stated that cancellation710 is the term used 
under South African law to terminate a contractual relationship due to a breach. Cancellation is 
an extraordinary remedy 711 available to the innocent party. The term cancellation implies a 
unilateral act of a valid contract 712 which entails a drastic step of bringing the transaction to an 
abrupt and premature end, contrary to the original intentions of the parties’.713 The other terms 
used in South Africa are repudiation, and rescission. But, repudiation is a term that technically 
refers to a breach of contract and not the exercise of a remedy. Rescission is used when there is a 
misrepresentation inducing a party to a contract. As such rescission desires to set the contract 
aside ab initio. The study thus recommends lawmakers and researchers to strive for clarity of the 
use of legal language and precision of interpretation of cancellation, repudiation and rescission as 
argued above. 
 
                                                          
704 CISG, arts 49, 64 (right to ‘declare the contract avoided’).  
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It was found out in the study that England has a number of terms such as discharge, 
‘rescission’714, and repudiation to refer to undoing or ending a contractual relationship715. The 
study argued that discharge is a term better used when a contract ends due to breach as it 
represents the point at which one party is no longer bound by its’ obligations under the 
contract716.  As a remedy, discharge is a useful term because it refers also to the ending of the 
primary obligations and creation of secondary obligations under the contract. 717 It is not the 
contract itself that is terminated, but rather the obligations of the injured party to perform its 
obligations under that contract. Rescission was understood to refer to the retrospective 
cancellation of a contract ab initio, as for instance, when one party is guilty of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. It was argued that repudiation is a breach and, therefore, is not the appropriate 
term to describe a situation where the refusal or inability to perform is justified. From the above 
critical analysis the conceptual muddle718 has been clarified. As pointed above, the term 
discharge was preferred in this study to refer to the state where a contract may be ‘avoided’719 or 
is brought to ‘an end’.720  
 
The study argued that avoidance ends contractual relationships where the conduct by one party in 
the contract deprives the other party of what it is entitled to receive or expect under the contract. 
The debate above on what avoidance is, is governed by art. 61. 721  From the debate it emerged 
that the CISG was drafted partly as a compromise between Common law drafters and Civil Law 
                                                          
714Tropical Traders Ltd v Goonan(1964) 111 CLR 41 (right to ‘rescind’ sale of land contract); Hyundai Heavy 
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717 Martin and Turner Contracts 400. 
718 Treitel  Contracts 139.  
719 Honnold Uniform Law  CISG, Arts 49, 64 (right to ‘declare the contract avoided’).  
720Ashdown v Kirk (1999) 2 Qd R 1 at 5 (sale of land to be ‘at an end’). 
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If the buyer fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or the Convention, the seller may:  
(c) Exercise the rights provided in Articles 62 to 65; 
(d) Claim damages as provided in Articles 74 to 77. 
(2) The seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to either 
remedy. 
(3) No period of grace may be granted to the buyer by a court or arbitral tribunal when the seller resorts to a 
remedy for breach of contract.  
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drafters who wished to avoid the baggage that came with certain terms such as rescission, 
termination and repudiation. Furthermore, the discussion above revealed that critics arrived at the 
word ‘avoidance’ as a technical term, adopted and given a uniform meaning in the Convention 
whose wording or expression in other languages does not always have the same definite legal 
significance attributed to it. Diverse domestic rules needed to be replaced with uniform 
international laws. The section argued that a compromise and consensus had to be reached and 
accepted by the legislators on the suitability of the use of the term avoidance. 722 Furthermore the 
discussion maintained that under the CISG avoidance denotes an early end to the contract and 
comprises national concepts of rescission and termination. 723  As stated in the introduction to 
this chapter, all three terms, namely, cancellation, discharge and avoidance relate to the same 
remedy, namely the lawful termination of the contractual relationship by one of the parties due to 
a breach by the other party. But, it is cautioned in this study that researchers need to be aware of 
the possible confusion that may result from the use of different terminology if one is not careful 
when doing comparative research and reading foreign cases. 
5.3 Requirements for cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
5.3 .1 Introduction  
The third question of the study required a discussion of the requirements of termination of 
contract under South Africa, England and the CISG. The question was: 
What are the requirements for termination under South Africa, England and the CISG? 
In response to this question it was noted that the main requirements for termination of contract in 
South African law are the acknowledgment of the materiality of breach, production of notice of 
cancellation and mutual restitution. Under English law the main requires are fundamental or 
repudiatory breach, election, affirmation and termination, while for the CISG, the main 
requirements are fundamental breach, notice for avoidance and Nachfrist period. These 
requirements are critically analysed in the sections below. 
5.3 .2 Requirements for cancellation 
The study established that in South African law, there are three requirements necessary for 
cancellation. These are materiality, notice of cancellation and mutual restitution.724 In order to 
                                                          
722 Harvard Unification 97.   
723 Enderlein and Maskow Remedies 340; Enderlein Rights 195; Tallon Avoidance 602; Bianca and  Bonell 
Commentary 28.  
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show how significant these requirements are to cancelling or terminating a contract, it is 
important to recap the arguments made in chapter two, starting with the idea of materiality. 
Chapter two identified late performance, positive mal-performance, prevention of performance, 
and repudiation, (anticipatory breach) as material/serious breaches that may result in the coming 
to an end of a contract725. The principles that inform the decision to bring a contract to an end 
have been discussed above, in this chapter.  So, what is key and deserves emphasizing further in 
this section is the meaning of ‘materiality’ of a breach. Material breach is a serious breach that 
goes to the root of the contract.  Going to the root means that the contract has been destroyed 
fundamentally, in such a way that it prevents a party from getting what it initially bargained for. 
However, a minor breach can result in an abrupt ending of a contract when a cancellation clause 
or lex commissoria is present. 
It was also argued in chapter two that South African law requires that notice of cancellation be 
clear and unequivocal, and takes effect from the time it is communicated to the other party726. 
This means that once a major breach justifies cancellation, the innocent party is faced with an 
election either to affirm or cancel the contract. The innocent party is given reasonable time to 
elect.727 An election once made is final and irrevocable, unless the other party consents to its 
reversal.  If the injured party elects to cancel the contract, he/she must notify the other party of 
the decision, and the language in the notice of cancellation must not be ambiguous728. But, 
failure to make the election within a reasonable time, may lead to the inevitable conclusion that 
the innocent party has elected to keep the contract intact. In the event of late performance, the 
innocent party may only cancel the contract when the period of time stipulated in notice of 
cancellation of contract is reasonable under the circumstances. 
The significance of notice of cancellation is that it spells out obligations of the party and reveals 
the procedures to be followed when one cancels within reasonable time. If these procedures are 
not followed one cannot cancel. Although the requirement of notice of cancellation mentions 
reasonable time what amounts to ‘reasonable time’ is a flexible concept. This fact suggests that 
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exactly how long reasonable time is, remains vague and a grey area. This legal ambiguity 
suggests that South Africa law needs to be precise with legal terms to avoid time wasting when 
dealing with cases that involve cancellation. Furthermore, there is need for South African legal 
experts to distinguish notice from choice to elect to end a contract and capture these terms 
separately in the country’s published/printed sales law statutes.  
In this study, it was argued that restitution is a consequence of cancellation under South African 
law729. Restitution requires both parties to restore or give back whatever performance that was 
received in the contract before it was cancelled730. This requirement is significant because 
cancellation extinguishes obligations as well as creating new obligations. On the positive side 
restitution restores confidence, certainty and each party is entitled to get damages in the end. 
However, this same requirement can be rather too strict for the parties because if there is no 
restitution, there is no cancellation. It is important to stress that in South African law restitution 
might not be exactly in the same manner in terms of quality and quantity as one would have 
invested time, money and effort which are measurable. There is, therefore, need to craft 
restitution laws that can come close and as precise as possible to the quantum of damage whether 
it is measured in money or performance and create an atmosphere of legal certainty of what 
penalties awaits the defaulting party. 
5. 3.3 Requirements for discharge 
It was revealed in this study that the requirements for discharge are fundamental or repudiatory 
breach, election, affirmation and termination.731 A fundamental breach undermines the core of 
contract. Anticipatory repudiation justifies the plaintiff’s action of avoiding wasteful expenditure 
of preparing for performance which the plaintiff had been already told would not be accepted. 732 
Every breach of contract can give rise to a claim for damages,733 and this fact gives an aggrieved 
party the incentive and right to undo the contract by terminating or rescission. Requirements for 
rescission are order of performance and serious failure to perform resulting in depriving the 
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injured party of ‘substantially the whole benefit’ 734which was intended and that one should 
obtain; or when the breach ‘goes to the root of the problem’.735 
It was observed in the study that under English law, the requirements of performance maybe in 
the agreed order but deficient in quantity or quality, or may be tendered after the agreed time736. 
Furthermore, it was noted that the requirement may be expressed in vague phrases. However, on 
the positive side, English Law has anticipated the limitations of the façade behind the vague 
language. English courts have applied a number of practical tests to bring a sense of confidence 
and certainty to the ambiguous terms of the requirements737. For example, on the issue of 
deciding the adequacy of damages, the first test is meant to ensure that the injured party is 
adequately protected by either an action of damages or drastic remedy in the form of rescission.  
On the requirement of reasonableness of time of accepting further performance, it was observed 
that English courts apply the relevant factor being the ratio of failure to the performance that was 
bargained for. In one case738 and in another case,739 a tenor had been engaged for the 1875 
season at Covet Garden, which was to last for three and a half months. It was held that this 
failure to attend rehearsal on account of illness on 4 out of 6 days before the season opened did 
not justify dismissal.  The test was used to determine whether or not failure to remedy the un-
seaworthiness of a chartered ship justifies rescission of the charter party.740 The English courts 
have also used the ulterior motives test. In this test, a bad bargain is the cause why courts are 
reluctant to hold that failure was sufficiently serious as ‘contracts are made to be performed and 
not to be avoided according to the whims of the fluctuating markets’.741 
It can be restated that, arguably the English law is flexible and possibly a realistic approach 
because a person may be held to have repudiated a contract without intending to do so742. 
However, it is not what the party intends that matters, but the reasonable interpretation that may 
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be placed on the party’s words or behavior by the other party. Furthermore, a breach or 
repudiation is treated very much like a contractual offer in that it has no legal effect until it is 
accepted743. The other party is entitled to either accept or affirm the contract, and thus in effect 
reject the proposed termination. Acceptance may be express or inferred from conduct. However, 
a party may be bound by an acceptance of breach or repudiation either because it intended to 
accept it, or because the party has led the other party to believe that it intended to do so, and 
thereby induce the other party to act to its prejudice. In short, in English law, if the contract is 
affirmed following a repudiatory breach, both parties must continue to perform their contractual 
obligations.744 
5.3.4 Requirements for avoidance  
The main requirements for avoidance under the CISG are a fundamental or a material breach, 
notice for avoidance, and compliance with the Nachfrist period requirements in the case of late 
delivery. 745 Article 25 is central in its importance for the CISG.746 The article emphasizes the 
preservation of the contract (favor contractus) and the relationship created under it. However, 
avoidance is seen as an extraordinary remedy.747 Late delivery, non-conformity, non-
performance and anticipatory breach are the forms of material breach under CISG748. However, 
what is emphasized in the interpretation of what is substantive of breach and that may result in 
avoidance is viewed different by scholars. For example, delivery does not in itself constitute a 
fundamental breach. It must be made fundamental by complying with the Nachfrist period 
requirements. But, non-conformity focuses on lack of conformity as a condition for avoiding.  In 
contrast, failure to provide a letter of credit and refusal to take delivery justifies an avoidance of 
contract after an additional period of time. In anticipatory breach the innocent party is entitled to 
avoid a contract based on an expectation loss.749 However, the aggrieved party has to prove the 
anticipated detriment to the contract and provide evidence of possible substantial deprivation that 
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the party did not foresee and that a reasonable party would not have foreseen such a loss.” 750 
The study argued that although Nachfrist can lead to automatic avoidance, the CISG has an in-
built understanding that assumes the aggrieved party must give notice and then elect to avoid a 
contract. 
5.4 Conclusions to requirements for cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
This conclusion critically summarized the analysis of the requirements of cancellation, discharge 
and avoidance in greater detail. The study revealed that South Africa uses the terms materiality, 
notice of cancellation and mutual restitution as requirements of terminating a contract. It was 
observed that each of these terms emphasize different aspects of what constitutes materiality. 
Mora debitoris entitles or warrants cancellation of a contract in the presence of a cancellation 
clause, when “time is of the essence”. But when time is not of essence a material breach has to 
be present.  The significance of the notion "time is of the essence of the contract" relates to the 
consequences of the breach and not to the breach itself. However, there appears to be conflict of 
authority in that when no time for performance is fixed but, ‘time is of the essence’, the debtor is 
not in mora and the creditor cannot cancel for nonperformance unless a proper demand for 
performance has been made. 
 The study was supported by scholars 751 in arguing that mora creditoris is a material breach that 
occurs when the creditor culpably fails to cooperate timeously with the debtor so that the latter 
may perform his or her obligations.752  But it also emerged in the analysis that the main effect of 
mora creditoris might shift responsibility for further delay or nonperformance onto the 
creditor753 or  might make it impossible for the debtor to perform on time. 754 In chapter four the 
study further argued and most mainstream scholars agreed that although giving notice usually 
justifies the grounds upon which the contract may be cancelled, the innocent party is faced with 
an election either to affirm or cancel the contract.755 The study argued that restitution aims to 
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return the parties to the position they were in before the contract,756 either by payment of money 
equivalent or through the recovery of goods or duties already performed.  757  
On the requirements for discharge in England, the study revealed that emphasis is placed on 
fundamental or repudiatory breach, election, affirmation and termination. The study showed that 
all the breaches under English law are underwritten or defined by an assumption that time is of 
essence and also that one is expected to give notice, and elects to discharge. It was argued in the 
study that similar to South African law, as the analysis758 on English law might appear at first 
sight, there are a number of differences.  Firstly, in English law where time is of the essence, 
untimely performance will be a breach of condition, and specific performance will not be 
available to the party in default. Secondly, in English law, to equate a non-essential time 
stipulation with one such that no breach does more than give a right to damages does violence to 
the historical roots of the doctrine, which was grounded on the assumption that the breach did 
give a greater right at common law, namely the right to terminate.  Where time was not of the 
essence, a decree of specific performance would be granted.  But even though it may now be true 
to say that a party whose untimely performance amounts to a breach of warranty may obtain 
specific performance in some cases, such a remedy is by no means available in all situations.  
The study demonstrated that in the CISG, fundamental or a material breach, notice for 
avoidance, and the Nachfrist period, are necessary requirements to justify avoidance. The debate 
on fundamental breach concluded that the key words detriment, substantial deprivation and 
foreseeability are guidelines used by courts and commentators to determine the materiality of 
breach.759 The study stated that a right for the seller to declare the contract avoided is governed 
by the Nachfrist period under Article 63 and 64 of the CISG which allows additional time for 
buyer before contract is avoided. A Nachfrist notice is limited to non-payment of goods and 
taking delivery and where the seller wants to provide the basis for avoidance without proof that 
the delay constitutes a fundamental breach. The seller’s non-compliance with the Nachfrist, 
might result in automatic avoidance as a notice would have been sent already. While it appears 
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that in the CISG, Nachfrist can lead to automatic avoidance, in South Africa a party has to give 
notice to cancel unlike in English law where a party must first give notice and then chose to elect 
to discharge. 
The CISG believes that in the interpretation, international case law should be used even though it 
is not binding. The thinking or reasoning behind the above assertion is that conflicts might arise 
because what is acceptable in one system of law may or actually is unacceptable in the other. In 
the CISG, although failure to notify the other party renders the declaration of avoidance 
ineffective, it is not always possible to give a notice in all situations. These exceptions show that 
the CISG is on one hand flexible in its requirements to avoid, and on the other hand, the CISG is 
sometimes inflexible as preservation of a contract its cornerstone principle. Avoidance is only 
considered as remedy of last resort. And even when that is granted, the innocent party must not 
only exercise the right to avoid but is required to uphold  restrictions on time limits, give notice 
and provide burden of proof that are essential to avoid.  
The three systems760 analysed in this study are similar in that they distinguish between 
fundamental/material breach and non-fundamental or non-material breach.  
The significance of this agreement among the three systems is that the above distinctions are 
viewed as being at the heart of what determines the life or death of a contract. South Africa and 
the CISG are further similar in that they seem reluctant to grant the remedy of cancellation and 
avoidance respectively. The two legal systems emphasize the preservation of the enforceability 
of the contract and therefore are strict in their application of the requirements of cancellation and 
avoidance.  
While notice is crucial for termination of a contract in all the three systems, the CISG and 
England go further to stipulate that the party wishing to terminate a contract must elect to do so 
and communicate this intention to the other party. 761Under the CISG, fundamental breach rests 
on a nuanced description of what is detrimental, substantial deprivation and foreseeability that 
may lead to voiding the contract. It is the existence of the meanings of several terms explained 
and included in the CISG articles that inclined my study to argue that the CISG reveals 
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considerable clarity and flexibility in the terms it uses. This can provide critics and lawmakers 
with interpretive space that is broad as well as specific, drawn from domestic and international 
context but still speaking to or addressing the uniqueness of the law of each of the country that is 
signatory to the CISG. This is unlike South African law that limits its definition of cancellation 
to materiality and fundamental breach. England simply describes its term as fundamental breach. 
The difference in the terminology used is significant in that it can sensitize researchers to be 
aware of the possibility of confusion that may arise when dealing with foreign cases.  
However, one of the most important differences of the legal systems is that the CISG calls for the 
Nachfrist period while South Africa places the guilty party in mora under late performance. 
England uses estoppel to prevent the guilty party from performing. The CISG uses article 26 for 
notification, unlike the SGA which uses section 15. CISG and South Africa state that the time 
factor for giving notice should be reasonable. The CISG does not state the degree of 
reasonableness and therefore, it appears to be flexible. Furthermore the CISG and South Africa 
allow the seller to cure its breach, unlike England that does not give a long time because it is 
inclined to favor discharge. 
5.5 Consequences of cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
 5.5.1   Introduction 
The study explored the consequences of cancellation, discharge and avoidance under South 
Africa, England and the CISG respectively. It was found out that there are similarities and 
differences among the three legal systems and these are discussed in the sections below. 
 5.5.2 Consequences of cancellation under South African law 
Consequences of cancellation under South African Law are that parties are discharged from 
performing further obligations762. The party cancelling must also be able to restore performance. 
Exceptions are available due to impossibility such as the loss not being the fault of the guilty 
party or due to inherent defect. Damages also establish the necessary elements of one’s claim 
such as a party committing a breach of contract or falling into mora creditoris, that the innocent 
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party has suffered loss for which the guilty party is liable763. The object of the award of damages 
is to compensate the creditor for the loss it has suffered.   
5.5.3 Consequences of discharge under English Law 
The requirements for discharge are fundamental or repudiatory breach, election, affirmation and 
termination.764However, the consequences765 for discharge relate to the obligations of parties for 
termination of contract. For example, while discharge absolves the guilty party from performing 
primary duties under the contract, the same primary duties are replaced by secondary obligations 
to pay damages. While the innocent party is absolved from having to perform any duties not yet 
due under the contract and is freed from all further liabilities, this absolution is subject to the 
question of obligations which should have been performed. Additionally, while both parties are 
liable in respect of accrued obligations which should have been performed before the 
termination, previously accrued obligations of the innocent party remain binding on it even after 
termination. In the case of the innocent party treating the contract as having ended, it would be 
better to talk of termination or discharge rather than rescission.766 This is because the innocent 
party would have elected to treat the contract as discharged. However, the party must make its 
decision known to the party in default since breach does not operate retrospectively. 767 
5.5.4 Consequences of avoidance under the CISG 
The study noted that the CISG also provides release from obligations, restitution of what has 
already been performed, the right to calculate damages in an abstract way, and the duty to 
preserve the goods as consequences of a valid avoidance of the contract768. Parties are released 
from contractual obligations when avoidance occurs. Central obligations under the contract must 
end when termination becomes effective (Article 81(1)769. However, jurisdiction, and arbitration 
clauses as well as damages remain in force despite any valid declaration of avoidance (Article 
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81(1)770. Restitution entitles parties to reclaim what they supplied or paid under the contract 
(Article 81(2)771. Interest on any sum of money has to be repaid and compensation is provided 
for the benefits which a party derived from the use of the goods (Article 84)772. While an abstract 
calculation of damages for any loss occurs for any damage is made, the party in possession or 
control of the goods which require restitution has to take reasonable steps to preserve those 
goods in the interest of the other party, even if the contract has been rightfully terminated 
(Articles 85 and 86)773. This duty of preservation also survives the termination of the contract. 
 
5.5.5 Conclusion on consequences of cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
From the above discussions on consequences of cancellation, discharge and avoidance, for South 
Africa, England and the CISG, it has been shown that the effects of ending a contract are more or 
less the same. These consequences are release from obligations, restitution of what has already 
been performed, the right to calculate damages in an abstract way, and the duty to preserve the 
goods which survives the termination of the contract. However, a point of difference that needs 
to be highlighted is that South African law emphasizes mutual restitution while English law and 
the CISG emphasize damages. In addition another point of major difference in the three legal 
systems is that in the CISG jurisdiction, arbitration clauses remain in force despite any valid 
declaration of avoidance. In contrast, under English Law the contract will not come to an end due 
to a wrongful repudiation or fundamental breach but will result in new obligations that have to be 
fulfilled. 
5.6 Evaluation of cancellation, discharge and avoidance as a remedy for breach 
5. 6.1Introduction 
The fourth question of the study required critical comparison and evaluation of the effectiveness 
and applicability of the concepts of cancellation, discharge and avoidance in terminating 
contracts. The question was: 
To what extent does a critical comparison and evaluation of the similarities or 
difference in the concepts of cancellation, discharge and avoidance construct and 
                                                          
770 Schlectriem and Schwenzer  Commentary 104-5. 
771 Schlectriem and Schwenzer  Commentary 106-7. 
772 Mazzotta Articles78/84  490-499. 
773 Kroll, Mistellis Viscasillas  Article 85-86  1152-1155.  
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manifest their explanatory potential as remedy of breach in South Africa, England 
and the CISG? 
In response to this question, the study found out that there are key similarities and crucial 
differences in the ways the concepts cancellation, discharge and avoidance are interpreted and 
applied in South Africa, England and the CISG. 
5.6.2. Critical Evaluation of cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
The similarities central or basic to cancellation, discharge and avoidance are that the terms are 
used as analogous to termination of a contract due to breach in South Africa, England and the 
CISG. In the three legal systems contractual obligations come to an abrupt end, and termination 
of primary obligations gives birth to secondary obligations to pay damages. Notice of intention 
to terminate a contract is a crucial requirement for all the three systems. The three legal systems 
are similar also in that they distinguish between fundamental/material breach and non-
fundamental or non-material breach. The significance of these facts of the similarities determines 
the life or death of a contract.  
However, there are crucial differences to the interpretation and application of the terms, 
cancellation, discharge and avoidance. Firstly, the three systems use different technical terms to 
mean termination. Secondly, South Africa uses the terms materiality, notice of cancellation and 
mutual restitution whereas England uses fundamental or repudiatory breach, election, affirmation 
and termination while the CISG fundamental or a material breach, notice for avoidance, and 
Nachfrist period.  
 
Thirdly, English law is different from South African law and the CISG that seem reluctant to 
grant the remedy of cancellation and avoidance. This is because the two systems emphasize the 
preservation of the enforceability of the contract and therefore are strict in their application of the 
requirements of cancellation and avoidance. However, under the CISG fundamental breach rests 
on three pillars which are detriment, substantial deprivation and foreseeability. This is unlike 
South African law that limits its definition to materiality and fundamental breach and England 
that simply describes its term as fundamental breach. This difference is significant in that it 
reveals the flexibility of the terms used by the CISG.  
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Fourthly, the CISG calls for the Nachfrist period under Article 63 and 64. Placing Nachfrist 
under recognizable articles, allows the CISG to elaborate on the requirements of Nachfrist. The 
fact that the CISG is published means it is an official and identifiable document that would be 
widely accessible in different countries, and printed in different languages. This allows 
systematic reflection should lawmakers want to change or amend certain aspects of the articles. 
A published document is binding and can avoid or lessen differences of interpretation and refers 
researchers to articles that elaborate on notice and election to avoid.  
Although South Africa places the guilty party in mora under late performance, there is need for a 
document that spells out the provisions in different articles. A published document for South 
Africa would be easy for referencing, intellectual reflection, may allow lawmakers to make 
amendments whenever conflicting ideas appear.  Articles relating to notice might save time when 
researching because they are written and found in specific articles of the CISG. A published 
document directs researchers to specific sections or articles which would unambiguously state 
the need to separate giving notice from the process of exercising the choice to elect to avoid.  It 
is advisable for South Africa to also follow the example provided by CISG to have a 
considerably detailed published document on sales law. 
 England uses estoppel to prevent the guilty party from performing on notice and election to 
discharge. In English law, where time is not of the essence, a decree of specific performance is 
granted.  South Africa only emphasizes where time is of essence. It is therefore, advisable that 
South Africa consider cases where time is not of essence. The advantage is that this would 
address the problem where a party whose untimely performance amounts to a breach of warranty 
may obtain specific performance in some cases, even though such a remedy is by no means 
available in all situations.  
 
The CISG uses article 26 for notification, unlike England which uses the SGA  section 15. But 
the CISG and South Africa state that the time factor for giving notice should be reasonable, even 
though the CISG does not state the degree of reasonableness and therefore, it appears to be 
flexible. However, the CISG and South Africa allow the seller to cure it’s breach, unlike England 
that does not give a long time because it is inclined to favoring discharge. It is preferable for 
South Africa to develop its sales law along the lines of the CISG and England because of their 
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relative flexibility that anticipate changes in international sales law. The CISG has a plethora of 
articles in part ll and lll of the Vienna Convention. These articles allow flexibility of 
interpretation, and the provisions in the articles allow for checks and balances within the CISG. 
South Africa needs to follow the CISG in having uniform sales law with detailed regulations that 
govern sale of goods. This can lead to a more liberal interpretation of the principles and 
regulations on cancellation. A further difference is that England is governed by the SGA of 1979 
and has a number of terms to mean termination. This allows it to offer the remedy of discharge 
more readily. 
5.6.3 Conclusion to evaluation of cancellation, discharge and avoidance 
From the critical observations made above on differences, South Africa lags behind England and 
the CISG in possessing flexible and sophisticated articles and nuanced provisions in its laws of 
sale of goods. This tends to limits interpretation awarded to legal practitioners and traders.  
 
5.7 Conclusion to the chapter 
The aim of this chapter was to offer critical comparative analysis and evaluations of the choice of 
the terms, general principles, requirements and consequences of cancellation, discharge and 
avoidance under South Africa, England and the CISG, respectively. The chapter used the 
questions of the study to guide the analysis in order to give structure and clarify the argument of 
the study, in a manner that avoids repetition of information in the presentation of the argument. 
From the exposition above, it is clear that cancellation, discharge and avoidance are remedies in 
South Africa, England and the CISG respectively. The chapter argued that under South Africa, 
cancellation is an extraordinary remedy. In England discharge is a right and under the CISG 
avoidance is a remedy of last resort. The chapter found out that there are similarities and crucial 
differences key to the way cancellation, discharge and avoidance are interpreted and applied as 
remedies to breach of contract.  
 
The main similarities are that cancellation, discharge and avoidance are used as analogous to 
termination of a contract due to breach in South Africa, England and the CISG respectively. 
Notice of intention to terminate a contract is a crucial requirement for all the three legal systems. 
In the three legal systems contractual obligations come to an abrupt end but this termination of 
primary obligations gives birth to secondary obligations to pay damages. The three systems are 
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similar also in that they distinguish between fundamental/material breach and non-fundamental 
or non-material breach. The significance of these distinctions is that they determine the life or 
death of a contract.  
 
However, there are also major differences in the interpretation and application of the terms 
cancellation, discharge and avoidance under South Africa, England and the CISG respectively. It 
was highlighted that the three systems use different technical terms to mean termination. South 
Africa uses the terms materiality, notice of cancellation and mutual restitution whereas England 
uses fundamental or repudiatory breach, election, affirmation and termination. The CISG uses 
the terms fundamental or a material breach, notice for avoidance, Nachfrist period, and damages. 
It was also revealed that unlike England, South Africa and the CISG seem reluctant to grant the 
remedy of cancellation and avoidance respectively. This is because the two systems emphasize 
the preservation of the enforceability of the contract and therefore are strict in their application of 
the requirements of cancellation and avoidance. It was shown further that under the CISG 
fundamental breach rests detriment, substantial deprivation and foreseeability. This is unlike 
South Africa that limits its definition to materiality and fundamental breach. England merely 
describes her term as fundamental breach. This difference is significant in that it reveals the 
flexibility of the terms used by the CISG.  
 
The CISG calls for the Nachfrist period while South Africa places the guilty party in mora under 
late performance. England uses estoppel to prevent the guilty party from performing. CISG uses 
article 26 for notification, unlike the SGA which uses section 15. The CISG and South Africa 
state that the time factor for giving notice should be reasonable. However, the CISG does not 
state the degree of reasonableness. This ‘omission’ of not state the degree of reasonableness 
might appear as flexible or inflexible depending on the cases that are being interpreted in 
domestic and international contexts. Both the CISG and South Africa allow the seller to cure it’s 
breach, unlike England that does not give a long time because it is inclined to favoring discharge.   
Furthermore, the CISG has a plethora of articles in part ll and lll of the Vienna Convention. 
These articles allow flexibility of interpretation, and the provisions in the articles allow for 
checks and balances within the CISG. South Africa does not have a uniform sales law but has a 
number of regulations that govern sale of goods. This can lead to limited interpretation of the 
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principles and regulations on cancellation. England is governed by the SGA of 1979 and has a 
number of terms to mean termination. This allows it to offer the remedy of discharge more 
readily. 
To conclude this study, it can safely be suggested that the critical analyses of the terms of ending 
a contract and sale of goods law on South Africa, in chapter two, revealed that in some important 
respects, the country has sound laws on sale of goods that have allowed the country to be an 
economic giant that it is today in Africa. South Africa has over the years developed terms such as 
cancellation to describe termination of contracts, defined different kinds of breach, put in place 
requirements for cancellation and suggested different forms of remedy due to breach of contract. 
To the extent that this economic arrangement based on the existing sale of goods laws- , whether 
written but not well elaborated or unwritten - has allowed South Africa to do trade with countries 
in Africa and the international world, it has been argued in this study that the term cancellation 
and sale of goods laws are satisfactory.  
But the study has argued that to say that South African terms that denote termination of contract 
and sale of goods laws are satisfactory invites one to suggest that the country could develop new 
terms and better laws. This view was supported by the comparative nature of the study which 
revealed that in some many ways, English laws and the CISG have better terms for termination 
and laws that are more accommodative or responsive to the ever-changing international business 
and its transforming sale of goods laws. South African terms of terminating a contract and sale of 
goods law can adopt and adapt some progressive international terms and sale of goods laws from 
other countries or trade blocs. This means South Africa should consider acceding to the CISG. 
This suggestion is dictated by the fact that international trade is expanding and that South Africa 
is part of a global system called capitalism which thrives on innovation and change in terms and 
sale of goods laws. Therefore, new terms and a new sale of goods legislation built on some of the 
country’s existing robust laws can be introduced carefully to enhance economic growth, and the 
development of the country. In the ever-changing global economic sphere, countries like South 
Africa find themselves willingly entering into new and complicated trade partnerships such as is 
demonstrated by the inclusion of the country into BRICS. This reality suggests that in order to 
keep abreast with fast changing domestic and international terms of ending a contract and the 
sale of goods law, South Africa should participate actively by sitting at various international 
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tables were new terms and sale of goods laws are constantly being re-created and modified to 
benefit countries that have entered into different trade blocs. 
One possible way or direction of changing the terms of terminating a contract and sale of goods 
law for South Africa in order to fully exploit its trade potential is to carefully consider joining the 
CISG, and also adopt some superior terms of ending a contract and sale of goods laws. This view 
does not ignore the fact that South Africa belongs to a different legal family and bears strong 
civil law influence. The idea behind this recommendation is that common law should be adapted 
to include some of the solutions discussed on English and the CISG that are superior. The 
English law can be used to improve the domestic sales which will still be applicable even if the 
CISG is adopted as it only applies to international sales. The argument here is that, any adoption 
of sales laws from other legal systems that can enhance South African sales law should be 
considered necessary. While adopting the CISG will not automatically change the domestic law, 
this is a different solution. Thus, the rationale of adopting a comparative approach in the study of 
English, South Africa and the CISG sales would be validated further in identifying best practices 
and in seeking ways of incorporating superior laws to change South African terms of ending a 
contract and the sale laws. While this process can be externally induced, there is nothing that can 
prevent South Africa to initiate change of terms of ending a contract from reconsidering or 
rethinking its own system of sale of goods. A starting point would be for South Africa to move 
away from a fragmented sales law system towards codifying its legal system so that the sales 
laws are accessed in one document. This will assist legal researchers to consolidate, and deepen 
the interpretation of these laws through revision, adding and amending the sales law. The 
economic and political will to change terminology of ending a contract and the sale of goods law 
that is internally induced impacts on the meanings of the terms denoting termination. This can do 
away with the red-tape that prevents South Africans from moving away from constricting terms 
and maximizing sale of goods amongst its people in the country.  
Since 1994, South Africa has been positively opening its economic doors to African countries to 
do trade and that reality creates an imperative for South Africa to update, modify and introduce 
new terminology for ending contract and new legislation on sale of goods laws that should 
benefit the country and the continent. Furthermore a willing desire to change and improve on 
South Africa’s sale of goods law can benefit South Africa’s project of modernization in such a 
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way that South Africa’s potential to become an international economic giant is not exploited by 
other countries. In short, from the findings of the comparative analysis of terminologies of 
ending contracts and sale of goods law of South Africa, England and the CISG, it emerged that 
South Africa seems to lag behind in innovating with terms of ending contract and creating new 
sale of goods laws. The need to change South African terminology of termination cannot happen 
outside the desired change in some aspects of the sale of goods and this cannot be 
overemphasized. These changes in the terminology of ending contracts and that sale of laws are 
overdue. 
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